CONCLUSIONES PERSONALES

The thesis of this present work is that the universe in which we live is not a universe of matter, but a universe o f motion, one in which the basic reality is motion, and all physical entities and phenomena, including matter, are merely manifestations of motion. The atom, on this basis, is simply a combination of motions. Radiation is motion, gravitation is motion, an electric charge is motion, and so on.

The concept of a universe of motion is by no means a new idea. As a theoretical proposition it has some very obvious merits that have commended it to thoughtful investigators from the very beginning of systematic science. Descartes’ idea that matter might be merely a series of vortexes in the ether is probably the best-known speculation of this nature, but other scientists and philosophers, including such prominent figures as Eddington and Hobbes, have devoted much time to a study of similar possibilities, and this activity is still continuing in a limited way.

But none of the previous attempts to use the concept of a universe of motion as the basis for physical theory has advanced much, if any, beyond the speculative stage. The reason why they failed to produce any significant results has now been disclosed by the findings of the investigation upon which this present work is based. The inability of previous investigators to achieve a successful application of the “motion” concept, we find, was due to the fact that they did not use this concept in its pure form. Instead, they invariably employed a hybrid structure which retained elements of the previously accepted “matter” concept. “ All things have but one universal cause, which is motion,” 19 says Hobbes. But the assertion that all things are caused by motion is something quite different from saying that they are motions. The simple concept of a universe of motion, without additions or modifications—the concept utilized in this present work—is that of a universe which is composed

entirely of motion.

The significant difference between these two viewpoints lies in the role that they assign to space and time. In a universe of matter it is necessary to have a background or setting in which the matter exists and undergoes physical processes, and it is assumed that space and

16 Nothing but Motion

time provide the necessary setting for physical action. Many differences of opinion have arisen with respect to the details, particularly with respect to space—whether or not space is absolute and immovable, whether such a thing as empty space is possible, whether or not space and time are interconnected, and so on—but throughout all of the development of thought on the subject the basic concept of space as a setting for the action of the universe has remained intact. As summarized by J. D. North:

Most people would accept the following: Space is that in which material objects are situated and through which they move. It is a background for objects of which it is independent. Any measure of the distances between objects within it may be regarded as a measure of the distances between its corresponding parts.20

Einstein is generally credited with having accomplished a profound alteration of the scientific viewpoint with respect to space, but what he actually did was merely to introduce some new ideas as to the kind

of a setting that exists. His “ space” is still a setting, not only for matter but also for the various “fields” that he envisions. A field, he says, is “ something physically real in the space around it.” 21 Physical events still take place in Einstein’s space just as they did in Newton’s space or in Democritus’ space.

Time has always been more elusive than space, and it has been extremely difficult to formulate any clear-cut concept of its essential nature. It has been taken for granted, however, that time, too, is part of the setting in which physical events take place; that is, physical phenomena exist in space and in time. On this basis it has been hard to specify just wherein time differs from space. In fact the distinction between the two has become increasingly blurred and uncertain in recent years, and as matters now stand, time is generally regarded as a sort of quasi-space, the boundary between space and time being indefinite and dependent upon the circumstances under which it is observed. The modern physicist has thus added another dimension to the spatial setting, and instead of visualizing physical phenomena as being located in three- dimensional space, he places them in a four-dimensional space-time setting.

In all of this ebb and flow of scientific thought the one unchanging element has been the concept of the setting. Space and time, as currently conceived, are the stage on which the drama of the universe unfolds—“ a vast world-room, a perfection of emptiness, within which all the world- show plays itself away forever.” 22

This view of the nature of space and time to which all have subscribed, scientist and layman alike, is pure assumption. No one, so far as the

history of science reveals, has ever made any systematic examination of the available evidence to determine whether or not the assumption is justified. Newton made no attempt to analyze the basic concepts. He tells us specifically, “ I do not define time, space, place and motion, as being well known to all. ” Later generations of scientists have challenged some of Newton’s conclusions, but they have brushed this question aside in an equally casual and carefree manner. Richard Tolman, for example, begins his discussion of relativity with this statement: “We shall assume without examination . . . the unidirectional, one-valued, one-dimensional character of the time continuum.” 23

Such an uncritical acceptance of an unsubstantiated assumption “ with­ out examination” is, of course, thoroughly unscientific, but it is quite understandable as a consequence of the basic concept of a universe of matter to which science has been committed. Matter, in such a universe, must have a setting in which to exist. Space and time are obviously the most logical candidates for this assignment. They cannot be examined directly. We cannot put time under a microscope, or subject space to a mathematical analysis by a computer. Nor does the definition of matter itself give us any clue as to the nature of space and time. The net effect of accepting the concept of a universe of matter has therefore been to force science into the position of having to take the appearances which space and time present to the casual observer as indications of the true nature of these entities.

