The United States Government has been repeatedly accused of influencing the WTO and using GM food to gain international trade supremacy (Nisse, 2002; Toke, 2004). Moreover, US authorities have placed undue pressure on African nations to accept surpluses of GM food from US farmers (Walters, 2006). The United States ambassador to the United Nations’ food agencies, Mr Tony Hall, has suggested, for example, that Zambia’s political leaders be convicted as criminals (see Reuters, 2002). In 2003, despite having a clear understanding of Zambia’s explicit opposition to GM food, the United States continued to distribute food aid through the UN’s World Food Programme that contained GM maize (Walters, 2006). When the Zambian Government called for an immediate withdrawal of all the contaminated food, a riot broke out among some starving people in Southern Zambia. The Zambian Minister for Agriculture, Mr Mundia Sikatana, accused the US of ‘promoting food riots in order to force Zambia to accept GM maize’ (quoted in Jonathan, 2004; Walters, 2006). By situating the decision to send geneti- cally modified maize to Southern Africa in the context of US–European debates over agricultural biotechnology, it becomes clear that the promotion of biotechnology has nothing to do with ending hunger in the region. As Zerbe (2004: 1) has argued:
… American food aid shipments to Southern Africa have little to do with the famine at all. Instead, I argue that US food aid policy following the 2002 crisis was intended to promote the adoption of biotech crops in Southern Africa, expanding the market access and control of trans- national corporations and undermining local smallholder production thereby fostering greater food insecurity on the Continent.
Such exploitations of the world’s hungry have previously been described as ‘famine crimes’ (see DeWaal, 1997) as powerful Western corporations manipulate market control of global food networks and undermine UN aid relief for commercial gain. Furthermore, the US Government has also been accused of dumping unwanted GM food on starving African countries and using Africa as a ‘human experiment’ (Townsend, 2002). In addition, it has been alleged that the US Government and biotech industries have used the UN Food Aid Programme as a ‘covert subsidy for US farmers’ (Vidal, 2002).
The economic imperatives of US agricultural and foreign policy are further highlighted in relation to the so-called ‘US trade wars’. In addition
to verbal pressure from international diplomats, the US Government launched a case with the World Trade Organisation in an attempt to seek a ruling that would prevent an anti-GM trade stance currently adopted by the European Commission. In May 2003 the Bush Administration began its case in the WTO against the European Commission seeking billions of dollars in damages for lost revenue, arguing that the EU violated its WTO obligations with a moratorium on GM food that constituted a‘trade barrier’ (Schifferes, 2003). As an observation through the lens of political economy, it should be noted that the Bush Administration submitted its case the very week after the Iraq invasion. In the preceding months to Iraqi invasion, the Bush Administration was completely silent on GM food; diplomatic energy was exerted on seeking European support for the war. A case in the WTO before the Iraqi invasion may have severely jeopardised much needed European support for the Bush post 9–11 ‘war on terror’ campaign.
Since the beginning of the proceedings, the US Government argued that the EU moratorium on GM food was not only harming international trade but was also preventing developing countries from importing biotechnology. The US sought an international ruling that would force countries to accept GM food and its associated biotechnology products. This raised serious concerns by governments and agricultural groups around the world that the WTO was an inappropriate place to make a judgement confined by narrow trade rules. The US Government (along with Australia and Argentina) launched a case with the World Trade Organization in an attempt to seek a ruling that prevents an anti-GM trade stance currently adopted by the European Commission. The EU Trade Commissioner Mr Pascal Lamy stated that:
the EU’s regulatory system for GMO’s authorization is in line with WTO rules: it is clear, transparent and non-discriminatory. There is therefore no issue that the WTO needs to examine. The US claims that there is a so-called“moratorium” but the fact is that the EU has authorized GM varieties in the past and is currently processing applications. So what is the real US motive in bringing a case?
