Conclusiones

In order to see that practical necessities do not require agents to have essential features of their characters, it will help to clarify in what way we might think that the constraints of a particular person's deliberations are necessary for that person. I will illustrate using a relatively trivial example, yet the point generalizes to more serious cases.

First, deliberative constraints might be necessary at a particular point of time, or in the course of this particular deliberation. For instance, at this given moment, as I deliberate about how to spend my day, there is much that is held fixed and, indeed, much must be held fixed in order for the deliberations of a finite agent like me to ever come to a conclusion. There is no question that I will write today. The only question is what in fact I will work on -- will I begin writing a new section, or go back and revise an earlier one? The constraints within which I deliberate right now might reveal something about my general attitude toward prioritizing work over pleasure, but need not. It might simply be the case that my cable and internet are out and so there is not much else for me to do at the moment.

In order for the constraints within which I deliberate to reveal something interesting about me or my character, it seems not only must they be necessary or held

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fixed at this time, or in the course of this particular deliberation but they must be necessary across some span of time, or some possible set of deliberations. If I hold constant that I will work today even though my cable and internet are fully functioning and allow for the possibility of endless hours of mindless amusement, this begins to reveal something about my commitments or my character. But, what could it mean to say

that these constraints are necessary?

Does it mean that I cannot question these constraints? There are two ways we

might mean that someone "cannot" question the constraints of her deliberation. It might just not occur to me that there are other options besides writing today. I might be

incredibly unreflective, unimaginative, or a creature of unthinking habits.44

So, it must be the case that if it were suggested to me that I take the day off, and these constraints of deliberation are necessary in the way intended, I would immediately reject this suggestion -- "I can't; I have to work." But, this too might not reveal anything particularly interesting about my character or my commitments. If you pushed back and

responded, "Of course you can! You deserve, you need, a day off!" and I still respond,

without thinking, "I can't. I must work," and that is all I have to say because I, somehow or other, cannot bring myself to question my commitment to working, this begins to look something like a real necessity, but not yet one that is obviously different from one that is merely pathological or one that should be regarded as morally interesting in any unique If you suggested to me that perhaps I should take the day off and go swimming, and I jump at the opportunity, it doesn't seem like these constraints could be necessary in a way that could give rise to a practical necessity.

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This too would suggest something about my character -- but it wouldn't reveal anything about the particular attitudes in question -- the attitudes towards work and pleasure. Thanks to Susan Wolf for pointing this out.

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way. If I am unable to question my commitment to working (or, my ideals regarding

marriage, or love for my children) and it is only because of this inability to question my commitment that I (necessarily) must act, then it seems I am just being narrow-minded, stubborn or (irrationally) compulsive. This seems even more the case if my commitment is destructive to my own well-being (perhaps I haven't taken a day off for months, I've neglected to visit my family, etc.) or that of others (perhaps I can't question my conviction that men are the intellectual and physical superiors of women; I can't question my commitment to following the orders of my superiors, no matter what they are).

Instead, what seems distinctive about practical necessities and incapacities is that

if the agent were to question her commitment, she would nevertheless not change it.

Again, there may be two ways reasons for this. One is that however it is she regards the commitment she simply cannot change it, even if she does not approve of her commitment or see it as worth having-- perhaps because it is central to her emotional life. This may tell us a great deal about the kind of person she is. But in such a scenario, it still seems that some of her powers as an agent are compromised. She is helpless with respect to such a commitment. She simply cannot do anything about it.

The other route in which an agent is willing to question her commitment but nevertheless does not change it is if she does not think it would be good to do so. There are two scenarios in which this might be the case. In the first, the agent doesn't think it is good to have such a commitment or think that it is worth sustaining, but she doesn't disapprove of it, either. For example, given that I've made it a point to work every day and I can't see a good reason why today should be any different from every other day, I might as well continue the status quo. This need not show any attitude on my part that

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singles out this commitment in any important respect. That is, I might be equally indifferent with respect to any of my options and so can't see any value in doing anything else. Such might be the attitude of many chronically depressed people who go on living without enjoying it or seeing any point in doing so.

In the second scenario, not only can I see no good reason to change my commitment, I can see no good reason because I think my commitment is one that is

worth continuing, worth having. Yes, it has become my habit to thoughtlessly get up

every morning, sit in front of my computer with a cup of coffee and write, if my schedule

allows.45

Of course, there is a sense in which I could distance myself from my commitment

if I saw good reason to do so in light of other deeper commitments, even though I cannot

simply choose to give it up at will. Even if I can only have reason to change my deepest

commitments on the basis of other deep commitments and so can only modify them No, I will not take today off to go for a swim --it would not be good to do so -- I need to finish my paper. I will not be able to enjoy doing anything else unless it is finished. In this scenario, the only options which are capable of moving me are those that are consistent with what I care about most and I see as being worthy of my care. Furthermore, I do not see myself as having good reason to do otherwise. This means that I will not be moved to change these commitments in these circumstances -- and not because I am stubborn, blind or unthinking. What makes practical necessities and incapacities distinct is not just that the commitments and ideals that rule out a given course of action are not in fact subjected to re-evaluation, but that even if they were one would find no adequate grounds for failing to endorse them in the circumstances in question.

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gradually over time, they are still capable of being changed. It does not appear that any are absolutely necessary to me. In fact, I think this is what we should conclude if we are to maintain that such necessities do not compromise any of one's powers as an agent. For

instance, if a commitment to my work began to repeatedly46 interfere with my family

commitments, I might, come to see my commitment to my work not as "dedicated" but as "obsessive," when viewed from the perspective of these other commitments. Once I come to see this (and I can't simply choose to see it this way) I may then be able to, with effort, change how it is that I think about things and deliberate. But even though we might think this is a real possibility, it is irrelevant to what a person can possibly do now

in this set of circumstances.47