Congruencia entre discurso y actos

Mill’s acquaintance with Coleridge’s thought came about primarily through the debating society founded by the young Mill during the 1820s. In an early draft of the

^ The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bo wring (Edinburgh, 1843), vol. 11, pp. 275- 95; Mill’s 1825 article, ‘Law of Libel and Liberty of the Press’, is at CWXXl, pp. 1-34. ^ See, for example, CWXll, p. 84.

^ Ibid. p. 77. ^Ibid. p. 221.

Autobiography, he described how the ideas of Coleridge were introduced there through

Frederick Maurice and John Sterling, young men who represented a ‘second liberal and even Radical party, on totally different grounds from Benthamism and vehemently opposed to it’.^° Mill’s own philosophy developed as his friendship with both men deepened. Unlike the ‘narrow utilitarianism’ of his upbringing, his new frame of mind was characterised by an openness to different ideas and ‘a conviction, that the true system was much more complex and many-sided than I had previously had any idea of.... [which] came from various quarters: from the writings of Coleridge, which I had begun to read with interest even before the change in my opinions; from the Coleridgians, with whom I was in personal intercourse’ and from o t h e r s . T h e change at this time was pronounced enough for at least one of Mill’s contemporaries to regard him as having rejected Benthamism altogether in favour of the ideas of Coleridge. Mill publicly denied all such charges, claiming that he embraced no system in place of the philosophy of his upbringing and insisting that he remained a utilitarian, albeit of a non-conventional kind.^^

^ C W X , p. 119.

CWl , p. 160. This passage was omitted in the final version, although Mill does there describe Maurice as a disciple of Coleridge, and Sterling as disciple of both Maurice and Coleridge. Additionally, in a letter to Frederick Maurice’s son Charles, dated 19 May 1872 (CW XVn, p. 1898), Mill admitted: ‘Indeed, his conversation [i.e. Frederick Maurice’s] and that of Sterling were almost my first introduction to a line of thought different from any I had previously known, and which, by itself and by its effects, contributed much to whatever mental progress I subsequently made’.

Autobiography, CW l, p. 161.

John Bo wring, first editor of the Westminster Review, is recorded by Caroline Fox as one who ‘spoke of Mill with evident contempt as a renegade in philosophy, Anglicé - a renouncer of Bentham’s creed and an expositor of Coleridge’s’, quoted in George L. Nesbitt, Benthamite Reviewing (New York, 1934), p. 173. However, relations were never good between Bowring and the Mills (ibid. pp. 130ff.); Bo wring, in turn, was portrayed in a less-than-flattering light in yiiW s Autobiography (e.g. CWl, pp. 92-93, 134-35).

See, for example, M ill’s letter of 12 January 1834 to Thomas Carlyle (CW XU, p. 207), where he claims ‘I am still, & am likely to remain, a utilitarian; though not one of “the people called utilitarians”; indeed, having scarcely one of my secondary premisses

Coleridge’s ideas concerning the liberty of the press and freedom of enquiry had been presented most completely in a series of articles written in 1809, published together in three volumes in 1818 as The Friend}^ Here, he champions ‘free enquiry of the boldest

kind’, but with restrictions including that ‘the enquiry be conducted with that seriousness, which naturally accompanies the love of Truth, and is evidently intended for the perusal of those only, who may be presumed to be capable of weighing the arguments’/^ He identifies four conditions which must be met if a correct (although by no means complete) notion of truth can be achieved through freedom of discussion: first, the speaker must not intend to mislead his audience; second, any error expressed must not be capable of perverting the truth of the matter under discussion; third, the value of the truth in question must outweigh the value of any possible error; and fourth, any error must not contain an impediment to the true doctrine which can replace it/^ Moreover, the speaker must act responsibly, looking to the matter, the manner and the time of expression. Coleridge believed that if these conditions are observed, there will not be any injurious results from the publication of truth; ‘much less can I imagine a case in which Truth, as Truth, can be p e r n i c i o u s F r e e d o m of expression should always be maintained where these circumstances prevail. Thus, for Coleridge the communication of truth should go totally unhindered as an exercise in reason by those who possess the intellectual ability and in circumstances where there is a conscientious observance of appropriate conditions.

in common with them; nor a utilitarian at all, unless in quite another sense from what perhaps any one except myself understands by the word’.

