Entre la condición de vida cacique y la discapacidad

Concern over authenticity is linked to the dawning of modernity and the sense Europeans had during the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment that their societies were undergoing a qualitative change. The shift in focus from religious to secular concerns meant a new philosophical, and increasingly scientific, interest in humanity. What might constitute defining human characteristics, the relationship between the human and the natural world, what humans shared and how their differences were to be accounted for, the origins of humanity and what its fate was to be - all these humanist questions and concerns were central to Enlightenment philosophy and have defined the human sciences since. This debate signifies that in modernity the nature of the self and humanity became a problem, a source of uncertainty. Broadly speaking, the early moderns can be divided between those who viewed this uncertainty positively, as a sign of human potentiality for improvement, and those who reacted against this view with a pessimistic sense of modernity as the loss of an earlier certainty and innocence.

Both camps deployed authenticity in their quest to define the human in the midst of the ‘civilisatory pain’ (Bendix, 1997:47) of modernity. Thus diverse understandings of the authentic developed out of different valuations made of the relationship between the human and time and the human and nature. The conception of ‘human nature’ encapsulates the complex and ambiguous relation argued to exist between humanity and nature. ‘Nature’ was often, but not always, conceived of as a source of ‘human nature’

and both nature and human nature were variously thought of as the source of vice (Enlightenment) or of virtue (Romanticism) (Soper, 1995:25-34).13

The idea that the past was the repository for a ‘lost’ authenticity collided with the belief that many co-existent peoples were actually living exemplars of that past, effectively living on the other side of the nature-culture divide, or at some lower point in the human development of culture.

The Enlightenment philosophers were primarily optimistic that human change through time represented a progression from a base nature to a state of civilised culture, as human potentiality was gradually developed. For these European thinkers, their own societies and philosophies represented the highest state of development from a purported ‘state of nature’ and headed towards an emancipated and ‘civilised’ future. The romantics, in contrast, reacted against the first flush of modernist enthusiasm. They viewed nature in paradisical terms and equated the ‘state of nature’ with a ‘lost’ human authenticity. Thus, for the romantics, the pursuit of authenticity was a means to ‘recover’ a pre- modern virtue.

14

Authenticity, then, became something that the European masculine and bourgeois subject assigned to his Others, in particular to non-European peoples and to the European peasantry.15 The authenticity of ‘primitive’, non-European peoples was encapsulated in the figure of the Noble Savage, that of the peasantry in the figure of the ‘Folk’.

13

For detailed discussion of these opposed views of the human/nature relation see Taylor (1989:305-493) and Soper (1995).

14

While the development of evolutionary theory is generally associated with Darwin and the nineteenth century, these earlier discourses on human nature and change also invoked evolutionary thinking, albeit without Darwin’s scientific emphasis. Maurice Cranston (1984:29), for example, argues that Rousseau developed a theory of evolution which prefigured Darwin. Certainly, these earlier modernist accounts of non-European peoples translated spatial distance into a distance across time.

15

It is intriguing that while women were also relegated to the other side of the nature-culture divide, their idealisation (as moral source) differed from that of the primitive other. My sense is that this difference is linked to the dependence on spatial distance to maintain the valuation of the primitive (to be discussed below) - a form of distance that could not be maintained between men and women.

From the outset, the modern concern over authenticity connects the construction of the ‘primitive’ and ‘n/Native’16

The chronologies of the development of primitivist and racist discourses and of their deployment in the representation of Maori are not exactly parallel however. The Noble Savage developed from the early sixteenth century, the Folk from the late eighteenth century. Thus at the time of earliest European contact with Maori in 1642 and still at the time of Cook’s voyages in the 1700s, the discourses of savagery were in wide circulation and their influences are apparent in the writings of the early European explorers. In the middle and later nineteenth century, the concept of primitivism became

other and the construction of the European ‘national’ self. The primitivism of the Noble Savage and of the Folk was not inherent in these peoples themselves, nor was it purely about defining them. Rather, the construction of these figures of primitivism was always about the definition and concerns of modern man himself. The Noble Savage acted primarily as a figure of critique of the state of modern ‘civilisation’. In this sense, the Savage acted as a source for replenishment of the ‘losses’ of modernity. The Folk likewise acted as a cultural source for the development of romantic nationalist movements. Both these primitivist figures were also shadowed by their opposites, the ‘Ignoble Savage’ and the ‘rabble’, figures of inauthenticity that justified the domination and exploitation of the non-European other and the European working class.

