Inspired by growing interest in the aesthetics in social theory, Alexander (2008) intro-‐ duced an interpretation of Standing Woman, a famous sculpture from Alberto Giaco-‐ metti. There, according to his own words, he hoped to pursue “the old romantic dream of reintegrating art and life” (2008: 10). The way Alexander deals with materiality gives voice to the sensual, material experience of art (he calls it iconic experience); however, he immediately extends the notion of such experience to everyday life. In the main argument, Alexander articulates the assumption that material experience is by no means limited to contact with art. Quite the opposite, materiality is essential for hu-‐ man’s experience of the world24. As we experience material surface of things, we can “feel” it “in our un-‐conscious minds and associate” it with meanings, i.e. with other personal as well as social ideas and things (Alexander 2008: 6). Making such associa-‐ tions is typical of and pivotal in the process of typification as defined by Berger and Luckmann (1991) and Alexander is thus able to conclude that materiality lies at the very basis of social life. Furthermore, since human experience of the material is medi-‐ ated by senses, the concern of iconic theory for materiality required also the inclusion of sensuality: “In the iconosphere of society, the meanings of social life take on sensual
24 Although such a statement may seem rather banal, it is true that the material aspect of human’s life
has been broadly ignored by sociological theory, while language and discourses were its preferred points of interest at the same time (for summaries about the effects of Rorty’s linguistic turn and consequent development in human sciences see Boehm and Mitchell 2009, Bartmanski 2012b, Moxey 2008 and Przyborski and Slunecko 2012).
form, whether by sight, hearing, touch, taste, or smell.” (Bartmanski and Alexander 2012: 11)
Even though the notion of iconic experience puts a striking emphasis on sensuality and materiality, it has nothing in common with and must not be confused with material-‐ ism. The iconic turn in cultural sociology suggested by Alexander (2010a) categorically disapproves of all materialistic approaches that reduce materiality to mere things of use-‐value. Therefore is Karl Marx one of three modern scholars, whom iconic theory opposes; his concept of commodification remains, according to Alexander, blind to the aesthetic dimension and viewer’s experience. Drawing on Durkheim and the manifesto of the strong programme (2.1), Alexander pursues analytical separation of meaning from social structure, which is supposed to be the first step in the sociological endeav-‐ or to understand the iconic, i.e. “how meaning, soul, and spirit manifest themselves through materiality” (2010a: 11). The concept of iconicity defies also the notion of dis-‐ entchantment as suggested by Max Weber. Quite the contrary, the theory of iconic power suggests that we do not live in perfectly rational and emotionless iron cages25, but rather in a world where sensual contact with material things that trigger emotions plays an essential role in the process of meaning-‐making. From the same argument stems also the critique of Walter Benjamin’s prediction of the loss of aura, which should have occurred with the onset of modernity. Nothing like that has, however, taken place, claim Bartmanski and Alexander and suggest rather shifting the attention to the way how “iconic aura continues to inhabit nonunique items” (2012). To sum up, the theory of iconic power aspires to bring aura, enchantment and fetish back, and hence it uses Durkheimian notion of totemism, which grants economic objects meta-‐ phorical and emotional powers. Elsewhere, Bartmanski (2012b) regards iconicity to be the missing link that enables us to bring totemism back into social theory.
But why had materiality in social research been ignored for such a long time? Accord-‐ ing to Alexander (2010a), it was because of the tension between materialism and ideal-‐
25 In criticising Weber has been Alexander truly consistent; similar argument was suggested already in
ism, which poses a problem that sociology always had to solve or avoid (cf. Alexander 1988). Earlier scholars seem to have escaped to the shelter of scientific realism in order to eschew moralistic and aesthetic fallacy at the same time by claiming to have access to the thing in itself. “It is this realist claim that lurks beneath Peirce’s theory of iconic as compared with symbolic meaning,” adds Alexander26 (2010a: 20). While interpreting Peirce’s concept of icon as “sign by resemblance” (Boehm and Mitchell 2009: 119), Al-‐ exander prefers Saussure’s theory by assuming that “(m)ateriality is non-‐verbal but still conventional” (Alexander 2008: 12). At the same time, he adopts Durkheim’s assump-‐ tion suggesting that morality is abstract and difficult to imagine, and therefore has to be connected to a concrete object, so that people could comprehend spiritual feelings (Alexander 2010a: 16).
Materiality is thus crucial for social life, since “in order to ‘express our own ideas to ourselves’ (…) we need to ‘fix them on material things which symbolize them’” (Alex-‐ ander and Smith 2005: 8). Therefore, the suggested point of departure for studying iconicity is to consider materiality as constitutive of sociability (Bartmanski and Alex-‐ ander 2012). Durkheim’s (1976: 207) notion of totem as “a symbol, a material expression of something else,” as a collective representation of the sacred that classifies things as sacred or profane, that plays an important role during rituals, and that personifies and represents collective identity under a visible form (Alexander 2012), is fundamental for the cultural sociological concept of icon, which should help us deal with the key ques-‐ tion how meaning manifests itself through materiality (Alexander 2010a: 12).
26 Peirce seems to be a highly controversial theoretician. While Alexander criticizes his realismus and
“purely pragmatic, non-‐conventionalist materiality of the icon and index” (2008:12) and backs up this critique by Mitchell’s words, Mitchell acknowledges Peirce as higly inspirational for his own thought: “Peirce’s resistance to taking the symbolic (or the verbal) as the foundational moment of semiotics, and his insistence on the phenomenon of the ‘qualisign’, the sign that signifies by virtue of its inherent sen-‐ suous qualities, that attracted me.” (Boehm and Mitchell 2009:118). Moreover, Peirce’s claim that icon and index are not based on experience but on the capacity of experience (1.1.1) is similar to Alexander’s notion of iconic consciousness, which is based on a Kantian disposition (see below).