Front-line, or local, practitioners can be defined as the counterparts of key individuals. Key individuals and front-line practitioners have direct access to the vulnerable communities and as such are able to develop a certain
18 RAN PREVENT Working Group (2012), op. cit.
19 RAN POL Working Group, “Proposed Policy Recommendations for the High Level
Conference”, Brussels, December 2012.
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degree of legitimacy and credibility within communities while at the same time being considered legitimate interlocutors by the state. They work within the communities, are critical contributors to the tailor-made strategies and most importantly are expected to provide insights about the communities. As the RAN PREVENT Working Group puts it, “the ones who are best positioned are practitioners and volunteers that work ‘on the ground’”.21
The choice of words seems particularly important here. The reference to “on the ground” is part of the differentiation the RAN policy recommendations make between being part of the community and being “outside” it. That is, of being a key individual and being a front-line practitioner. This differentiation illustrates the deep and clear division the RAN policy recommendations are making between vulnerable communities and other communities.
Front-line practitioners are also the connection between vulnerable communities and the state. As with key individuals, a prerequisite for their engagement is their acceptance of the state-sanctioned narrative about radicalisation and concomitant policies. It follows that the discourse articulated within the communities must be unified and standardised. Nevertheless, this requires a certain presence of the state, as outlined by the RAN DERAD Working Group:
The deradicalisation intervention delivered by outside non- governmental practitioners [needs] to be securely embedded in the governmental institution and supported through the informed assistance of the institution’s statutory employees. Since good- practice deradicalisation is systemic by nature … the intervention needs to be systemically grounded in and complemented by the everyday procedures of the institution.22
Consequently, the vision of the RAN is one in which front-line practitioners are directly overseen by the state in order to present a unified and standardised discourse. Indeed, front-line practitioners are thus the ones making sure that key individuals convey the same discourse carried by the state and translated by front-line practitioners for the communities. Furthermore, this document from the RAN DERAD Working Group establishes a ‘two-tiered’ approach through which counter-radicalisation policies are delivered, thereby differentiating between front-liners and
21 RAN PREVENT Working Group (2012), op. cit. 22 RAN DERAD Working Group (2012), op. cit.
62DAVILA GORDILLO &RAGAZZI
governmental institutions. The latter are clearly not directly engaging with communities but employing front-liners to carry out their policies.
Interestingly, the RAN policy recommendations underscore the importance of a two-tiered approach based on two arguments. First, that it would be counter-productive to introduce into communities an ‘expert’ with no rapport or engagement with the communities. The RAN refers to “parachuting” an expert into communities and insists on its negative effects.23 The reference to “parachuting” has the same effect as the reference
to “on the ground” previously addressed. It is employed to differentiate the actual public spaces of the communities and the state. In addition, the RAN also argues that a direct state presence might limit trust and rapport on the part of communities towards practitioners. A case in point is the following statement: “People feeling marginalized and sometimes alienated by state structures will rather accept to work with non-governmental practitioners than with authorities.”24
The second argument of the policy recommendations in favour of the two-tiered approach is that direct state intervention may complicate matters because of bureaucratic constraints. The following points illustrate this:
Too much statutory control and regulation … leads to the inhibition of creativity and responsiveness of those specialist non-statutory organisations … In addition, these organisations [civil society and NGOs] are often specifically set up to deliver ‘this’ [build trust, delivering intervention and prevention] work. They are therefore able to be flexible and responsive in their approach whereas larger, more bureaucratic organisations may face greater challenges due to the ‘broader’ nature of their function/ role e.g. social workers whose remit it is to safeguard – not to provide counter narrative.25
Clearly the RAN presents arguments to disengage the state from direct action. Yet total disengagement does not occur, for, as argued previously, those executing policies will have to accept the official discourse and reiterate it. Consequently, it is possible to assert that by promoting the employment of front-line practitioners the RAN policy recommendations legitimise the state taking a step back and implementing a system of governance by ‘indirect rule’.
23 RAN PREVENT Working Group (2012), op. cit.
24 RAN, “Empowering Local Actors to Prevent Violent Extremism”, Discussion Paper for
the High Level Conference in Brussels, 29 January 2013.
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