C. La experiencia de fomento productivo en regiones:
XI. Conclusiones
While analysing al‐Suri’s work enables a comparison between al‐Suri’s thinking and
AQI, analysing Naji’s enables a comparison of Naji’s strategic thought and IS. Also
structured according to the analytical framework, that comparison contributes
similarly to answering the paper’s research questions. The comparison works by
comparing the results of the analysis of Naji’s thinking to empirical data concerning
IS’s insurgency, and establishing whether IS’s exhibited organisational phenomena,
operational phenomena, and lifecycle stages accorded or varied with Naji’s
guidance. This shows that despite indications of IS members’ familiarity with Naji’s
writings,216 IS ultimately organised and developed in a manner varying substantially
from Naji’s dicta, and operated only in limited accordance.
Like those from the preceding chapter, that comparison’s results serve two
purposes: demonstrating variance between Naji’s strategic thought and IS, and
enabling the fifth chapter’s analysis which addresses the paper’s second research
question.
4.2: Comparing IS and Naji’s Thinking
Comparing the results of the analysis of Naji’s thinking to data concerning IS shows
that IS’s insurgency occurred at considerable variance with Naji’s dicta, despite IS
members’ familiarity with Naji’s writings. While not establishing the juncture and
cause of divergence from Naji’s thinking, that comparison—structured in line with
the analytical framework—demonstrates that IS’s organisation and development
mostly varied from Naji’s dicta, while its operations were in only limited
accordance.
The comparison first establishes that IS organised in a manner mostly diverging
from Naji’s thinking. Variance occurred in three categories of observable
organisational phenomena. First, despite Naji’s warning to limit their influence, pre‐
conflict social networks held significant sway over IS’s behaviour. Former officials
from the pre‐war Ba’athist government comprised one network; while not affecting
IS’s ideological programme, they influenced IS’s operational behaviour, increasing
its combat effectiveness.217 IS‐aligned tribes were another, albeit looser, network.
While IS needed them to assert territorial control, ideological and social differences
prevented tribes’ complete integration into IS.218 Consequently, tribal fighters
sometimes operated with separate priorities, enmeshing IS into local conflicts.219
While neither pre‐conflict network altered IS’s ideological platform, they affected its
operational behaviour, thus indicating their influence upon IS, contradicting Naji’s
recommendation.
Second, while Naji advocated strong horizontal ties, IS’s lack of operational
cohesion indicated weak ones. IS commanders maintained strategic cohesion: in
2013 and 2014, groups of IS personnel converged upon locales like Mosul, Ramadi,
and Fallujah,220 operated with broad geospatial spread across central and Northern
Iraq,221 and undertook “campaigns” like the waves of bombings in 2012 and
2013.222 Commanders were not operationally cohesive, however. The
aforementioned bombing campaigns were more consistent with prior centralised
planning than middle‐level collaboration,223 and coordinated attacks were abnormal
217 Ronen Zeidel, "The Dawa’ish: A Collective Profile of IS Commanders," Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 4 (2017): 20‐21; Craig Whiteside, "A Pedigree of Terror: The Myth of the Ba’athist Influence in the Islamic State Movement," Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 3 (2017): 13.
218 Richard Barrett, The Islamic State, (New York: The Soufan Group, 2014). 19‐21.
219 Michael Knights and Alexander Mello, "The Cult of The Offensive: The Islamic State on Defense,"
CTC Sentinel 8, no. 4 (2015): 2.
220 Paul Kamolnick, The Al‐Qaeda Organization and The Islamic State Organization, (West Point: US Army War College Press, 2017). 194‐95.
221 Chicago Project on Security & Threats CPOST, "Data From CPOST, Islamic State, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and Islamic State of Iraq Attacks, 2011 & 2016," (2018).
222 Jessica Lewis, "Al‐Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I," Middle East
Security Report, September 2013 (2013). 13‐16.
in GTD data.224 IS’s operational commanders also operated independently while IS‐
aligned tribal fighters worked according to separate priorities,225 causing “disjointed
and localized” operational behaviour;226 while IS’s defensive operations relied more
upon preparation than coordination.227 Despite its strategic cohesion, IS’s
operational behaviour belied strong horizontal ties of the sort Naji advocated.
