Conclusiones sobre los instrumentos sectoriales de planificación y acciones

27 Phil 374 (March 28, 1914)

Facts: J.H. Chapman visited a man by the name of Creveling, in front of whose house the accident occurred. Chapman wanted to board a certain

"San Marcelino" single-track street-car coming from Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by Creveling that the car was approaching, he hurriedly, passed from the gate of Creveling’s home into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the rear platform. Chapman attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come within reach for him to board. While in this position, he was struck from behind and run over by Underwood’s automobile.

Immediately prior to the incident, Underwood’s automobile, which was being driven by his chauffeur, followed behind a street car from Manila bound to Santa Ana (Opposite direction of the “San Marcelino” street-car that Chapman wanted to board). Just before reaching the scene of the accident, the street car being followed by Underwood took the switched off the main line to the left. Thereupon, Underwood’s automobile no longer followed that street-car nor went to the left, but either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. The street-car which the Chapman intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car (the one which plaintiff attempted to board) was almost in front of Underwood’s automobile, the latter’s driver suddenly went to the right striking and running over Chapman.

The trial court rendered decision in favor of the defendant.

Issue: Is defendant liable in the case at bar?

Held: A careful examination of the record leads to the conclusion that the Underwood’s driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an incoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff, out to board the car, was not obliged to observe whether a car was coming upon him from his left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that, according to the law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car.

Underwood, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the facts and circumstances of this case. As stated in the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within the list of persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up to Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.

In this case, it DOES NOT appear that, from the time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.

Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai

G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968

Facts: On March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village, Marcial Caedo was driving his Mercury car. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque home to

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Basconcillo • Batungbacal • Base • Buenaventura • Clareza •Daganta •David •Escucha •Lingao •Llave• Lucaylucay•Malvar •Mangrobang• Porquez • Quesada • Rigor • Rosal • Salud Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly

moderate speeds, their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance.

Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.

Bernardo tried to overtake the carretela, instead of slowing down or stopping behind the carretela until the lane was clear. Its rear bumper caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose, and the car skidded to the other lane. Caedo tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful.

Caedo and his family members were injured. They filed a suit for recovery of damages from the defendants. The CFI Rizal rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo.

ISSUE: Is Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, solidarily liable with the driver?

HELD: No. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code:

ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten

years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master.

The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another.

Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.

Felina Rodriguez-Luna vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-62988 (February 28, 1985)

Facts: Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision took place on January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license.

Luna's heirs brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father, Jose dela Rosa at the CFI Manila. The dela Rosas were sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship, with legal interest from the date of this decision; plus attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00, and the costs of suit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosa, the CA reduced the unearned net earnings to P450,000.00.

ISSUES: (1) Did the court err in reducing the amount of unearned income? (2)

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Should the award for attorney's fees have legal interest?

HELD: (1)The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the deceased Roberto R. Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his annual net income was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses. The CA sustained the trial court's conclusion with respect to Luna’s life expectancy of 30 years and his annual income and expense.

In reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 years, the CA said that his habit and manner of life should be taken into account, i.e. that he had been engaged in car racing as a sport both here and abroad - a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. That Luna had engaged in car racing is not based on any evidence on record. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedalled four wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to have disturbed the determination of the trial court which it had previously affirmed.

Similarly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual income of the deceased by increasing his annual personal expenses but without at the same time increasing his annual gross income. It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the

"escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing" [a statement which lacks complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof.

(2) Yes. The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (See Art. 2211, Civil Code.) As with the other damages awarded, the interest should accrue only from the date of the trial court's decision.

Vicarious liability of Parents

Exconde vs .Capuno

G.R. No. L-10134 (June 29, 1957)

Facts: Dante Capuno, the 15 year old minor son of Delfin Capuno and Boy Scout Organization member, attended a parade upon the instruction of the City school’s supervisor. Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and drove the same when it ran with the driver in his left. Shortly after, Dante sent the jeep tumbling, killing two of its passengers.

Issue: Whether or not the father is liable for the acts of his son in a parade?

Held: Yes. The civil liability imposed upon the father and mother for any damages that may be caused by the minor children is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them, which imposes upon parents the “duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means,” while, on the other hand, gives them the “right to correct and punish them in moderation.” The only way to relieve them is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family. This defendant failed to do.

Salen vs Balce

G.R.No. L-14414 (April 27 1960)

Facts: Gumersindo Balce, 14 years old, was convicted of homicide and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the amount of P2,000. The amount was not realized by the heirs after execution because Gumersido had no property in his name so they demanded the father of the minor to indemnify them.

Issue: Whether or not the father is liable for obligations arising from criminal acts?

Held: Yes. While the court agrees with the theory that, as a rule, the civil liability arising from a crime shall be governed by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, it disagrees with the contention that the subsidiary liability of persons for acts of those who are under their custody should likewise be governed by the same Code even in the absence of any provision governing the case, for that would leave the transgression of certain right without any punishment or sanction in the law. Such would be the case if we would uphold the theory of appellee as sustained by the trial court.

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Basconcillo • Batungbacal • Base • Buenaventura • Clareza •Daganta •David •Escucha •Lingao •Llave• Lucaylucay•Malvar •Mangrobang• Porquez • Quesada • Rigor • Rosal • Salud A minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from

criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides:

"The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who lived in their company."

To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.

FUELLAS v CADANO

G.R. No. 14409 (October 31, 1961)

Facts: Rico Fuellas took the pencil of one of his classmates. Pepito returned the pencil which angered Rico who then held Pepito’s neck and pushed him on the floor. Their teacher separated them and ordered them to go home.

Rico met Pepito outside and repeated what he did earlier which broke Pepito’s right arm. Rico was later convicted for intentional felony with discernment,and his father held subsidiarily liable for damages.

Issue: Whether or not the father is liable should his minor child act with discernment in a criminal offense?

Held: Yes. Since Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability in case a minor child acts with discernment and become criminally liable so the resort should be referring to the general law which is the Civil Code.

The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage

caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.

Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez

G.R. No. 34840 (September 23, 1931)

Facts: Bonifacio Gutierrez, the 18 y/o son of Manuel Gutierrez, was driving the family car with other family members overly speeding while approaching a bridge which caused an accident with a passenger bus injuring Narcisso Gutierrez (not related to Bonifacio and Manuel). It was later held that Bonifacio is incompetent to drive.

Issue: Is the father liable for the act of his son?

Held: Yes. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant.

Rodriguez-Luna v IAC

135 SCRA 241 (1985)

Facts: Luis dela Rosa, 13 years of age and without a driver’s license, at that time while driving a Toyota car negligently killed Roberto Luna who was driving a Go-Kart in a practice run. Later, Luis already became of age, married, with two children, and living in Madrid says that he has no properties so a writ of execution cannot be enforced against him.

Issue: May the father still be held liable despite the attainment of majority by his son at the time the decision was promulgated?

Held: Yes. Notwithstanding emancipation, he is still liable but as a matter of equity, the liability shall become merely subsidiary.

Cuadra vs. Monfort

35 SCRA 160 (1970)

Facts:Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13 years old, together

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with three other classmates were assigned to weed the grass in the school premises. Monfort pulled a prank to scare Cuadra by throwing a plastic headband at her face and making it appear that it was an earthworm.

Unfortunately, the headband hit Cuadra’s right eye, blinding the same.

Issue: Is the father liable for his daughter’s acts?

Held: No. In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.

On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused

On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused

In document PROGRAMA DE DOCTORADO EN PATRIMONIO TESIS DOCTORAL (página 188-200)