In Chapter 3, the notions of there being non-physical domains of operations and non-physical effects of naval presence was mentioned. The immediate added
value of having a principle of control/denial of visibility is, as stated above, to encapsulate this non-physical dimension of naval operations. To refer back to the visibility triad, this dimension is about more than just the acquisition (or denial) of information. It also concerns itself with how that information is perceived and interpreted by human actors, and how those human actors might seek to control, influence or deny it to others424.
From a scholarly, conceptual perspective, history is awash with examples of naval power being used to achieve non-physical effects. Torrington's fleet-in-being in 1690 is an early and widely discussed case in works of naval strategy, where an English naval fleet, by its physical presence, has at times been accredited (whether rightly or wrongly) with creating a distinctly non-physical effect: a perception of threat in the minds of the French enemy, deterring from any attempt at a physical invasion of England425.
Hattendorf also points out numerous examples of naval operations which, depending upon the historian interpreting them, have at various times been argued to have produced non-physical effects. Such examples include a contested case from the Spanish-American War of 1898, where Colomb and Mahan had engaged in a debate over whether a Spanish fleet-in-being had deterred an American attack on Santiago de Cuba - Colomb had taken the position that it had, suggesting an instance of a physical naval presence producing a distinct, non-physical effect similar to the Torrington case426.
One of the more significant fleet-in-being examples Hattendorf provides comes from the American Revolutionary War years. In this particular instance, Britain found itself in a strategic situation where it was threatened by France and Spain. In 1779, with a combined Franco-Spanish fleet bound for the English Channel and many thousands of troops amassing in France for an amphibious attack on English soil, the inferior British Channel Fleet could not confront the enemy directly for fear of annihilation. However, through a combination of factors, the Franco-Spanish fleet was eventually frustrated. Among these was the overall aim adopted by the Channel Fleet, reflected in the writings of one Captain Richard Kempenfelt, captain of the fleet under 424 This is not limited to the maritime domain, but ultimately maritime strategy is not just about the use of the sea in isolation – it is about how the sea is used in pursuit of national goals, for, to paraphrase Corbett, humankind lives upon the land, not upon the sea.
425 Hattendorf, J. B., ‘The Idea of a “Fleet in Being”’, pp. 43-4; Till, G., Seapower, pp. 173-4. 426 Hattendorf, J. B., ‘The Idea of a “Fleet in Being”’, p. 45.
Admiral Hardy. Kempenfelt made it clear that the aim of the Channel Fleet was to only attempt actions against the enemy when circumstances were favourable, or, if circumstances were not favourable, to "hover" close by in order to convey the perception that any action would come at great cost427. In essence, part of the Channel
Fleet's aim was therefore to use physical assets to potentially create a non-physical effect; namely, the deterrence of the Franco-Spanish invasion fleet by engendering perceptions of threat and cost.
Hattendorf's examples, of course, are of the fleet-in-being principle. They are examples of naval forces being used to create non-physical, 'coercive' effects - ones that utilise a display of force to modify an adversary's behaviour in a negative way (denying actions rather than encouraging them). Naval power can, however, also be used to encourage non-physical effects that are not coercive in nature. Port visits and exercises in cooperative naval diplomacy fall under such a category. The case of US port visits to Georgia is one example; the presence of vessels such as the USS Vella Gulf, Mount Whitney and Laboon was intended, among other aims, to demonstrate American commitment to partners and security in the Black Sea region428. Part of the
US Navy’s objective during such visits, in summary, is to have a non-physical effect on regional actors’ perceptions of American commitment alongside other, operational goals such as increased interoperability.