Third, although Naji endorsed constructive engagement with non‐adversary third
parties, IS’s relations with non‐adversary third parties in Iraq were belligerent and
uncompromising. IS’s conduct between 2011 and 2013 reflected this. The
insurgency violently pressured tribal actors in that period, integrating some by
exploiting the Iraqi government’s failure to provide security, and attacking those
which had resisted AQI.228 Even when not hostile, IS was unaccommodating—with
the Islamic Army of Iraq, Ansar al‐Sunnah, the 1920s Revolution Brigades, and
others, it cultivated relationships via shared interests rather than compromise.229
The alienation of third parties, particularly as incentives to tolerate IS’s behaviour
lessened in and after 2014, also indicated this inflexible attitude towards third
parties. Lacking close bonds to incentivise ongoing relationships, other groups
distanced themselves entirely from IS or maintained only discreet relations, to avoid
being targeted by increasingly‐capable security forces.230 Similarly, tribes turned
224 UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017,"
225 Daveed Gartenstein‐Ross and Sterling Jensen, "The Role of Iraqi Tribes After the Islamic State's Ascendance," Military Review 95, no. 4 (2015): 108‐09.
226 Thomas Maurer, "ISIS’s Warfare Functions: A Systematized Review of a Proto‐state’s Conventional Conduct of Combat Operations," Small Wars & Insurgencies 29, no. 2 (2018): 232.
227 Michael Knights and Alexander Mello, "Defeat by Annihilation: Mobility and Attrition in the Islamic State's Defense of Mosul," CTC Sentinel 10, no. 4 (2017): 2‐4; Andrea Beccaro, "Modern Irregular Warfare: The ISIS Case Study," Small Wars & Insurgencies 29, no. 2 (2018): 218.
228 Gartenstein‐Ross and Jensen, 102‐03, 05‐06.
229 Fishman, The Master Plan, 183; Aymenn Jawad Al‐Tamimi, "Islamic Army of Iraq Interview,"
Aymenn Jawad al‐Tamimi's Blog, 04/09/2014 (2014).
230 Sinan Adnan and Aaron Reese, Beyond The Islamic State: Iraq's Second Sunni Insurgency, (Online: ISW, 2014). 15‐16, 18; Al‐Tamimi.
against IS,231 or signalled their intent to do so when able.232 That backlash further
evinced the character of IS’s relations with other actors—rather than co‐opting
them and accommodating their interests like Naji recommended, IS’s relations with
non‐adversary third parties were hostile and uncompromising. This, alongside pre‐
conflict social networks’ influence and the weakness of horizontal ties, indicated
variance between IS’s organisation and Naji’s thinking.
Organisational variance was not complete, however. Accordance appeared in two
of five areas. First, IS reflected Naji’s endorsement of purposeful growth—
circumstances permitting—by expanding purposefully in response to operational
requirements. From 2011 to 2013, IS grew cautiously in response to specific
challenges. Prison breaks enabled the recruitment of experienced jihadis, expanding
IS’s initially‐small workforce;233 while engagement with tribes allowed IS to assert
and maintain territorial control.234 This growth hastened in 2014, as IS’s “state”
created greater manpower requirements.235 To satisfy those requirements, IS
courted Iraqi Sunnis by leveraging political anxieties and attacking objectors,236 and
invited foreign personnel to fill military and non‐military roles.237 After late 2014,
however, growth slowed. Military failures hampered recruitment within IS’s
territory and caused unsustainable personnel turnover, while the closure of
smuggling routes reduced the flow of foreign personnel, and IS’s worsening
231 Anthony Cordesman and Sam Khazai, Shaping Iraq's Security Forces, (Online: CSIS, 2014). 54‐56. 232 Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel, "A Marriage of Convenience: The Many Faces of Iraq's Sunni Insurgency,"
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 12, no. 15 (2014): 4‐5.
233 Al‐Sumaria News, "ﺎﻫﺭﺻﺎﻧﻋ ﻥﻣ ﺔﺳﻣﺧ ﻝﺗﻘﻣﺑ ﻑﺭﺗﻌﺗﻭ ﺕﻳﺭﻛﺗ ﻥﺟﺳ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻡﻭﺟﻬﻟﺍ ﻰﻧﺑﺗﺗ ﺓﺩﻋﺎﻘﻟﺍ/al‐Qa'ida Mounts Attacks Upon Tikrit Prison and Acknowledges the Killing of Five of Its Members," Al‐Sumaria News, 12/10/2012 (2012); US Department of State, Iraq 2013 Human Rights Report, (Online: US Department of State, 2014). 9.
