CONCLUSIONES INVESTIGADOR OBSERVADOR OBSERVADOR

Mellor acknowledges that while at any present moment there axe ‘many possible futures, there is only one possible past, the actual one’ (Mellor 1998: 20). Of course, he does not actually believe that there is such a thing as the present, since the present moment is an A-nioment, and he thinks only B-moments exist. So at any ^-moment, say, 5 PM on January 16, 2004, it is tme that thei*e are many possible fixtures (l elative

to that B-moment), but only one past (relative to that B-moment). In the same breath, however, Mellor wishes to maintain that at that B-moment there is only one actual future, ‘containing all and only the B-facts that will eventually be first present and then past’ {ibid). So ‘B-possibilities’ vary over time, even though B-facts do not. Are these claims consistent?^ Mellor thinks so. This is because, for him, the future’s being non-fixed and the past’s being fixed^ are not constituted by an asymmetry of

ontology, rather they are constituted by the unidirectionality of causation {ibid.\ 35). The latter is what deteimines both the direction of time and the modal asymmetry between past and future events. Mellor is quick to point out that this asymmetry does not depend upon, or hold between, events that actually instantiate pastness and

futurity; rather, it simply depends upon whether, at any B-moment t, events are earlier or later than t {ibid). If they ai e earlier, then at t they are fixed, if later, then at t they are non-fixed.

Setting aside, for the moment, the claim that the asymmetry of fixity is constituted by the unidirectionality of causation, what should we make of Mellor’s other claims? He believes it is consistent to claim that at t all events later than t are actual and existent, even though there also exist at t possible alternatives to those actual future events. But if there is only one series of actual events, and these exist eternally and tenselessly, then in what sense can there be other possibilities as of any time r? Consider two events, E\ and £"2, which occur at t\ and t2, respectively.

Regardless of where (when?) one’s current temporal experience is located on the timeline, E\ and E2 eternally exist and occur at ti and t2. Suppose that fa is present. friture cannot be tmtli apt. The latter claim is one that I should like to deny. See the Epilogue. ^ One should not think that, if there is any inconsistency, it must lie in his use of A-teims when he doesn’t believe that A-properties exist. He still thinks that A-temiinology is useful and, indeed, required, even tliough it does not refer to anything real. So when he uses these teims, one should understand tliat upon demand he could offer a consistent (if not altogether satisfying) paraphrase using only B-teniiinology.

^ Mellor does not actually refer to tlie asymmetry in terms of fixity, but in terms of the modal characterization (temporal necessity/possibility) that I have been offering the B-Theorist.

then clearly there is no sense in which E2 could (at ^3) fail to occur at t2. It already has

occurred! But what if ^ is present, how is it now the case that it is possible that E2 not

occur at ^2? Nothing has changed! Our location on the timeline does not change the

ontology of events in time. That ontology, according to the B-Theorist, is perfectly symmetiical with respect to past and future (or with respect to earlier than/later than the present moment).

Perhaps Mellor would claim that I am confusing actuality with necessity. The fixture is actual, but this does not mean that it is necessaiy. This reply would force me to aclmowledge that at t\ it is, in some sense, possible that E2 not occxxi* at t2. But it

seexus to me that the sense in which it is possible fails to do justice to our intuition that the fixture is non-fixed. It is only possible in the sense that there is some possible world in which the seiies of events in time is fixed diffexontly. And all this means is that in the actual world, though the fixture is not fixed necessarily, it is fixed

contingently.^’^ The past is also thus contingently fixed, and yet this fact does not give us any comfort when we find ouiselves legietting a past event. It is not as if someone could console us by saying, ‘Just because the past is actual, doesn’t mean it is necessary. Things might have gone diffexently.’ The appropriate I'cply would be, ‘But they didn’t! And the occurrence of that event is now inexorable.’ So, too, at t\ E fs occuiTence at t2 is inexorable, even z/there is a possible world in which E2 does

not occur at t2\ since, in this world, E2 is eternally at t2.

Although I believe the foregoing considerations cast doubt on Mellor’s ability to reconcile an actual and real fixtixre with a non-fixed one, they ai*e by no means conclusive. In the next section I will expand on them as well as consider possible B-

^ The contingency of the fixity I am refeiing to here should be read as broadly logical, not causal or deterministic, contingency.

^ This is the reason that I eschew the modal characterization of the asymmetry, since, if I am right, it is possible that the future be fixed in a way that thr eatens fatalism witlrout it being fixed—or fixed in just that way—in all possible worlds. See Chapter 3, Section IV and Conclusion.