By way of another set of examples, operations conducted by the PLAN have often been intended, among various goals, to enhance perceptions of the PRC and its commitment to peace, stability and partnership in the minds of regional actors. The HARMONIOUS MISSION cases, which have seen the hospital ship Peace Ark make medical and humanitarian visits to ports across the globe, are exercises in projecting images of soft power and commitments to peace as much as they are humanitarian missions429. Also relevant, however, are the operations of the Zheng He training ship,
which in 2012 circumnavigated the globe in a display of PLAN capability. Zheng He
has also made port visits to locations such as Pearl Harbour (in 2015) for dialogue with actors such as the US Navy. Such operations are designed with both non-physical and physical effects in mind. Zheng He’s circumnavigation of the globe in 2012 was a 427 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
428 US Naval Forces Europe-Africa/US 6th Fleet, ‘Mount Whitney Departs Batumi, Georgia’, last modified 18 October 2014, http://www.c6f.navy.mil/news/mount-whitney-departs-batumi-georgia; US Naval Forces Europe-Africa/US 6th Fleet, ‘USS Laboon Arrives in Georgia’, last modified 28 June 2015, http://www.c6f.navy.mil/news/uss-laboon-arrives-georgia.
means of demonstrating China’s advances in maritime capability, and influencing the perceptions other actors had of this capability. It is noteworthy that the PLAN chose
Zheng He for this role, given that the vessel is named after Admiral Zheng He, a Ming dynasty figure known for his expeditionary voyages in the 15th century. Zheng He's historical voyages were grand exercises in diplomacy, designed to be a statement of Chinese maritime power capable of deterring foes and impressing foreigners with a sense of awe430. In a similar vein, contemporary port visits such as the Pearl Harbour
visit have been exercises in diplomacy; except in these cases, they are opportunities for American and Chinese officers to focus upon building perceptions of trust and confidence431.
These examples show that navies can be used to produce non-physical, cognitive effects as much as they can physical ones. Yet, as Chapters 2 and 3 have shown, there is no single principle specifically devised with these non-physical effects in mind. Fleet-in-being, going by the definition set out in Chapter 2, is arguably the closest any traditional principle comes to encompassing the non-physical effects of naval power/presence. Even then, however, fleet-in-being alone cannot suffice for one key reason. Firstly, its definition used widely in this thesis focuses upon a particular non-physical effect: the creation of a perception in the mind of one actor regarding the capabilities of another, with the ultimate end of frustrating some action by the former against the latter.
Furthermore, there is no principle that specifically encompasses cognitive, cooperative effects of naval power/presence. These particular effects might be classed under the umbrella of ‘naval diplomacy’, but diplomacy is not a principle of maritime strategy; it is a general function of navies, alongside the military and constabulary roles. Various traditional principles of maritime strategy might arguably account for cognitive, cooperative effects of naval operations to very limited extents. Port visits intended to demonstrate commitment to allies and partners, such as the aforementioned cases of US Navy visits to Georgia, constitute a form of soft power projection as well as an instance of naval forces positioning forward. The conceptual problem with this, however, is that neither power projection nor forward positioning were conceived solely with cognitive effects in mind – indeed, it is debatable whether the underlying ideas were originally devised by traditional thinkers with cognitive 430 Williams, E. et al, China and the Sea.
431 Dexter, L., ‘Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy Ship Visits Pearl Harbour’, US Department of
effects in mind at all. Looking at the roots of the concept of power projection, for example, traditional writers say little to nothing about cognitive effects; instead, the concept’s primary focus was on the notion of projecting force ashore, into the heartlands of an adversary432. Similarly, the roots that underlie the principle of forward
positioning were laid by writers focusing on physical rather than cognitive effects433.
Finally, principles such as power projection and forward positioning, when used in reference to the cognitive effects of naval power, suffer from the same problem that afflicts fleet-in-being: when they are used in this way, they tend to refer to rather specific types of cognitive effect.
From a conceptual, scholarly perspective, then, a principle of control/denial of visibility is therefore useful as it makes up for the shortcomings of traditional principles. It is useful as a means of categorising the broad spectrum of cognisant effects of naval power, unlike the traditional principles, which only account for such effects in limited and/or specific ways.