In a universe of motion, one in which everything physical is a manifestation of motion, this uncertainty does not exist, as a specific definition of space and time is implicit in the definition of motion. It should be understood in this connection that the term “ motion,” as used herein, refers to motion as customarily defined for scientific and engineering purposes; that is, motion is a relation between space and time, and is measured as speed or velocity. In its simplest form, the “ equation of motion,” which expresses this definition in mathematical symbols, is v = s / t .

The definition as stated, the standard scientific definition, we may call it, is not the only way in which motion can be defined. But it is the only definition that has any relevance to the development in this work. The basic postulate of the work is that the physical universe is composed entirely of motion as thus defined. What we are undertaking to do is to describe the consequences that necessarily follow in a universe composed of this kind of motion. Whether or not one might prefer to define motion in some other way, and what the consequences of such a definition might be, has no bearing on the present undertaking.

Obviously, the equation of motion, which defines motion in terms of space and time, likewise defines space and time in terms of motion.

18 Nothing but Motion

It tells us that in motion space and time are the two reciprocal aspects of that motion, and nothing else. In a universe of matter, the fact that space and time have this significance in motion would not preclude them from having some other significance in a different connection, but when it is specified that motion is the sole constituent of the physical universe, space and time cairnot have any significance anywhere in that universe other than that which they have as aspects of motion. Under these circumstances, the equation of motion is a complete definition of the role of space and time in the physical universe. We thus arrive at the conclusion that space and time are simply the two reciprocal aspects o f motion and have no other significance.

On this basis, space is not the Euclidean container for physical phenomena that is most commonly visualized by the layman; neither is it the modified version of this concept which makes it subject to distortion by various forces and highly dependent on the location and movement of the observer, as seen by the modern physicist. In fact, it is not even a physical entity in its own right at all; it is simply and solely an aspect of motion. Time is not an order of succession, or a dimension of quasi-space, neither is it a physical entity in its own right. It, too, is simply and solely an aspect of motion, similar in all respects to space, except that it is the reciprocal aspect.

The simplest way of defining the status of space and time in a universe of motion is to say that space is the numerator in the expression s/ t ,

which is the speed or velocity, the measure of motion, and time is the denominator. If there is no fraction, there is no numerator or denominator; if there is no motion, there is no space or time. Space does not exist alone, nor does time exist alone; neither exists at all except in association with the other as motion. We can, of course, focus our attention on the space aspect and deal with it as if the time aspect, the denominator of the fraction, remains constant (or we can deal with time as if space remains constant). This is the familiar process known as abstraction, one of the useful tools of scientific inquiry. But any results obtained in this manner are valid only where the time (or space) aspect does, in fact, remain constant, or where the proper adjustment is made for whatever changes in this factor do take place.

The reason for the failure of previous efforts to construct a workable theory on the basis of the “motion” concept is now evident. Previous investigators have not realized that the “ setting” concept is a creature of the “matter” concept; that it exists only because that basic concept envisions material “ things” existing in a space-time setting. In attempting to construct a theoretical system on the basis of the concept of a universe of motion while still retaining the “ setting” concept of space and time, these theorists have tried to combine two incompatible elements, and

failure was inevitable. When the true situation is recognized it becomes clear that what is needed is to discard the “ setting” concept of space and time along with the general concept of a universe of matter, to which it is intimately related, and to use the concept of space and time that is in harmony with the idea of a universe of motion.

In the discussion that follows we will postulate that the physical universe is composed entirely of discrete units of motion, and we will make certain assumptions as to the characteristics of that motion. We will then proceed to show that the mere existence of motions with properties as postulated, without the aid of any supplementary or auxiliary assump­ tions, and without bringing in anything from experience, necessarily leads to a vast number and variety of consequences which, in total, constitute a complete theoretical universe.