Theoretic objections. In the mean time, this is a natuial point at which to return to Mellor’s claim that the asyimnetry of fixity is grounded in the unidirectionality of causation; since it is on the basis of this claim that Mellor thinks an actual future is possible in a way that the actual past is not. The idea is that even though there is no ontological difference between past and future events, there is an asymmetry in the direction of causation (from earlier to later), and this asymmetry results in a fixed past and non-fixed future {ibid). I will ai*gue in Chapter 2 that the presentist’s attempt to ground the asymmetry of fixity in the unidirectionality of causation cannot succeed. But the arguments I rely upon in that context assume an A-Theoretic account of causation—one according to which the direction of causation is gi ounded in the direction of time and objective temporal becoming. Clearly, however, arguments based on this account would not cany any weight against Mellor, since his account of causation is obviously jwt an A-Theoretic one. According to Mellor, causal order determines temporal order, not the other way around {ibid.: 106-8); so causation is the most fundamental aspect of time, not—for obvious reasons—temporal becoming. Nevertheless, in the present context, I am happy to allow Mellor’s views regarding the nature of causation; for if I can shed doubt, even upon these giounds, on his ability to account for the asymmetry of fixity, then so much the worse for the grounds.

One reason for dissatisfaction with Mellor’s attempt to base the asyimnetry of fixity on the fact that causes temporally precede their effects, is that it is not clear that that fact isn’t a mere manifestation of the asymmetry in question, as opposed to a detenninant of it. For Mellor, at any B-moment t, all events earlier than t are fixed, and some events later than t are non-fixed; and this is because nothing at or later than t could be a cause of anything earlier than t, whereas many things at or earlier than t can be causes of things later than t {ibid.: 35). But this is simply an observation about the nature of causation, and in no way explains what makes the past fixed and future

non-fixed. There is, of course, a sense in which this objection is unfair, since it seems to demand of the B-Theorist something she cannot offer; namely, an explanation of how past events acquire the property of fixity. This is unfair because B-Theorists do not think past events have any special properties in virtue of which they are past—all events ai e ontologically on a pai*. In spite of the unfairness of this demand, however, it is a natural one to make if one endorses a robust asymmetry of fixity. And once this point is aclaiowledged, one begins to wonder whether A-Theorists and B-Theorists are really agreeing, rather than equivocating, when they both affirm the non-fixity of the fiituie. We will return to this point later in the conclusion to the chapter.

Another reason for disputing Mellor’s account, is that he has not shown that an event tliat can be causally effected might not also be a fixed one. Consider an

example fiom fatalism. Suppose that I am able, at ^i, to cause E2 to occur at The

fact that I am able to do so, but am unable, at t2, to cause E\ not to have occurred at t\,

in no way implies that I was able, at ^i, to avoid causing E2 to occur at t2. In short, it

is perfectly conceivable that events which we are able to causally effect might, nevertheless, be fixed; since the intention to cause such events might be every bit as fixed as the effects themselves. In connection with this point, recall fi*om the

Introduction to the thesis the distinction between the Lazy Argument for fatalism and the traditional version. Here, in making the point that the unidirectionality of

causation does not mle out fatalism, I am appealing to the latter. That is, I am not appealing to the argument that says, for example, ‘Since it is fated that you will either be killed or not be killed tomonow, there is no point in taking precautions against being killed’; because this argument implies that our actions—though freely willed— are not efficacious. I am, rather, appealing to the argument that says, ‘Though your actions affect the future, they (the actions) ai*e fated and so aie not performed with autonomy.’ According to this version of fatalism, the effects of our future actions ai*e

fated not because of a breakdown in the causal process, but because that process itself—beginning with our deliberations and volitions, and ending with our actions and their effects—is fated. Thus, as long as I can get the B-Theorist to acknowledge the possibility of this type of fatalism, then my point—that an event caused by an agent might nevertheless be a fixed one—follows. If these arguments have any merit, then the mere fact that causes precede their effects cannot constitute the asymmetry of fixity; in which case, the B-Theorist cannot appeal to this fact in trying to account for the temporal possibility of the future.

So my line of ai'gument against Mellor and the B-Theorist is to claim that a real and actual futui e does threaten to underaiine the asymmetry of fixity, and that the unidirectionality of causation does not entail otherwise. Again, however, I wish to stress that these considerations aie merely suggestive, and that they will need to be reinforced in the next section. Before moving on to that section, we will first see what Tooley has to say in favor of a non-existmt future.