The turbulent times following the end of the First World War displayed that Japan rather than China had become the leading East-Asian power. The United States continued its China-policy, known as the “Open Door Policy”, which called for an international
agreement preventing an expensive naval race developing in East Asia, as well as protecting American interests in East Asia and the Pacific.113 It was vital for the United States to avoid being pushed out of China by the other treaty powers. Westad
accentuates that Japan's power and influence had increasingly grown in the region and had led to rivalry between Japan and the United States.114 Hence the Open Door Policy also emphasized that China should be kept open for trade on an equal basis for all nations.115 The United States arranged the Washington Naval Conference from 1921 to
111 Ibid. p 32
112 Mackerras, China in Transformation pp. 32-33
113 Spence, Jonathan D. 1999. The Search for Modern China (2nd ed.) USA: W. W Norton & Company p. 360
114 Westad, Restless Empire pp. 132-133
115 Spence, The Search for Modern China p. 230
His 350 Jens Tepstad 36 1922. The goal of the conference was to limit the naval arms race in Asia and to
determine the status of China.116
This conference resulted in the powers agreeing on several treaties, among which was the Eight-Power Resolution (officially known as: Extraterritoriality and Administration of Justice in China).117 The Eight-Power Resolution agreed on assembling a commission (known as the Commission on Extraterritoriality) to look into the legal jurisdiction
practiced in China, and to investigate if China was ready to have foreign extraterritoriality abolished.118 This treaty initiated the first move towards genuinely addressing the issues that surrounded foreign extraterritoriality in China. Even though similar promises had been given China earlier, for instance the vague pledge from the British Empire in the Mackay Treaty of 1902 to abolish extraterritoriality if China westernized its legal system;119 none had been as specific as this treaty.120 This makes the Eight-Power Resolution highly relevant for my research, not only because it addressed the state of extraterritoriality in China, but even more so since Norway at a later stage decided to adhere to it. I will address the Eight-Power Resolution in more detail after clarifying the historical context that was relevant to its making.
Japan´s rise to power and its increasing influence over China had triggered the “May Fourth Movement” of 1919. The movement started out as a protest-march organized by Chinese students to demonstrate against the treaty powers. This event also sparked student rallies in other significant Chinese cities such as Shanghai. The primary reason provoking the movement was the treaty following the aftermath of the First World War.
This treaty accepted Japan’s demand that all former German interests in China should be transferred to them. China had assumed being rewarded for having joined the allied countries in the war by having some foreign privileges reverted.121 The demands of the protesters were mainly to dismiss the pro-Japanese leadership; and the government
116 Spence, The Search for Modern China p. 360
117 I have shortened and simplified the name of the resolution known as: “Extraterritoriality and
Administration of Justice in China” to: "the Eight-Power Resolution" for the sake of simplicity in this thesis.
118 Library of Congress. Extraterritoriality and Administration of Justice in China. Signed at Washington December 10, 1921. Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office Accessed on: May 06. 2015 Accessible from:<http://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0329.pdf>
119 Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism p. 153
120 Wang, China's Unequal Treaties pp. 19-23
121 Westad, Restless Empire pp. 132-133
His 350 Jens Tepstad 37 decided to comply with their demands.122 The protests persuaded the Chinese
government to refusing to sign the Treaty of Versailles. Protests in China however, did not alter the decision of granting Japan the previous German holdings in China.123 Westad states that the major foreign powers by this clearly demonstrated how they believed that the principles of self-determination glorified during the First World War, were not applicable for the Chinese or other Non-Europeans, except for the already westernized Japanese.124
Another event sparkling anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese sentiments in China, was the
“twenty one demands” that Japan pressed upon China in 1915. These demands increased Japan’s control over Manchuria and over the Chinese economy. In doing so Japan violated the Open Door Policy. But the United States and Japan came to an agreement in 1917 in which the United States acknowledged Japan's special interest over Manchuria, known as the “Lansing-Ishi agreement”.125 The Washington Conference was a continuation of this initiative. Summarized, the treaties made at the Washington Conference were: “the Four-Power Treaty” (to reaffirmation of the status quo regarding the Pacific Islands), 126 “the Five-Power Treaty” (an arms control treaty that dealt with the naval arms race)127 and “the Nine-Power Treaty” (a reaffirmation of the Open Door Policy).128,129 However, it is the Eight-Power Resolution that is of most significance for this thesis since it dealt with extraterritoriality in China.