The following three sections of this chapter outline the chronological development of the figures of the Noble Savage and the Folk, and the subsequent development of scientific racism with its refiguring of authenticity in terms of ‘racial purity’. Throughout, I illustrate this history with examples from European representations of Maori. These modes of thought clearly influenced the developing relation between indigene and settler in Aotearoa New Zealand. In addition, European experiences of Maori, and study of Maori language and culture, contributed to the knowledge base which informed the discourses of primitivism and racism themselves. It was a two-way exchange.

16

The capitalised ‘Native’ distinguishes the ‘native’ of the nation from the figure of the ‘Native’, synonymous with the Noble Savage (see Goldberg, 1993:79).

interwoven with the ‘scientific’ development of racial theory. While romantic thought continued to exert an effect, in the late nineteenth century the language of scientific racism predominated. This language can also be identified in European and settler representations of Maori from this period. The romanticisation of the primitive reappeared in the early twentieth century; in the case of New Zealand, the belief that Maori were a ‘dying race’ providing the nostalgic sense of regret and loss that provokes such romanticism. I also argue that, in twentieth century settler/Pakeha representations of Maori, the figure of the Noble Savage shades into the figure of the Folk, in the sense that once Pakeha New Zealanders begin to conceive of their own identity in nationalist terms, Maori primitivism increasingly becomes a cultural source for the fledgling nation.

The Savage and modern man

The savagery or wildness of the Other is a trope that has a long history in European thought (see White, 1978). Out of this history the figure of the Noble Savage developed following the ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’. These human others were viewed through the lens of primitivism or savagery, the Europeans unable to acknowledge ‘a human substance truly other’ (Todorov, 1984:42). The difference of the others of the ‘New World’ was interpreted either as absolute, a marker of non-human status, or, more paradoxically, as a sign of their basic human sameness in relation to their European conquerors. Either way, difference was linked to a belief in European superiority and used to justify practices of domination. According to Tzvetan Todorov’s (1984) study of texts dating from the Spanish arrival in Central America, from Columbus onwards the idea of absolute difference, an irredeemable otherness often signified as ignoble savagery, was used to justify genocide and enslavement (in the Americas and later Africa). The belief in equal humanity, on the other hand, led to assimilationist practices, in particular via Christian conversion. In the latter case, the difference of the indigenous inhabitants of the ‘New World’ was understood as indicative of their ‘lower’ level of development in relation to European societies. From this perspective the natives were seen as capable of development and ‘salvation’. It is this view, which sees a basic

human goodness in the primitive other, which held the germ of the figure of the Noble Savage.

Both ignoble and noble responses to Maori difference were apparent in early reports of the European explorers. Abel Tasman was the first European to make contact with Maori in 1642. The interactions between Tasman’s crew and Maori they met were at times friendly, but at others resulted in conflict and death. Despite this violent contact, Anne Salmond (1997:22-3) cites the account of Dirk van Nierop in 1674 to argue that the Dutch explorers of this period describe Maori in fairly non-judgmental terms. However, she reports that seventy years later accounts of the same events had taken on a far more judgmental and moral tone. In 1746 Prévost, for example, describes the Maori involved as ‘barbarians’ and ‘savages’, guilty of ‘dark treachery’ (cited in Salmond, 1997:23).