CWSTC 4 (I). The Friend was originally published as a periodical and privately circulated by Coleridge. CWSTC 4 (I) reproduces the 1818 edition, and Part II the serialised 1809 edition, which differed slightly.

The Friend, CWSTC 4 (]), p. 42. Ibid, pp. 44ff.

In a case of libel, however, where a private individual is publicly accused of some immorality, Coleridge holds that most people are insufficiently familiar with the facts involved to judge the truth of any allegations made (most people are not personal witnesses and therefore either will not know or will know very little about the accused). Mcflfe importantly, he believes that there is a higher moral issue involved: the person who publishes a libellous opinion is setting himself up as judge, jury and inflictor of punishment, but in reality lacks the authority to play such a role. The frame of mind and motive of the person who expresses a libellous opinion are therefore all-important, and the absence of a correct disposition can be regarded both in law and in morals as tantamount to a wrong disposition. ‘Under such circumstances’, Coleridge continues, ‘the legal Paradox, that a libel may be the more a libel for being true, becomes strictly just, and as such ought to be acted upon’.^^ For the Radicals, the notion that a libel might be considered even more libellous for being true was regarded as an example of the ridiculous nature of the law as it existed and a prime reason in favour of its reform.

For Coleridge, the fact that mankind has progressed towards truth is due to ‘the successive Few in every age (more indeed in one generation than in another, but relatively [j/c] to the mass of mankind always few) who by the intensity and permanence of their action have compensated for the limited sphere, within which it is at any one time intelligible’ As most people are incapable of judging the whole spectrum of possible tmths, Coleridge maintains that they need the leadership of superior intellects to guide them. Yet, when

" Ibid. p. 49. Ibid. pp. 93-94.

James and John Stuart Mill’s disagreement with the old maxim is outlined in Chapter 1. The phrase was also quoted by O’Connell during a speech in support of his February 1834 Bill for the liberty of the press discussed in Chapter 2 above. Mill’s position against O'Connell at that time is practically identical to that held by Coleridge.

truths become universally accepted, they tend simultaneously to become impotent and must therefore be kept lively if they are to retain their value: ‘Truths, of all others the most awful and mysterious, yet being at the same time of universal interest, are too often considered so true that they lose all the powers of Truth, and lie bed-ridden in the Dormitory of the Soul, side by side with the most despised and exploded errors’. G e n i u s alone can bring the novelty of approach needed to revive such dead truths, and meditation and serious discussion are the means by which mankind can be rescued from being the victims of pseudo-knowledge and of stagnation.^^

These are all ideas which any reader of On Liberty'^ second chapter will automatically

recognise. Other aspects of Coleridge’s system are more explicit in Mill: the many- sidedness which Mill began to advocate in the wake of his crisis, for example, is an idea which not only demanded freedom of thought and discussion, but which was also necessary to the atmosphere in which the well-rounded individual grew and developed.^^ Coleridge professed a creed of the harmony of opposites, opposing no system but striving to find the truth that lay in every system ‘and how that which was true in the particular, in each of them, became error because it was only half the truth’ Imagination, the aspect

which Mill fostered in the wake of his crisis, was also important - Coleridge referred to it

Ibid. p. 110.

