C. Obligaciones en materia de acceso a información
V. CONCLUSIONES
“The persistence of royal absolutism or more generally of a preindustrial bureaucratic rule into modern times has created conditions unfavorable to democracy of the Western variety.”
Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 1966 The Kremlin, from its external projections of imperial force in Georgia and Ukraine to its decentralization into regional absolutists loyal to Putin, is a reflection of its institutional past. While inferior to the efficient, profit-seeking open-access societies of the West, the Muscovite model has proved to be significantly more durable and sophisticated than expected. From 1440 to the present, regimes that may appear to be different on the surface are in fact strikingly similar to the original model.
Centuries ago, Muscovy emerged as an unlikely winner between principalities in the wake of Mongol control thanks to the political shrewdness of its rulers. The fledgling state thrived under institutions created in the dualism of Orthodoxy and its relationship to the Tartars. This paper identified several key aspects of the institutional system and the forces behind its emergence. One is Russia’s unique geographical setting in terms of both weather and security, which led to early adoption of communal social organization. As is consistent with Haber (2012), such social organization is not easily amenable to open and inclusive society. Rather, it is
susceptible to a centralized formation of extractive institutions. This deep historical legacy was reinforced and adapted at several key moments in history, such as during the rise of the
Bolsheviks, and continues to play a major role today in rejecting the Western conception of liberalism.
Additionally, the unifying influence and powerful secular institutional system the Mongol brought by force set Russia down a much different path from fragmented Europe. Rent
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the powerful Russian Empire long after the Golden Horde had vanished from the steppe. At the turn of the industrial age, however, this system struggled to adapt and eventually collapsed. The Soviet Elite that arose in its place took hold of similar extractive and authoritarian institutions. Their slight modifications to economic institutions allowed for adoption of some capitalist
efficiency, but did not result in real transition because they were offset by an even more intensely personal state in political life. Finally, conflict, divergence of Orthodoxy from the rest of
Christendom, and concentrated propaganda evolved over a significant amount of time into a powerful concept of Russian nationalism and rejection of influences deemed foreign rather than Russian.
This paper hopes to serve in the first place as a model for similar analysis of countries that often confound Western academics. In the second place, it raises broader policy
implications. Policymakers ought to be wary of failing to comprehend the institutional legacies of a country they might seek to influence because the everyday social dynamics of that country will naturally be tied up in its past. For Russia specifically, whose entire concept of reality is based on longevity —on rejecting and outlasting opponents— half-hearted external efforts to force change can only be expected to strengthen the Muscovite narrative.
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