(European Union, 2003) In essence, the US sought an international ruling through the WTO that would force countries to accept GM food and its associated biotechnology products. This raised serious concerns by governments and protest groups around the world that the WTO was an inappropriate place to make a jud- gement confined by narrow trade rules. Moreover, the US Government was reportedly seen as pressuring the three-person WTO panel not to involve scientific experts but instead to make its ruling in private. As a result, petitions were sent to the WTO urging it not to pass judgement in public (Bebb, 2004). The pressure on countries (notably developing countries) from powerful international bodies intensified during 2004. In May 2004, 60 organisations
from 15 African countries forwarded an open-letter to the UN’s World Food Programme criticising that the WFP and USAID were misleading African nations by presenting them with a ‘no choice option’ to accept GM food (Ash and Mayet, 2004). Further condemnation of the UN followed with the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) releasing its report Agri- cultural biotechnology: meeting the needs of the poor? which was criticised for being ‘biased against the poor, against the environment and against food production in general’. It prompted a second open-letter signed by repre- sentatives from 80 countries angered by the UN’s support of biotech com- panies stating, ‘The report turns FAO away from food sovereignty and the real needs of the world’s farmers, and is a stab in the back to the farmers and rural poor FAO is meant to support’ (quoted in Grain, 2004). This legal and political pressure from powerful international institutions has had an impact on some anti-GM countries. For example, the European Union’s Consumer Protection Commissioner, David Byrne urged seven EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg) to lift their bans on new GM food products arguing that Europe risks were falling behind the United States. In March 2004, the European Commission approved the trial planting of NK603 maize, a herbicide-resistant crop owned by biotech giant Monsanto (Engdahl, 2004). The European Commission has since ‘ordered’ Greece to lift its ban on 17 different GM maize varieties or face litigation. The GM maize MON 810 has been included in the EU’s seed catalogue which permits farmers to grow plants from the seed varieties without gov- ernment restriction (Environment Daily, 2006). The European Commission has been accused by various organisations as ‘misleading’ and ‘lying’ to member states. For example, Greenpeace International accused the EU Commission of providing‘false and misleading information to member states by saying that Monsanto fulfilled the current legal requirements to allow commercial growing of its genetically modified maize (MON 810)’ (Greenpeace, 2006). This claim was based on Monsanto’s failure to provide the necessary monitoring plans and environmental impact assessments (Greenpeace, 2006). Arguably the international pressure exerted by the United States and the aggressive trade practices of biotech corporations is influencing the decisions and policies of EU Commissioners.
The WTOfinally released its ruling in 2006. More than 2000 pages of the report were published, including an 802-page section on ‘findings’. In essence, the WTO argued that the EU had adopted a moratorium that was inconsistent with international trade law (WTO, 2006). It did not rule on the safety of GM food, nor did it decide in favour of compensation to the complaining countries. It stated that six EU member countries including Belgium, Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Luxemburg had acted illegally in banning GM food products from national trade. It did not, however, suggest that it was illegal for such countries to prohibit GM products for environmental and health reasons. For many, the WTO was the wrong place
to hear such a case. Moreover, it was, as one might expect, heavily skewed in favour of pro-trade initiatives and incentives. As Somja Meister, trade cam- paigner for Friends of the Earth stated,‘The international community must find an alternative before another case occurs … The WTO ignored inter- national environmental laws, met in secret behind closed doors and barred any public involvement, even though we have a strong public resistance against GMOs in Europe’ (quoted in Fletcher, 2006). The criticism of the WTO’s ruling was widespread; with various allegations of scandal, concealment and secrecy (Mekay, 2006). On the other hand, proponents of biotechnology argued that the WTO rightly exercised its rights to protect national health standards whilst ruling on issues of trade (Chen and Ni, 2009). Notwith- standing the ambiguities surrounding jurisdiction and the conflicts between trade and environmental law (discussed in the next chapter), the WTO ruling has created a platform for continued trade while providing a mechanism to prevent opposition and resistance to GM food. For now it is important to explore specific forms of resistance and how pressure from the US and biotech companies has impacted on the world’s hungry.