This early account of Maori ‘ignoble savagery’ was influential in shaping the attitudes of later visitors. Salmond (1997:24) cites the visit of Surville in 1769 where, in advance of actual contact, the sailors described Maori as ‘savages of bad repute’. Cook, on the other hand, accompanied by both van Nierop’s and Prévost’s accounts, along with the Earl of Morton’s ‘Hints’ which argued that ‘natives’ were equal humans with rights to their own lands, did not, according to Salmond, engage in such pre-judgments.17 It appears that Cook and a number of the influential individuals who travelled with him, such as Joseph Banks and George Forster, generally had a positive regard for the Maori they came into contact with (for example, Salmond, 1997: 25, 94-6). These positive judgments were, however, framed by a secure belief in the superiority of European civilization (Salmond, 1997:27). This attitude is apparent in Benjamin Franklin’s (1771) argument in support of a Royal Society expedition to New Zealand:18

The inhabitants of those countries, our fellow men, have canoes only. Not knowing iron, they cannot build ships. They have little astronomy, and no

17

Salmond’s (1997:24) citation from Morton’s ‘Hints’ includes such classic examples of the Noble Savage as the following: ‘Conquest over such people can give no just title; because they could never be the Agressors [sic]’.

18

knowledge of the compass to guide them. They cannot therefore come to us, or obtain any of our advantages ... a voyage is now proposed to visit a distant people on the other side of the Globe; not to cheat them, not to rob them, not to seize their lands, or enslave their persons; but merely to do them good, and enable them as far as in our power lies, to live as comfortably as ourselves... From these circumstances, does not some duty seem to arise from us to them? (quoted in Salmond, 1997:37-8).

Maori, whether denigrated as ‘desperate, fearless, ferocious cannibals’ (Bosun Elliott, quoted in Salmond, 1997:84) or admired as ‘brave, war-like people, with sentiments devoid of treachery’ (Cook, quoted in Salmond, 1997:25) were clearly seen as occupying a place of inferiority to the ‘white man’.

These figures of the Noble and Ignoble Savage continued to structure the new arrivals’ responses to Maori. Tim McCreanor (1997), for example, finds both prevalent in the 1839 pamphlet Information Relative to New Zealand, which was published by the New Zealand Company to entice prospective colonists. As McCreanor (1997:38) argues, their use in this context would have been influential in predetermining the views of early colonists prior to their ever meeting Maori.

According to Hayden White (1978:176) by as early as the mid-1500s the savage was being used as a figure of ‘intracultural criticism’. White cites the well-known example from this period of Michel de Montaigne’s essay ‘Of Cannibals’, which compared the barbarity of cannibals to the greater barbarity of Montaigne’s European contemporaries. While the former may engage in barbaric acts such as cannibalism, Montaigne argued, this was only following nature. The savagery of the Europeans, on the other hand, was the result of culture and hence far worse (White, 1978:176; see also Cocchiara, 1981:16). Thus Montaigne managed to combine a positive evaluation of natives with a belief in the higher (albeit flawed) development of European society. This seeming paradox depended on a particular interpretation of the nature-culture divide. The ‘savage’ was considered to live a ‘natural’ life. European ‘cultured’ life, on the other hand, was an ‘advance’ on the life of nature, but any specific form of European life and belief could be interpreted as having taken a wrong turn into alienation and

greater barbarity.19

19

Two key features of the Noble Savage were apparent even earlier in the writings of Spanish missionary Bartolemé de Las Casas (1474-1566) who firstly saw the Americans as ‘wild’ Christians, effectively identifying them with his own ‘ego ideal’ (Todorov, 1984:165). Thus, from this earliest contact, the positive valuation of the non-European other was linked to a lack of any real interest in their cultural difference, in favour of a projection of European desires and concerns onto them. Secondly, like Montaigne, Las Casas made comparative judgments between European and American in favour of the latter (Todorov, 1984:163-7).