The Eight-Power Resolution was signed on the 10th of December 1921 during the
Washington Conference. This resolution addressed the status of foreign extraterritoriality in China. The treaty powers were Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal; while the remaining participants were the countries that also addressed the balance of power in
122 Mackerras, China in Transformation p. 40
123 Ibid. p. 41
124 Westad, Restless Empire p. 152
125 Ibid. p. 132
126 This treaty agreed to uphold the status quo in the Pacific. Britain, the U.S., Japan and France all agreed to respect the holdings of the other powers in the Pacific and not to seek further expansion there.
127 This treaty regulated the navies of the signatory powers - Britain, The U.S, Japan, France and Italy agreed to respectively limit their navies to a ratio of 5:5:3:1,75:1,75 ratio.
128 The signatory powers all agreed to respect the sovereignty of China. They also recognized the
Japanese control over Manchuria, but otherwise the treaty affirmed the principles of the Open Door Policy.
China also promised not to discriminate against any country seeking commerce there.
129 Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism p. 155
His 350 Jens Tepstad 38 East-Asia. These states were Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy.
The Resolution stated that the Signatory States had concluded to establish a
Commission to which every government should appoint one member, to inquire into the practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China.130 The treaty also declared that the
nonparticipating treaty powers that practiced extraterritorial rights in China, could accede to the resolution by notifying the government of the United States about their adherence to the said treaty.131 The newly established inquiry of foreign extraterritoriality caused some worried reactions within the foreign communities in China.
Another important circumstance surrounding the Washington Conference was how Chinese students who had been educated at Western Universities, had started to
question the powers' justification of their practice of extraterritoriality in China. Mackerras highlights that the new Chinese intellectuals being part of the May Fourth Movement, brought forward modern and progressive trends of knowledge to the country.132
Kayaoğlu shows how the first Chinese attempt to westernize its legal system occurred in 1904 through the establishment of the Law Codification Commission. This attempt was motivated by the British and American declarations that linked the abolition of
extraterritoriality to the Chinese institutionalization of state legislation.133 He also reveals how the Chinese in 1911 drafted a Civil Code based upon the Japanese Code; however, this code was never promulgated due to a strong conservative opposition from the
Chinese elite.134
Nevertheless, we will see in the upcoming chapter how these attempts of reform were used by the Chinese to push for the abolishment of extraterritoriality as well as how the treaty powers responded to this attempt. Since the focus of this thesis is to look into how and why Norway abolished its extraterritoriality in China, the main focus will be on the Norwegian response.
130 Library of Congress. Extraterritoriality and Administration of Justice in China. Accessed on: May 06.
2015 Accessible from:<http://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0329.pdf>
131 Ibid.
132 Mackerras, China in Transformation p. 42
133 Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism p. 163
134 Ibid. p. 163
His 350 Jens Tepstad 39
Chapter III
Responses to the Washington Naval Conference
3.1 Introduction
The First World War and its aftermath were to change foreign policies towards China.
The Washington Naval Conference was initiated exactly with the purpose of setting out a new policy dealing with security issues in Asia, and to determine China’s new “status” in particular. China was changing too. As an emerging modern nation state with features and characteristics that was reminiscent to the treaty powers, China was
interchangeably a player to be reckoned with on the international diplomatic scene. This chapter addresses how Norway responded to the Washington Naval Conference though its diplomatic channel. More precisely how the Norwegian diplomats in China argued for making Norway continue to support extraterritoriality because the Eight-Power
Resolution had declared to investigate the system’s practice. This adheres to the research question highlighted in chapter one since this debate is a vital part of the development that ultimately ended Norwegian extraterritoriality in China.
The aim of this chapter is thereby to examine how the responses sent by the Norwegian diplomats in China to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo reflected their views on the continuance of extraterritoriality. Extraterritoriality was something that all Norwegians in China benefitted from. Consequently I have decided to investigate the following sub-questions in this chapter: 1) how and why did the Norwegian diplomats respond to the Eight-Power Resolution? And: 2) how and why did the Norwegian diplomats attempt to influence their superiors in Norway to share their opinions on the continuing practice of extraterritoriality in China?
His 350 Jens Tepstad 40 In order to answer these questions properly I will first briefly address the different views on extraterritoriality, before exploring the contents of the Norwegian diplomats' letters.