CONFIGURACION DEL ENRUTAMIENTO EST Á TICO
CONFIGURACI Ó N DE ENRUTAMIENTO SIN CLASE
By the late 1 970s, therefore, with stagflation and an unsustainable balance of payments, as well as fiscal deficits that had reached serious proportions, manifesting poor economic growth, it was obvious that existing policies were less useful, and radical and structural changes in economic policy were urgently required. The Labour Government of 1 984 took up the challenge and introduced economic reforms with broad objectives. The major objectives of its agenda were the provision of more employment opportunities, further growth and development, a favourable standard of living, and improvement of the country' s sustainable competitive advantage. Widespread deregulation, aimed at privatisation of state-owned assets and enterprises, together with liberalisation policies, and capital flows through more FDI and trade, were the means through which the objectives were to be attained. In sum, both domestic and international policy initiatives encountered a non-discriminatory environment.
3.3.1 Economic Reforms
The economic reforms2 involved bringing to an end a number of long-standing policies in international trade and fmance. A primary step was the removal of the fixed exchange rate and the introduction of a floating regime. The broader objectives, however, had closely been linked with the adoption of a market-led economic paradigm. For example, the import substitution strategy was replaced by an outward-looking
2 For a detailed analysis of the actual phasing of the twelve areas of reforms for the period 1 984- 1 995 see Silverstone et at. ( 1 996).
strategy (Akoorie, 1998b). The adoption of a market-led framework had as its major tenet that the government should facilitate rather than participate in economic activities, and should create a stable and supportive environment conducive to macro-economic stability. The reforms opened up the capital and financial sectors, and promoted trade and investment. There were also accompanying changes in the government policy such as monetary policy, tax reforms, and the corporatisation and, in some cases, the privatisation of government departments.
An underlying thrust of the liberalisation approach was the emphasis on the commercial objectives of higher efficiency and productivity rather than on social objectives. There was a clear positive shift from public to private ownership. Some of the most regulated and restricted sectors were now not only open but were also most accessible to foreign investment. Thus, there were also clear suggestions that FDI had an important role to play in the ongoing economic transformation.
An accompanying feature of the fmancial reforms had been a surge in money supply leading to inflation, and a sharp rise in interest rates. Balancing this was an improvement in the terms of trade, and a fall in the real exchange rate helped towards an increase in exports. Yet the deficit on current account hardly improved, largely due to servicing of the external debt. The 1 984 reforms signalled favourable changes in the industrial structure, while many primary industries like fishing, mining, agriculture, forestry recorded marked growth, as did the communication sector, transport, finance, and community and personal services. It was clear that a devalued exchange rate had rendered a greater effect than a costly subsidy scheme. However, textiles, apparels and leather goods fared worst, due particularly to the termination of import licensing. Opportunities were now given to imports from the Asian trading partners. Building and construction also recorded a decline.
Once the new policies were in place, negative outcomes in certain industries were inevitable. Today, about two decades after the 1 984 reforms, there is no firm opinion on the overall benefits gained. Several studies have concluded that the reforms were
misconceived (Easton, 1 997; Dalziel, 1 999).3 But there are others, which, while accepting the reforms did not achieve their intentions, argue the failure was not due to the refonns per se but was due more to factors unique to New Zealand. Chief among these factors is New Zealand's small population and geographical isolation. This is echoed in the statement made by Treasury (1 999):
Because New Zealand is relatively isolated geographically, there has been considerable interest within the country on how this may affect economic performance. As the Treasury notes (Treasury, 1999): "Draw a circle with a radius of
2200
kilometres centred on Wellington and you capture within it3.8
million New Zealanders and rather a lot of seagulls. Draw a similar circle centred on Helsinki and you capture a population of over300
million from 39 countries. " Traditionally, New Zealand has sought to overcome its isolation by maintaining relatively open m arkets by i nternational s tandards a nd c reating a regulatory framework that is conducive to foreign investment. In part, there was a belief that it had to do even more than other . . . new technology may help to overcome some of these barriers by reducing "distance " (through for example electronic commerce), but to close the gap in living standards with other GECD countries implies that an even more ambitious reform agenda has to be carried out (GECD,2000).
In addition to these, the recent globalisation along with the slow progress of adjustment by the New Zealand economy, had implications (Treasury, 1 996; OECD, 1 998, 1 999c). In the light of such an economic and political background, the next sub-section elaborates the nature of FDI.
3 New Zealand has carried out extensive reforms over the last two decades ( 1 980s and 1 990s) that have affected all major sectors. The nature of its problems in the mid-1 980s, the rationale of the policies used to deal with them, the policies themselves and the way these were phased and thus their ultimate outcome, have all been extensively analysed both inside and outside the country (refer ChatteJjee, 1 996 and Evans et aI., 1 996, for further details). The critics, naturally enough, question not only the appropriateness of some of the policies, but the nature of some of the outcomes.