234 Muhammad Al‐'Ubaydi et al., The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State, (West Point: CTC, 2014). 25; International Crisis Group ICG, Iraq: Falluja's Faustian Bargain, (Online: ICG, 2014). 7.
235 Fishman, The Master Plan, 203‐05.
236 Gartenstein‐Ross and Jensen, 107‐09; Mohammed Tawfeeq and Chelsea Carter, "Officials: ISIS Recruting on the Rise in Sunni Areas of Iraq," CNN, 11/08/2014 (2014).
237 Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler, The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look At The Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail, (West Point: CTC, 2016). 1, 18, 28.
circumstances precipitated desertions.238 While IS’s behaviour between 2011 and
late 2014 indicated an initial desire for purposeful growth of the sort advocated by
Naji, changing circumstances ultimately curbed that ambition.
Second, IS accorded with Naji’s endorsement of the formation of auxiliaries. Those
auxiliaries existed within two classes. The first supported military operations and
was continuously present. It conducted information operations,239 supported IS’s
administration and logistics,240 facilitated attacks in the territories of third‐party
adversaries like Belgium and France,241 or generated funds through criminality or
collaboration with criminal networks.242 The second class managed IS’s “state” by
performing law and order, regime security,243 civil service, and public works
functions,244 although it shrunk over time amidst military losses, financial pressures,
and mismanagement, however.245 Shrinkage notwithstanding, they—alongside
personnel supporting military operations—constituted an auxiliary within IS. But
despite IS’s development of auxiliaries and purposeful growth, most organisational
phenomena exhibited by IS varied from Naji’s guidance.
At the same time, IS exhibited operational phenomena which were in only limited
accordance with Naji’s thinking. Across six categories, accordance occurred in three.
First, as Naji advocated coercive relations with the population, IS asserted control
238 Colin Clarke et al., Financial Futures of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017), 19‐20; Knights and Mello, 4‐5.
239 Daniel Milton, Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts, (West Point: CTC, 2016). 15‐19.
240 Lynn Davis, Jeffrey Martini, and Kim Cragin, "A Strategy to Counter ISIL as a Transregional Threat,"
RAND Perspectives, 2017 (2017). 16.
241 Anne Speckhard and Ahmet Yayla, "The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s Intelligence Apparatus," Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 1 (2017): 11‐13.
242 Vaughan Phillips, "The Islamic State's Strategy: Bureaucratizing the Apocalypse through Strategic Communications," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 9 (2017): 732‐33.
243 Carl Anthony Wege, "The Changing Islamic State Intelligence Apparatus," International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 31, no. 2 (2018): 273‐76.
244 Eric Robinson et al., When the Islamic State Comes to Town: The Economic Impact of Islamic State
Governance in Iraq and Syria (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017), 78‐79; Seth Jones et al., Rolling Back the Islamic State (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017), 17.
245 Aymenn Jawad Al‐Tamimi, "A Caliphate Under Strain: The Documentary Evidence," CTC Sentinel 9, no. 4 (2016): 2‐4.
over political, social, and economic life within its territory. This was evident after IS
seized territory in late 2013 and 2014 and asserted control over significant
dimensions of life. To control political affairs, IS security personnel identified and
punished politically unhygienic materials, statements, or perceived sympathies.246
To regulate social life, the insurgency established guidelines concerning public and
private morality,247 banned “un‐Islamic” practices and products,248 and attacked
undesirable groups.249 IS also regulated economic affairs by imposing taxes,250 and
encroaching upon the cement, gas, oil, and other industries.251 That behaviour did
not necessarily indicate coercion—alone, it also resembled an intent to win support
by providing illiberal governance. Rather, the coercive nature of IS rule was
established by the use of kidnappings,252 executions,253 and corporal punishment to
secure it.254 It was the maintenance of such control via those methods which
indicated a coercive relationship with the population, reflecting Naji’s ideas.
Second, IS’s provocations and their polarising outcomes mirrored Naji’s guidance.
