CONCLUSIONES

8.1 General

8.1.1 SAR operations enter the conclusion stage when:

information is received that the ship, aircraft, other craft, or persons who are the subject of the SAR incident are no longer in distress;

the ship, aircraft, other craft, or persons for whom SAR facilities are searching have been located and the survivors rescued; or

during the Distress Phase, the proper authority determines that further search has no significant chance of succeeding.

8.2 Closing a SAR Case

8.2.1 The authority to terminate a case sometimes rests with different levels within the SAR organization depending on the circumstances dictating that the incident be closed or active search suspended. In particular, the responsible SC or other SAR managers may retain the authority to suspend a case when the subjects of a search have not been found, and may delegate to the SMC the authority to close cases in all other circumstances, i.e., when the SMC determines that the craft or people are no longer in distress. In areas not under the responsibility of an RCC, or where the responsible centre is not able to co-ordinate the operations, the OSC may need to take responsibility for deciding when to suspend or close the search.

8.2.2 Most SAR operations typically conclude when those in distress are no longer in distress or are rescued. The basic steps to closing this type of case are:

notify immediately all authorities, centres, services, or facilities that have been activated; and complete a record of the case.

8.3 Suspending Search Operations

8.3.1 Some cases may require extended searching. At some point, the proper authority must make the difficult decision to suspend active search operations pending the receipt of additional information. That is, the authority must decide that additional search effort will not result in success. In making this decision, each SAR incident must be considered on its own merits, and care should be taken not to end the search prematurely. The decision to suspend a search involves humanitarian considerations, but there is a limit to the time and effort that can be devoted to each SAR case.

8.3.2 Prior to suspending search operations, a thorough case review should be made. The decision to suspend operations should be based on an evaluation of the probability that there were survivors from the initial incident, the probability of survival after the incident, the probability that any survivors were within the computed search area, and the effectiveness of the search effort as measured by the cumulative probability of success. The reasons for search suspension should be clearly recorded. The case review should also examine:

search decisions for proper assumptions and reasonable planning scenarios;

certainty of initial position and any drift factors used in determining search area;

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significant clues and leads re-evaluated;

data computations;

the search plan, to ensure that:

all assigned areas were searched;

the probability of detection is as high as desired; and

compensation was made for search degradation caused by weather, navigational, mechanical, or other difficulties; and

the determination about the survivability of survivors, considering:

time elapsed since the incident;

environmental conditions (Appendix N provides information on some of the environmental factors);

age, experience, and physical condition of potential survivors;

survival equipment available; and

studies or information relating to survival in similar situations.

8.3.3 A search should normally be terminated only when there is no longer any reasonable hope of rescuing survivors from the SAR incident. Considerations for suspending a search include:

all assigned areas have been thoroughly searched;

all reasonable probable locations have been investigated;

all reasonable means of obtaining information about the whereabouts of the ship, aircraft, other craft, or persons who are the subject of the search have been exhausted; and

all assumptions and calculations used in search planning have been reviewed.

8.3.4 The SMC should advise the relatives of the missing persons that the search has been suspended. Relatives are normally more willing to accept the decision to suspend operations if they have been allowed to follow the progress of the search. The SMC should have maintained regular contact with relatives during the search, as discussed in section 1.10, to provide information and outline future plans. Providing access to the RCC, or if not co-located, to the SMC headquarters, if appropriate, enables relatives to see the search effort. Notification of the decision to terminate should normally be made at least one day prior to suspension of operations, allowing relatives at least one more day of hope, while giving them time to accept that the search cannot continue indefinitely.

8.3.5 When a search has proven unsuccessful and the SMC has suspended search operations, others concerned, e.g., the operating agency of the missing craft, may continue the search. These activities should, if requested, be co-ordinated by the RCC.

8.3.6 The RCC should maintain a suspended case file, which should be periodically reviewed so that the operations can be re-activated without delay if additional information develops which justifies engaging in renewed search efforts.

8.4 Reopening a Suspended Case

8.4.1 If significant new information or clues are developed, reopening of a suspended case should be considered. Reopening without good reason may lead to unwarranted use of resources, risk of injury to searchers, possible inability to respond to other emergencies, and false hopes among relatives.

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8.5 Final Reports

8.5.1 When a SAR case is closed or search efforts are suspended, every authority, centre, service, or facility activated should be notified. This is normally done via radio or telephone, and then followed by a final situation report (SITREP) from the RCC. To ensure that search facilities remain under some type of flight or vessel following system, the RCC should not stand down its efforts until all resources have established alternate following plans, where appropriate. Other RCCs involved should be notified of the conclusion of SAR operations, especially if responsibility for the case was assumed from another RCC, such as the first RCC to receive the distress alert.

8.5.2 If the RCC Chief and the responsible managers were not involved in a search suspension decision, they should be informed about the lack of success and the reasons for halting operations.