3.3.2 Foreign Direct I nvestment Policy i n New Zealand
Statistics New Zealand defines FDl as 'investment that is made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise; the investor's purpose being to have an effective influence in the management of the enterprise' . For measurement purposes, Statistics New Zealand ( 1 999) also proposes a threshold level. It was originally decreed that 25%-or-more of the voting share capital should be owned by a non-resident.
FDl in New Zealand consists of three principal elements (Enderwick, 1 998): • Equity capital, i.e. purchase of shares and real estate;
• Unremitted earnings, i.e. undistributed earnings including profits and losses; and
• Intra-company lending and borrowing, i.e. lending and borrowing between parent and affiliates or between affiliates.
As discussed, before 1 938, with foreign exchange control and quantitative restrictions on imports, F 01 p layed a s ubstantial p art i n d eveloping t he p astoral-based e conomy. With the experience of the Great Depression, foreign investment was seen as a means of diversifying the economy and providing sufficient employment opportunities to the increased labour force (Akoorie, 1 995). Despite the restrictive policies of the 1 970s, there had been a substantial momentum in foreign investment. Yet FD 1 still had to be approved by the Overseas Investment Commission (OlC). Controls over capital flows and foreign exchange were, however, lifted completely in 1 984. Table 3 .2 provides a summary of the FDl policies during the pre- and post- 1 984 periods. A noteworthy feature had been the similarity in policies, in the pre- and post- 1 984, except for the relaxation during the latter period (Akoorie, 1 998a). Akoorie's study further underlined how foreign investment policy could be integrated with macro- and micro-economic policies to derive the benefits of foreign investment.
Table 3.2 Pre-and-Post Reform FDI Policies in New Zealand
Pre-1984 Policies: Restricted Non-integrated Post-1984 Policies: Liberalised Non-integrated
Policies Policies
• Highly restricted FDI • Highly liberalised unselective FDI • No incentives or concessions • No incentives or concessions • Assessed FDI on its fit with import • No integrated macro-organisational
substitution policy objectives policies
• Restricted outward investment policy • Neutral attitude towards outward FDI-
trade support
Source: Akoone, 1 998a
The current policy on inward FDI could be described as more cordial, liberal and non discriminatory. A minimal level of control over ' significant' investment is still maintained (DIe, July 2000). The DIe policies operate, depending on the policy threshold, through an authorisation system that screens all inward FDI. The current requirement is that an 'overseas person,4 should obtain ole consent for any investment proposal. 0 le d ifferentiates p otential i nvestment i nto e ither g eneral b usiness o r t heir belonging to a sensitive sector, (e.g., commercial fishing and rural land). General business investments usually require DIe consent when a minimum of 25% shares is held overseas or the investment expenditure exceeds NZ$ 50 million. The consent requirement is also applicable when applications involve land of five hectares or more and/or their worth is more than NZ$ 1 0 million. If the said plot is deemed "sensitive land" (rural land), the minimum threshold for which consent is required comes down to 0.4 hectares. Furthermore, any proposal involving land that is a repository of some unique feature, or is of certain size, should be subj ected to a net economic benefit assessment (Tradeport, 1 999). This assessment would include one or more of the following: i ncreased m arket competition a nd e fficiency; n ew t echnology; n ew e xport markets; and employment opportunities.
An observation of the above policies reveals that the policies by themselves do not forbid foreigners forming fully-fledged, New Zealand companies. Nevertheless, the 4 'Overseas person' is defined as an individual or company not-ordinarily resident in New Zealand, or a
companies are called upon to meet certain legal requirements, of a restrictive character (OIC, 2000). It is noteworthy that foreign involvement in certain agricultural and horticultural sectors (e.g., kiwi fruit) is thus effectively sealed; as producer boards have statutory monopoly. In the fisheries sector, on the other hand, a quota system restricts foreign involvement. The International Institute for Management Development, which studied FDI policies in 46 countries, ranked New Zealand 1 2th ( 1 998). Its assessment was based on the level of available control that can be acquired in a domestic company. When it comes to incentives to attract FDI to New Zealand, the country, has, however, been ranked 33rd by the same study. This indicates that control over companies is minimal, while incentives have highly been curtailed. Thus, in line with the free-market policy, the New Zealand Government does not offer incentives to specific investors in certain areas of industry or in particular regions. The thinking seems to be that a stable economic and political environment would serve as a sound base for foreign investment growth.
As FDI and trade are always connected it is therefore important to examine the trade
policies adopted by New Zealand. With the liberalization of the economy in 1 984, the
aim of external trade policy was to lower tariffs. Import licensing and restraints on capital movement were removed, leading to the CER agreement with Australia bringing an increase in bilateral trade. With the elimination of subsidies and incentives for exports, the competitive environment for domestic producers was enhanced (Scott
Kennel, 200 1 ), and these changes too had implications for FDI.