Between 2011 and June 2014, attacks aggravating pre‐existing sectarian tensions
indicated IS’s provocative intent. Following US withdrawal in December 2011, IS
frequently attacked the predominantly‐Shi’a security forces, anti‐AQI Sahwa militia
which Iraqi Sunnis had come to view as the Iraqi state’s partner,255 and Shi’a and
246 Speckhard and Yayla, 8‐9.
247 Rukmini Callimachi, "The ISIS Files," New York Times, 04/04/2018 (2018). 248 Robinson et al., 149.
249 Hassan, 3.
250 Jones et al., 65; Robinson et al., 10‐11. 251 Robinson et al., 12‐13; Phillips.
252 Erin Cunningham, "In Iraq, Islamic State Fighters Seize Sunni Tribesmen for Resisting Rule,"
Washington Post, 06/11/2014 (2014).
253 Iraq Body Count, "Iraq 2015: A Catastrophic Normal," Iraq Body Count "From the Numbers", 01/01/2016 (2016); Iraq Body Count, "Another Year of Relentless Violence in Iraq," Iraq Body Count "From the Numbers", 2017 (2017).
254 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights UNOCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30 September 2016, (Baghdad, Iraq: United Nations, 2016). 35.
255 Lewis. 10; International Crisis Group ICG, Make or Break: Iraq's Sunnis and the State, (Online: ICG, 2013). 11‐12.
Shi’a‐affiliated targets.256 Similarly telling was IS’s targeting of Sahwa‐linked tribes,
to signal that cooperation with IS was essential to other tribes’ survival.257 That
provocative intent was further evinced by the responses to such attacks. Iraq’s
government reinforced IS’s narratives of Sunni disenfranchisement by demonising
Sunnis and allowing Shi’a militias’ remobilisation,258 while tribes lost confidence in
the government’s willingness to protect them and increasingly tolerated IS’s
intrusions into their affairs.259 More broadly, sectarian violence intensified as Shi’a
militias and security forces attacked Sunni citizens, gatherings, and properties,260
while locals’ governing concern was the government’s response when IS announced
its presence in Fallujah in December 2013.261 Alongside IS’s provocative attacks
themselves, such reactions further indicated IS’s intent and action to provoke and
polarise, as Naji recommended.
Third, in keeping with Naji’s thinking, IS sought to disrupt and usurp government
functions, although the balance between disruption and usurpation shifted. IS
prioritised disruption between 2011 and 2013, targeting security force personnel
and recruits,262 intimidating former or suspected security personnel,263 and
targeting the government and essential services.264 While such attacks continued
until at least 2016,265 IS began usurping government functions in 2014 by assigning
256 Agencies, "Al‐Qaeda Claims Wave of Deadly Iraq Attacks," Al Jazeera, 22/03/2012 (2012); UMD‐ START, "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017".
257 Jessica Lewis, "AQI's "Soldier's Harvest" Campaign," ISW Backgrounders, 09/10/2013 (2013). 6. 258 ICG, Make or Break: Iraq's Sunnis and the State. i‐ii, 1.
259 Barrett. 41.
260 State, Iraq 2013 Human Rights Report. 2‐3; Michael Knights, "Iraq's Never‐Ending Security Crisis,"
BBC, 03/10/2013 (2013).
261 ICG, Iraq: Falluja's Faustian Bargain. 7‐8.
262 Rod Nordland, "Iraq Empties Mass Graves in Search for Cadets Killed by ISIS," New York Times, 08/04/2015 (2015).
263 Beccaro, 213; Mustafa Habib, "Why Aren't Anbar's Locals Fighting Extremists?," Niqash, 14/04/2016 (2016).
264 Jessica Lewis, "Al‐Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: Part II," Middle East Security Report, October 2013 (2013). 11; Anthony Cordesman and Sam Khazai, Iraq in Crisis, (Online: CSIS, 2014). 31‐32.
265 UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017".
personnel to security,266 civil administration, healthcare, education, and other
duties in its territory,267 and inviting foreigners with relevant expertise to that
territory.268 Such efforts were not necessarily effective—IS’s governance was
inept,269 and only of a competitive standard because expectations were low.270 But
success or failure notwithstanding, IS nevertheless exhibited an intent to disrupt
and later usurp government functions in Iraq. As with IS’s coercive treatment of the
population and its use of provocations, that intent was accordant with Naji’s
thinking on how insurgencies should organise.