This tradition of the figure of the ‘natural’ and ‘noble’ Savage being used to critique the cultured and debased European continued throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hence, by the eighteenth century and the time of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the Noble Savage already had a lengthy history on which he drew. It is in this period that the concept is considered to have reached its apogee and Rousseau is credited as having been the most significant figure in popularising it (Cocchiara, 1981:116; Jimack, 1988:28).20 Rousseau is also considered to have been pre-eminent in articulating modern concerns over authenticity (Berman, 1970:76; Taylor, 1991:27, 1994:29; Bendix, 1997:16; Ferrara, 1998:8). His work then brought together the figure of the Noble Savage and ideal of authenticity in a relation which was to be hugely influential. Rousseau’s comparative account of the Noble Savage (or ‘Natural Man’ in his terminology) and modern man continued the tradition begun by Montaigne of valuing nature over what Europeans had made of ‘culture’. Rousseau was scathing in his condemnation of the civilised society of his day, with its preoccupation with the accumulation of wealth and the marked inequalities consequently produced. Against this problematic civilisation, Natural Man provided an exemplar of qualities humanity should aspire to.21

While Rousseau (1984:68) acknowledged that his Natural Man was an ideal type that ‘perhaps never existed’, he did draw on accounts of existing peoples in developing his philosophy.22

20

Maurice Cranston (1986:101), although subsequently entitling the second volume of his biography of Rousseau, The Noble Savage (1991), argues that Rousseau’s ‘Natural Man’ bears less likeness to the idealised figure of the Noble Savage than does Diderot’s, the primary difference being that Rousseau’s natural man is solitary while Diderot theorised an original sociability.

21

An exemplar defined in terms of lack, the savage defined as ‘without work, without speech, without a home, without war and without relationships’ (Rousseau, 1984:104). He did not, unsurprisingly given the lack of sociality in his image of Natural Man, suggest this as the ideal to which humanity should strive to return (see for example, Taylor, 1989:358-9; Soper, 1995:29). Rather, he understood a simple return was not possible, nor even desirable. On the contrary, he felt that the human capacity for self-improvement could be developed and in A Discourse on Inequality, and Emile in particular, set out his prescription for this modern pursuit of authenticity.

While he drew on the accounts of explorers, they in turn drew on his

22

See for example, discussion of the Hottentots and the ‘savages of the West Indies’ in Rousseau (1984:144-5). But see also his observation that in the accounts of travels in the New World ‘we have come to know no other men except Europeans’ (Rousseau, 1984:159).

theories of primitivism. Salmond (1991:309) reports that Rousseau’s and Montaigne’s idealisations of the Noble Savage were influential in shaping Marion du Fresne’s approach to Maori in the Bay of Islands in 1772. According to Salmond (1991:384- 395), du Fresne’s adherence to the image of the Noble Savage contributed to the series of events which led to his being killed and eaten by local tribesmen, an event which, to complete the circle, was later reported back to Rousseau by one of du Fresne’s companions, Julien Crozet (Salmond, 1997:114).

The role of the figure of the Savage in the practice of ‘intracultural criticism’ is illustrated in the account of Cook’s naturalist, George Forster, in an echo of Montaigne:

Though we are too much polished to be canibals [sic], we do not find it unnaturally and savagely cruel to take the field, and to cut one another’s throats by thousands, without a single motive, besides the ambition of a prince, or the caprice of his mistress! ... A New Zeelander, who kills and eats his enemy, is a very different being from a European, who, for his amusement, tears an infant from the mother’s breast, in cool blood, and throws it on the earth to feed his hounds (quoted in Salmond, 1997:95).

This primitive ‘innocence’ of the Maori was to be preserved, Forster felt, at the cost of the cessation of contact with Europeans:

It were indeed sincerely to be wished, that intercourse which has lately subsisted between Europeans and the natives of the South Sea islands may be broken off in time, before the corruption of manners which unhappily characterises civilized regions, may reach that innocent race of men, who live here fortunate in their ignorance and simplicity (Forster, quoted in Howe, 1977:138).

The figure of the Noble Savage, from Montaigne to Rousseau, depended on an interpretation of the nature-culture distinction that valued an idealised nature over what European societies had achieved in culture. Existing non-European peoples were equated with a hypothesized human (read ‘European’) past, when people lived peacefully and innocently in harmony with nature. Following Rousseau, the Noble Savage and authenticity became entwined in an idealisation of an original state of

human nature that had been ‘lost’ in the impact of ‘civilisation’. While the non-European ‘savage’ became one important site for the projections of this lost authenticity, the European peasantry became another.

The Folk and the European nation

Both the non-European and European primitive were treated as ‘historical documents’