8.5.3 A record of SAR operations is required to improve methods, evaluate mistakes, if any, and provide statistics for SAR managers to justify SAR system support. This record should include information from debriefing of survivors as discussed in section 6.16. If the SAR service maintains computer files of SAR cases, appropriate information from this case file should be extracted and entered into the database for future analysis.

8.6 Performance Improvement

8.6.1 Constant improvement in the performance of the SAR system should be a clearly stated goal of SAR managers. One method to encourage performance improvement is to set up goals whose degree of attainment can be measured by key performance data. This data should be collected, analysed, and published on a routine basis so that individuals can see how the system as a whole is doing, and how their performance is contributing to the achievement of the established goals. Where the SAR case-load is high, some States have established computer databases to aid this analysis. Where the case-load is lower, routine reports from the SMCs to the SCs or other SAR managers can be used for monitoring system performance and highlighting areas where improvement is possible through changes in policies, procedures, or resource allocation.

8.7 Case Studies

8.7.1 Sometimes a SAR case has a surprise ending, as when the survivors are found by someone not involved in the search effort in a location outside the search area, or they are found, alive and well, in the search area after the search effort has been suspended. There are also occasions when there seems to have been an unusual number of problems in spite of the best efforts of the SAR personnel. Finally, there may be important and valuable lessons to learn from a SAR incident and the subsequent response of the SAR system that would be revealed only by a careful after-the-fact review.

(a) A SAR case study is an appropriate method for addressing those aspects of an incident that are of particular interest. Individual aspects of interest could include problems with communications, assumptions made, scenario development, search planning, or international co-ordination. SAR case studies or incident reviews also provide opportunities to analyse survivor experiences and lifesaving equipment performance. Survival in hostile environments is affected by many variables, including the physical condition of the survivors, survivor actions, reinforcement given by rescue forces prior to rescue, and the effectiveness of safety or survival equipment. Knowing more about these factors can help the SAR system become more effective.

(b) When used to review and evaluate all aspects of a response to an incident, SAR case studies are one of the most valuable and effective tools for improving SAR system performance. Therefore, SAR case studies or reviews should be performed periodically even when no problems are apparent. There is almost always room for improvement, especially in large, complex cases. The most important outcome, however, is that early detection and correction of apparently small problems or potential problems will prevent them from growing into serious deficiencies later.

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8.7.2 The discussion on case review in paragraph 8.3.2 provides topics that typically may be examined during a case study.

8.7.3 To get a balanced view, SAR case studies should be done by more than one person; the case study team should include recognized experts in those aspects of the case being reviewed. To achieve maximum effectiveness, case studies should not assign blame, but rather, should make constructive suggestions for change where analysis shows that such change will improve future performance.

8.8 Archiving Case Files

8.8.1 All information pertaining to a specific SAR incident should be placed in an easily identified and labelled file folder and then placed in storage. Length of time to retain these records in storage is the decision of the SAR managers. Some States retain all records for a few years and then place files dealing with significant, historically important, or sensitive incidents into permanent secure storage, discarding those involved only with routine situations. Defining which files belong in the ‘‘routine’’ category is, again, a SAR manager matter. Files pertaining to incidents that become the subject of legal proceedings must be retained until those proceedings are complete, including all appeals and legal reviews. Files that are to be permanently retained should be prominently marked so that they are not inadvertently thrown out when the routine files are discarded.

8.9 Incident Debriefings

8.9.1 Debriefings, feedback sessions and experience sharing opportunities between the crews of SAR facilities, SMCs and SCs are methods of quality control and continuous improvement to a SAR system. To benefit from this process, SAR authorities should establish a structured and systematic approach to debriefing. Of particular significance would be the following matters:

(a) extent of the debriefings (what experiences need to be shared);

(b) focus of the debriefing (strive to focus on the most important issues);

(c) level of participation at the debriefing;

(d) definition of participants’ needs; and

(e) process of information flow from the debriefing (normally from the bottom up).

Although each level of debriefing targets a specific audience, significant benefits can be derived from conducting simultaneous/joint debriefings in which all parties participate. It is important to note that improvements to a SAR system will not be obtained unless recommendations identified by debriefings are reviewed and implemented.

8.9.2 Types of debriefing can be grouped into three categories: operations, liaison and administration. Each category deals with specific segments of an operation that normally includes the following aspects:

(a) Operations:

– operations/response;

– co-ordination;

– communications;

– reporting;

– debriefing; and – logs and documents.