As Turk points out (op. cit., pp. 49-50), Mill’s copy of the 1818 edition of The Friend

at Somerville College, Oxford, is marked in pencil in over twenty places. These passages, all in volume I, relate to topics such as the bad effect of popular novels, arrogance, tolerance and other issues which are readily identifiable as close to Mill’s heart. Turk acknowledges that Mill did not often mark his books, but suggests that if these markings were made by Mill, they ‘would provide interesting evidence of what Mill found memorable in Coleridge’. However, for many years Mill’s books formed part of the general collection at Somerville and were readily circulated among students. The origin of the marks is therefore very much open to question.

as ‘the distinguishing characteristic of man as a progressive being’ which ‘ought to be carefully guided and strengthened as the indispensable means and instmment of continued amelioration and refinement’/^ The similarities between these passages and much of what Mill had to say on the topic is striking. However, Mill made little reference to The Friend

in his writings. Rather, he believed the 1830 work On the Constitution o f Church and

State to be the best of Coleridge’s writings, and enthusiastically encouraged others to read

There are two central ideas in Church and State which Mill embraced, explicitly

acknowledging their Coleridgian origin. The first is the notion that society subsists on the tension which flows between its conservative and liberal elements - that, in effect, the dynamic of progress and permanence is the mechanism which keeps society from stagnating. On this point. Mill wrote to Sterling in October 1839 regarding Coleridge’s political philosophy:

he stands almost alone in having seen that the foundation of the philosophy of the subject is a perception what are those interests [j/c] (comprehending all others) each of which must have somebody bound and induced to stand up for it in particular, &

‘Table Talk’ 136, quoted in Holmes, op. cit., pp. 51-52. Holmes directly connects this with Mill who, he continues, ‘later considered the idea of reconciling “the noisy conflict of half-tmths” one of Coleridge’s greatest contributions to progressive thought in England’.

Lecture X, ‘General Course on Literature’, quoted in Holmes, op. cit., p. 61.

That he thought Church and State the best is mentioned in an October 1839 letter to Sterling (CWXUI, p. 409). For an example of his encouragement to others, see his letter to John Pringle Nichol of April 1835 (CWXU, p. 221) as well as the article ‘Coleridge’, CW X ,pp. 117-63.

between which a balance must be maintained - & I think with him that those great interests are two, permanence and progression.^^

Mill subsequently developed Coleridge’s ideas, broadening them to allow for a much wider base from which society can progress further towards civilisation and intellectual pursuits. Coleridge had envisioned the two elements embodied in a bicameral legislature, the first house consisting of a conservative hereditary peerage, the second, larger, progressive house being elected from among the landed community and commercial classes. He even refers to the first as the force of law and the second as that of liberty, the dynamic of government being the reconciliation of these two forces.^^ However, by 1839, Mill had come to disagree with Coleridge’s identification of permanence with land and the gentry, and progress with the commercial classes, instead maintaining a broader view of the possibility of progress: ‘The land has something to do with permanence, but the antithesis, I think is rather between the contented classes and the aspiring, wealth & hopeful poverty - age & youth - hereditary importance and personal endowments’.^^

For Coleridge, progress had to be grounded in ‘cultivation’, in the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that characterise humanity.^® Freedom of expression can therefore be regarded as a catalyst which keeps society on the road to progress and cultivation. However, for Coleridge it is not enough simply to leave the way open for progress to happen - cultivation must be actively encouraged if humanity is to avoid the stagnation which follows when ideas become widely accepted. Thus he

CWXm, pp. 408-9. The notion is described in On Liberty (CW XVin, p. 252) as ‘almost a commonplace’ in politics, and is used in support of the argument for freedom of thought and discussion, although it is not explicitly attributed to Coleridge.

CWSTC 10, pp. 29,44.

employed the notion of a national church or clerisy, whose role was to secure the improvement of civilisation. This group would be composed of the learned of all the liberal arts and sciences whose knowledge constituted and contributed to civilisation. Mill in an 1831 letter to Sterling had expressed the view that he thought Coleridge would agree with him that the clerisy should be drawn from all ranks of people capable of improving

others by their example and exhortations, and that such people are found in all walks of

life, both Christian and non-Christian.^^ For Coleridge, the clerisy exists to educate all people in ‘civility’, defined as those qualities which enable a people to conserve its ‘essential interests’, which in turn leads to the progressive civilising of the entire community.^^