But despite appearing across three categories of observable operational
phenomena, accordance was absent within three others. Outright variance
occurred twice. First, despite Naji’s endorsement of infiltrating and co‐opting the
government and security forces, IS attempted neither infiltration nor co‐optation,
remaining hostile towards Iraq’s government and favouring disruption over co‐
optation. Partly, this was evident in the number of attacks against the
government—between 2011 and 2016, IS conducted more than 1,700 attacks
against security forces and government targets.271 IS also killed some former or
suspected security or government personnel within its new territories, while
compelling others to resign and renounce government ties.272 Further, security
forces’ service of IS’s interests at specific junctures was not due to IS’s behaviour.
Security personnel deserted Mosul in 2014,273 but because of demoralisation,
266 Speckhard and Yayla, 6. 267 Phillips, 734‐35.
268 Islamic State IS, "Khilafah Declared," Dabiq 1 (2014): 11.
269 Al‐Tamimi, "A Caliphate Under Strain: The Documentary Evidence," 2‐4; Robinson et al., 184‐85. 270 Phillips, 735.
271 UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017".
272 Kamal Al‐Ayash, "Iraqi Policemen Who ‘Repented’ To Extremists, Not Allowed To Return Home,"
Niqash, 25/10/2016 (2016); S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, "Violence‐producing Dynamics of Fragile States: How State Fragility in Iraq Contributed to the Emergence of Islamic State," Terrorism and Political Violence (2018): 16.
273 Tallha Abdulrazaq and Gareth Stansfield, "The Enemy Within: ISIS and the Conquest of Mosul," The
equipment shortages, and incompetence.274 Similarly, security forces' failure to
thwart IS’s seizure of Fallujah in December 2013 resulted from demoralisation and
locals’ obstructive efforts.275 While occasional, apparent cooperation was consistent
with the co‐optation Naji recommended, a broader body of evidence indicated IS’s
ongoing hostility towards Iraq’s government and security forces, rather than an
intent to infiltrate or co‐opt them.
Second, although Naji recommended preserving territorial control, IS’s conduct
after August 2014 signalled an unwillingness to risk its organisational or
reputational survival to do so. In permissive circumstances,276 IS seized territory
between December 2013 and June 2014,277 and signalled an intent to maintain
control.278 But after the size of its territories peaked and Western intervention
began in late 2014,279 IS prioritised organisational and reputational survival over
territorial control—something reflected in its behaviour. IS attempted to defend
major cities after late 2014 amidst security force encirclement,280 but ultimately
resumed focusing upon guerrilla and terror operations—in the battle for Mosul’s
final weeks, for example, most IS attacks were comparatively small and outside that
city.281 IS’s rhetoric reflected this—it began counselling sympathisers outside Iraq to
operate in their own countries in late 2014,282 its propaganda increasingly
274 Mitch Prothero, "The Iraqi Army's Collapse," Jane's Defence Weekly, 24/07/2014 (2014). 275 ICG, Iraq: Falluja's Faustian Bargain. 6‐7.
276 Anthony Cordesman, Hitting Bottom: The Maliki Scorecard in Iraq, (Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2014). 2.
277 George Joffé, "The fateful phoenix: the revival of Al‐Qa’ida in Iraq," Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 1 (2016): 10‐11.
278 Islamic State IS, "From Hijrah to Khilafah," Dabiq, June‐July 2014 2014; Islamic State IS, "Remaining and Expanding," Dabiq 5 (2014).
279 Knights and Mello, 1.
280 Zana Gulmohammad, "Unseating the Caliphate: Contrasting the Challenges of Liberating Fallujah and Mosul," CTC Sentinel 9, no. 10 (2016): 17; Associated Press, "ISIS Organizing Bloody Mosul Withdrawal, Preparing for the Next Fight," Haaretz, 14/03/2017 (2017).
281 Hassan Hassan, "Insurgents Again: The Islamic State's Calculated Reversion to Attrition in the Syria‐ Iraq Border Region and Beyond," CTC Sentinel 10, no. 11 (2018): 4‐5; UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, al‐ Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017"; CPOST.
emphasised military operations rather than the “state” in 2015,283 and a senior IS