Construction of a fully integrated theory of this nature, one which derives both the existence and the properties of the various physical entities from a single set of premises, has long been recognized as the ultimate goal of theoretical science. The question now being raised is whether that goal is actually attainable. Some scientists are still optimistic. “ Of course, we all try to discover the universal law,” says Eugene P. Wigner, “ and some of us believe that it will be discovered one day.” 24 But there is also an influential school of thought which contends that a valid, generally applicable, physical theory is impossible, and that the best we can hope for is a “model” or series of models that will represent physical reality approximately and incompletely. Sir James Jeans expresses this point of view in the following words:

The most we can aspire to is a model or picture which shall explain and account for some of the observed properties of matter; where this fails, we must supplement it with some other model or picture, which will in its turn fail with other properties of matter, and so on.25

When we inquire into the reasons for this surprisingly pessimistic view of the potentialities of the theoretical approach to nature, in which so many present-day theorists concur, we find that it has not resulted from any new discoveries concerning the limitations of human knowledge, or any greater philosophical insight into the nature of physical reality; it is purely a reaction to long years of frustration. The theorists have been unable to find the kind of an accurate theory of general applicability for which they have been searching, and so they have finally convinced themselves that their search was meaningless; that there is no such theory. But they simply gave up too soon. Our findings now show that when the basic errors of prevailing thought are corrected the road to a complete and comprehensive theory is wide open.

20 Nothing but Motion

It is essential to understand that this new theoretical development deals entirely with the theoretical entities and phenomena, the conse­ quences of the basic postulates, not with the aspects of the physical universe revealed by observation. When we make certain deductions with respect to the constituents of the universe on the basis of theoretical assumptions as to the fundamental nature of that universe, the entities and phenomena thus deduced are wholly theoretical; they are the constituents of a purely theoretical universe. Later in the presentation we will show that the theoretical universe thus derived from the postulates corresponds item by item with the observed physical universe, justifying the assertion that each theoretical feature is a true and accurate repre­ sentation of the corresponding feature of the actual universe in which we live. In view of this one-to-one correspondence, the names that we will attach to the theoretical features will be those that apply to the corresponding physical features, but the development of theory will be concerned exclusively with the theoretical entities and phenomena.

For example, the “matter” that enters into the theoretical development is not physical matter; it is theoretical matter. Of course, the exact correspondence between the theoretical and observed universes that will be demonstrated in the course of this development means that the theoretical matter is a correct representation of the actual physical matter, but it is important to realize that what we are dealing with in the development of theory is the theoretical entity, not the physical entity. The significance of this point is that physical “matter,” “radiation,” and other physical items cannot be defined with precision and certainty, as there can be no assurance that our observations give us the complete picture. The “matter” that enters into Newton’s law of gravitation, for example, is not a theoretically defined entity; it is the matter that is actually encountered in the physical world: an entity whose real nature is still a subject of considerable controversy. But we do know exactly

what we are dealing with when we talk about theoretical matter. Here there is no uncertainty whatever. Theoretical matter is just what the postulates require it to be—no more, no less. The same is true of all of the other items that enter into the theoretical development.

Although physical observations have not yet given us a definitive answer to the question as to the structure of the basic unit of physical matter, the physical atom—indeed, there is an almost continuous revision of the prevailing ideas on the subject, as new facts are revealed by experiment—we know exactly what the structure of the theoretical atom is, because both the existence and the properties of that atom are consequences that we derive by logical processes from our basic postu­ lates.

Inasmuch as the theoretical premises are explicitly defined, and their consequences are developed by sound logical and mathematical process­ es, the conclusions that are reached with respect to matter, its structure and properties, and all other features of the theoretical universe are unequivocal. Of course, there is always a possibility that some error may have been made in the chain of deductions, particularly if the chain in question is a very long one, but aside from this possibility, which is at a minimum in the early stages of the development, there is no doubt as to the true nature and characteristics of any entity or phenomenon that emerges from that development.

Such certainty is impossible in the case of any theory which contains empirical elements. Theories of this kind, a category that includes all existing physical theories, are never permanent; they are always subject to change by experimental discovery. The currently popular theory of the structure of the atom, for example, has undergone a long series of changes since it was first formulated by Rutherford and Bohr, and there is no assurance that the modifications are at an end. On the con­