(b) Liaison:

– participation in briefings/courses held by various SAR providers;

– seminars/workshops/working groups;

– RCC staff visits to sub-units/agencies/groups;

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– joint exercises;

8.9.3 The following methods of debriefings could be used to assist SAR Authorities to improve their system:

(a) Situation Report (SITREP). As described in chapter 2, this method provides the quickest means to forward issues of concern to the responsible authorities;

(b) SAR Debrief (Search Operation Debriefing Form). As described in chapter 5, this debriefing form is intended to report actual actions and observations of SAR facilities after each tasking. It provides the opportunity to report areas of concern in a more formal way;

(c) SAR Mission Report. This method requires the primary rescue facilities to prepare a quick description of the tasks and actions taken (see Appendix H). This report would provide another avenue for responsible authorities to capture previously undisclosed issues of concern. Concerns may involve issues of broader scope not necessarily apparent at the time of the event;

(d) Formal Debriefing Session. This debriefing method could be initiated by a participating SAR facility, RCC, or a high-level authority and would normally involve an in-depth review of issues of concern.

Attendance by representatives of all SAR-participating units would be highly desirable. Findings and proposed changes/amendments to local procedures would be validated and approved by those concerned and promulgated to the responsible authorities for implementation. There would be no requirement for a specific format as the results of this debriefing would be intended for internal use only (distributed among the various emergency service providers); and

(e) SAR Operation Report. This method of debriefing would be required after a significant SAR incident and/or when issues identified in the operation need to be addressed. The report would be prepared by the responsible authority in line with the process described in section 8.7. The report would be intended for a wider audience, which could include government departments, outside agencies, interested groups, owners and operators. Consequently, an established format would be needed to ensure adequacy and consistency of the reports (see Appendix H).

8.9.4 The beneficiaries of debriefings and those methods of debriefing best suited to them are described in the following table:

A Distress Communications

Morse Code. . . A-1 Procedural Words . . . A-2 Distress Signals. . . A-3 Ground-to-Air Signals . . . A-4 Air-to-Ground Signals . . . A-5 Panel Signals . . . A-6

B Message Formats

RCC-Cospas–Sarsat Message Formats . . . B-1 Inmarsat-C Format . . . B-9 Inmarsat-E Format. . . B-10 DSC Format . . . B-11 C Mass Rescue Operations: Exercises, Industry Roles and Incident Management

MRO exercises . . . C-1 MRO industry roles . . . C-3 MRO incident management . . . C-4

D Uncertainty Phase Data

Uncertainty Phase Checklist . . . D-1 Communications Searches . . . D-2 Person Overboard Checklist . . . D-4 Weather Information . . . D-5 MEDICO or MEDEVAC Checklist . . . D-6 Lost Person Checklist . . . D-7

E Alert Phase Data

Alert Phase Checklist . . . E-1 Overdue Checklists . . . E-2 Unlawful Interference . . . E-4

F Distress Phase Checklist

G Facilities and Equipment Selection

Selection of SAR Facilities . . . G-1 Supplies and Survival Equipment Guide. . . G-9 H Operation Briefing and Tasking Forms

SAR Briefing and Debriefing Form. . . H-1 Abbreviated SAR Briefing and Debriefing Form . . . H-3 SAR Briefing and Tasking Form — Marine . . . H-4 Sighting Report Form . . . H-6

I SITREPs and Codes

Situation Report Formats and Examples . . . I-1 Code of Standard Phrases for Use Between RCCs and RSCs . . . I-4 Maritime Search and Rescue Recognition Code (MAREC Code) . . . I-7

J Intercepts

Appendix list i

Guidance for Establishing Probable Survivor Location . . . K-1 Effort Allocation Worksheet (Single Point, Leeway Divergence, or Line Datums) . . . L-7 Effort Allocation Worksheet (Single Point, Leeway Divergence, or Line Datums)

Instructions . . . L-9 Preparing Initial Probability Maps for Area Datums with Uniform

Distribution Instructions. . . M-7 Preparing Initial Probability Maps for Area Datums with Generalized

Distribution Instructions. . . M-8

POD Graph (Figure N-10). . . N-18 Cumulative POS Graphs (Figures N-11 and N-12) . . . N-19 Chill and Hypothermia Curves (Figures N-13 and N-14) . . . N-20 Parachute Tables (Tables N-13 and N-14) . . . N-21 Descent Data (Figure N-15) . . . N-22

O Ship Reporting Systems for SAR

P Functional Characteristics to Consider with Computer-based Search Planning Aids

Q Sample Problem

F/V Sample – Alpha Search . . . Q-1 Datum Worksheet for Computing Drift in the Marine Environment . . . Q-2 Average Surface Wind Worksheet. . . Q-4 Total Water Current Worksheet . . . Q-5 Wind Current Worksheet . . . Q-6 Leeway Worksheet . . . Q-7 Total Probable Error of Position Worksheet for Land and Marine Environments . . . Q-8 Total Available Search Effort Worksheet . . . Q-10 Effort Allocation Worksheet for Optimal Search of Single Point, Leeway Divergence,

or Line Datums . . . Q-11 Results of a Monte Carlo Simulation using the F/V Sample Data for the Alpha Search . . Q-13

Appendix list iii