Before proceeding to analyse the FDI trend, it is vital to examine the policy orientation that influences the flow of FDI, because overseas investment decisions are usually based on locational benefits as well as on host country policy criteria. Table 3.3 presents the key determinants of FDI in a host country. They indicate the advantages and disadvantages a small, developed country could encounter in attracting FDI. The main disadvantage, due to the present process of globalisation, is the centralised production
activities, w hich a re l ikely t o r esult i n l osing F DI m ainly b ecause 0 f N ew Z ealand's
distance from main markets and the high labour cost. 5
Table 3 3 Host Determmants of Direct Investment
Host Country Determinants Types ofFDI classified Principal Economic Detenninants in a Host Country Policy framework for
FDI
+ Economic, political and social stability
+ Rules regarding entry and operations
+ Standards of treatment of
foreign affiliates
- Policies on functioning and structure of markets (especially competitive and policies governing M&A)
? International agreements on FDI
+ Privatisation policy
- Trade policy (tariffand non-tariff barriers) and coherence of FDI and trade policies
- Tax policy
Economic determinants (See table on the right)
Business facilitation
- Investment promotion (including image-building and investment generating and investment facilitation services
- Investment incentives
+ Social amenities (for example, bilingual schools, quality o f life)
- After investment services
by Motives of Finns
Market-seeking
Resourceslassets seeking
Efficiency-seeking
- Market size and per capita income - Market growth
+ Access to regional and global markets
+ Country-specific consumer preferences
? Structure of markets + Raw materials
- Low-cost unskilled labour
+ Technical, innovative and other created assets (for example, brand names) included as embodied in individuals, finns and clusters
+ Physical infrastructure (ports, roads, power, telecommunications)
- Cost of resources and assets l isted above, adjusted for labour productivity
- Other input cost such as transport and communication cost tolfrom and within host economy and other intennediate products
? Membership of a regional agreement conducive to the establishment of regional corporate networks
Sources: UNCT AD, World Investment Report I 998:Trends and DetermInants, Table IV. I , p.9 1 .
Notes: ' +' , indicates t he advantages, ' - ' , i ndicates d isadvantages, a nd '?, indicates u ncertainties, which are based on the business environment ranking (See Appendix 3.3).
5 In terms of labour cost, Appendix 3. 1 shows that of the Asia-Pacific rim countries, excluding Japan, New Zealand faces the highest labour cost in the region.
The market for international investment is extremely competitive, and governments around the world recognise the importance of FDI, as more and more countries (Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin American countries) are open to FDI. The risk faced by New Zealand in this respect is that New Zealand's policies are uncompetitive compared with other countries. Waiting for foreign investors to come and invest and offering only a
non-discriminatory policy may not be an appropriate approach in the present globalised
context.
The implementation of the liberalisation process III 1 984 orchestrated an increase in actual flows of FDI, and can be construed as a sign that foreign investors have responded favourably to liberalisation policies. Though, the policies of the free market economy have led to a recent surge in FDI, and New Zealand still suffers from a relatively poor record of FDI compared with Australia, Finland6 and I reland7 (Figure
3 . 1 ).
6 Finland is another small, developed country that has in the recent past achieved significant economic growth through FDI. The small size of the economy was taken as a factor of flexibility i.e. as mentioned by Kathryn ( 1 999) " we are small players in a big world. We have to be quick, flexible and have specialities to compete. We don't have rigid structures to conserve and it is easy to make a quick arrangement. What we can do in a week here would take months in Switzerland and a year in Germany" (p. 3). Using the smallness of the country as an advantage, Finland has attracted a considerable amount of export-driven FDI and foreign-owned companies located in the small southern tip of Finland contribute nearly 28% to GDP and 23% of jobs to the economy.
7 The Irish economy has grown rapidly and steadily over the last 1 0 years due to factors of highly educated and trained labour force; larger scale improvement of physical infrastructure. The beneficial consequences of a successful fiscal stabilisation in the mid-1 980s, and the move towards consensual wage bargaining enhanced the attractiveness of Ireland as a FDI destination. This shows that for small countries tariff-jumping FDI is less dynamic in technological terms and much smaller in volume than potential export-oriented FDI, and indicates that liberalised trading arrangements are a prerequisite for substantial inflows. The positive impact of FDI indicates that FDI flowed into manufacturing and entails the construction of new factories. This indicates that the building blocks of a country's ability to attract FDI are: R&D, infrastructure, labour skills, educational system, and telecommunications infrastructure (The Independent, 01 . 09. 1999; Callino and Carpano, 2000; and Economists Intelligent Unit, 2002). Also see Barry and Bradley, ( 1 997) for host country experience in FDI and trade impact.
16000 14000 12000 � 10000 • :: 8000 1: 6000 •
Figure 3.1 Inward FDI: Selected Countries 1991-2000
�
2�
.�
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1998
1997
Ye a r