The years that followed the achievement of Cambodian independence, not inclusive of the interregnum before the 1955 national elections, are widely regarded as the most politically stable in postindependence Cam-bodian history. They are also characterized by the ubiquitous presence of Norodom Sihanouk, whose rise to political supremacy began with his self-titled “Royal Crusade for Independence.” Once described by a se-nior United States (U.S.) government official in a confidential memo as “selfish, arrogant, personable, pragmatic, [and a] highly egocentric individual,” Sihanouk often appeared erratic and his actions sponta-neous. Throughout the crusade, Sihanouk went into voluntary exile, as he would do many times later, providing an opportunity, as his biogra-pher would say, for his compatriots to “come to their senses.”3He also traveled the world, seeking foreign support and sponsorship of his ideas, another tactic that would be repeated over the years.
Following the success of the crusade, Sihanouk practically usurped political authority in Cambodia. His complete control seemed assured until the 1954 Geneva conference, which ratified the cessation of the First Indochina War4and which decided that Cambodia should conduct a national election. The decision came as a blow to the increasingly po-litically aware young king, providing an opportunity for the Democrat Party to attempt to regain the momentum it had enjoyed before Si-hanouk’s independence crusade had effectively neutralized its central policy objective. In conjunction with the new Citizen’s Group, it was widely believed that the Democrats would win enough National Assem-bly seats to form at least an effective left-leaning parliamentary minority.
Quite rightly, Sihanouk feared that the elections would erode the po-litical dominance he had thus far achieved. In order to participate fully in the new political system, he surprised both friends and foes by abdi-cating the Cambodian throne in favor of his father, Prince Suramarit.
Stressing that he was now merely a private citizen, Sihanouk nonetheless
accepted the title of prince and became Samdech Upayuvareach, the Prince Who Has Been King.5Shortly after, he claimed:
I hope that in abandoning my reign, my crown and my throne, my sacrifice will help to call the attention of our elite to the great impor-tance of raising our Nation from its present state, which prompts for-eigners to say that we do not know how to conduct ourselves with the dignity and courage required by the statute of independence.”6 The prince’s reflections provide significant insight into two of his cen-tral aspirations that, despite the changes and convolutions in his adopted stance on many issues, would remain constant throughout the years when he ruled Cambodia. First, Sihanouk was determined to en-hance the development of Cambodia; and second, he strove to have the country recognized, if not admired, by the international community.
His power absolute, and alone at the helm of the Cambodian boat, the former monarch was in a position to chart the formation of the Cambo-dian state, promoting both “development” and “nationhood.”7
In the first definitive act of nation building following his abdication, the prince announced the formation of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (People’s Socialist Community). The Sangkum was not a political party but a vast assemblage or organization, embracing players from both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum.8 From the elections of September 1955 through the elections of 1958, 1962, and 1966, no non-Sangkum politician was elected to Cambodia’s National Assembly. Prior to the elections of 1966, Sihanouk personally selected the Sangkum can-didates for each electoral district. Throughout these years, until he re-fused to select candidates for the 1966 election and subsequently lost control of the Assembly, the Sangkum-controlled national body was to become nothing more than a rubber stamp for the prince and his poli-cies. Put simply, the Sangkum, and the political institutions with which it was associated, merely reinforced Cambodia’s traditional political cul-ture, where the power and position of the ruler were exalted, where the credentials of political opposition were not recognized, and where the aspirations of the ruled were largely ignored.9
With his capacity to control the Cambodian state seemingly assured, Sihanouk was in the enviable position of being able to formulate its di-rection. The ideology set down by the prince, Buddhist socialism, ac-corded entirely with his personal political convictions and with his aspi-rations for the Khmer nation. The ideology, the prince acknowledged, was formulated in contradiction to many of the basic tenets of Marxism.
Its cornerstone, according to Sihanouk, was not a Western political ide-ology but the religious traditions of Cambodian life. Buddhist socialism asserted that the ruler should treat the people equally, with empathy and with goodness. This assertion repudiated the Marxist view that the ruled (the weak) should overthrow and eliminate the rulers (the strong) and establish a proletarian dictatorship. Marxist socialism advocated the abolition of private property ownership and encouraged state or collec-tive ownership of all capital. Sihanouk opposed this belief, arguing that citizens should not be dispossessed of the fruits of their labor. Drawing on Buddhist beliefs, the rich, the prince argued, should be encouraged to give to the poor in order to gain merit.10
At best, the ideology was a hazy abstraction. An editorial inKambuja magazine in 1966, published primarily for foreign consumption, at-tempted to explain and rationalize Buddhist socialism. In it, Sihanouk claimed that Buddhism is a religion of “stoic energy, of resolute perse-verance, and of very special courage.” As a result, the prince was able to embrace an essentially conservative state ideology that, while preserving his own base of power, emphasized “a struggle against social injustice and underdevelopment” and was compatible with the goals of eco-nomic, if not social, modernization.11
Buddhist Socialism and the International Community
The formation of the Sangkum, and particularly the promulgation of Buddhist socialism, provided a basis for Cambodia’s state-making efforts during a period when the state, and state intervention, was considered central to achieving development.12The core of Buddhist socialism, an
“intense and constant crusade for national development,”13was warmly welcomed within international circles at the time. The 1950s and 1960s had seen structural-functionalism emerge to dominate sociological thinking in the Western-oriented developing world. In relation to de-velopment, structural-functionalism resulted in the emergence of both modernization theory and human capital theory. Together, they shed some light on the nature of Sihanouk’s state ideology and on the un-bridled drive for educational expansion that it accompanied.
Modernization theory emerged during the early years of Sihanouk’s dominance of Cambodian political life. The theory asserted that indus-trialized societies had reached the “new” or “modern” era. Their past, the theorists assumed, would provide the path for the nations of the de-veloping world to follow in their quest for modernity. Modernization was in no way definitive. Essentially, it implied Westernization, but to the
leaders embracing it, the term also connoted recognition by the global community, mechanization, industrial development, and enlighten-ment. Although the meaning of modernization was unclear, it was the provision of modern, secular education that was at its core. “Cambo-dian education looks simultaneously in two directions: backward to a uniquely integrated Buddhist culture, and forward to modern, secular democratic forces,” wrote Jeanette Eilenberg in 1961.14The provision of modernizing institutions, such as a school education system, were pop-ularly regarded as the carts on which governments could ride in order to acquire modern behavior, modern values, and to become a modern society.
If education had the potential to modernize minds, then it also had the potential to enhance economic development. While modernization theory preoccupied sociological thinkers, economists began to focus on manpower needs in the development process. The result of their think-ing was human capital theory, articulated by Theodore Schultz in the celebrated article “Investment in Human Capital.”15The theory viewed education not as a form of consumption but as an investment that would provide the type of labor force necessary for industrial development and economic growth. As with modernization theory, human capital theory provided the builders of the world’s new nation-states, such as Prince Si-hanouk, with a justification for large public expenditure on education.