H2 posits that voters prefer ballot measures that are inclusive in scope, regardless of policy type. If ballot measures most often result in exclusive benefits or burdens, as many critics believe, then it can be said that they are the tools of special interests. While this approach has been used previously in the literature (Braunstein 2004), a review of its application revealed that it was often unable to account for the various and sometimes competing interests that initiatives can affect. Accordingly, it was necessary to evaluate each measure more precisely according to three dimensional criteria: citizen scope, citizen impact, and business impact.89
An examination of the initiative population revealed that over 89 percent of proposed measures were inclusive in scope. This reflected that the benefit or burden that was generated by the initiative applied potentially to the entire community, though those who did not desire to partake of the benefit or did not engage in the regulated behavior would not be affected. While it is important to determine if each person could benefit or be burdened, it is equally necessary to gauge whether a policy was designed to have a disproportionate effect—either positively or negatively—on one or more segments of the community. As such, a variable to address whether this benefit or burden was evenly or unevenly distributed was included. Almost 63 percent of all measures were uneven in scope, indicating that only particular segments of the
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This approach is a departure from Braunstein (2004), who used only one variable in an effort to ascertain an individual’s ability to access the benefits of proposed measures—often with inconsistent results. In the process, the effect of initiatives on business was disregarded.
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population were likely to be the beneficiary of or be burdened by these proposed initiatives. While it is axiomatic that 100 percent of exclusive measures were unevenly applied, it is interesting to note that more than 58 percent of inclusive measures were similarly uneven in their focus. As expected, most governance reforms were inclusive (90 percent) and evenly distributed (52 percent) in their scope; policy mandates were similarly inclusive (88 percent), but unevenly distributed (75 percent), reflecting a special interest bias. Accordingly, citizen impact was significantly and moderately correlated with each policy type.
Historically, it is said that the initiative process was a powerful tool with which ordinary citizens defeated special interests, and diluted the influence of business on the governmental process. It stands to reason then that the initiative would be used by citizens to shift certain costs for their benefits onto the business sector when legislators proved reluctant to do so, given the political consequences. While most ballot measures did not appear to impact business interests, those that imposed a burden outnumbered those that secured a benefit by more than a three-to-one margin, 22 versus seven percent. Of these, over 95 percent were inclusive in scope and 43 percent evenly distributed, suggesting that a burden on business was unlikely to result in an exclusive citizen benefit but that a majority affected some at the expense of others. Business benefits appeared to magnify this disparate effect, given that only 79 percent were inclusive and 25 percent even. Still, citizen scope and impact were significantly but only weakly associated.
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Having examined the scope of the initiatives that qualified for the ballot, the question remains as to whether citizens structure their voting behavior according to these characteristics. Further analysis revealed no significant relationship between citizen scope or impact and the success of a measure. While many more inclusive measures passed than exclusive, 386 versus 40, so, too, did more unevenly-distributed measures than those that were more broadly accessible, 259 versus 167. Still, inclusive measures were more successful at the polls than exclusive ones, 45 versus 40 percent, and ‘even’ measures were more popular than their uneven counterparts, 47 versus 43 percent. Finally, business impact was significantly, but weakly correlated. While passage was as likely as failure absent any business effect, the existence of such a benefit or burden reduced a measure’s chances of success by about 16 percent.
With regard to subject matter, citizen inclusive measures were most prevalent in the fiscal, government operations, public morality, resources and environment, and economic regulation categories, while exclusive measures favored education and public morality. A significant, albeit weak, relationship exists between scope and subject. Citizen impact favored the governmental operations, fiscal, and resources and environment categories when its effects were evenly distributed, but fiscal, public morality, and economic regulation when they were not. A significant and somewhat stronger relationship was revealed in this context. Business was most burdened by measures in the resources and environment and economic regulation areas, and most
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benefited by changes in public morality.90 These observations intuitively make sense, given the characteristics of the behaviors they address.
In light of the foregoing, the disposition of H2 is unclear. While inclusive measures comprised an overwhelming majority of the initiatives that qualified for the ballot, most measures unevenly impacted the population—policy measures more so than governance reforms. However, inclusive and evenly-distributed measures were approved at a higher rate than the alternatives. Even so, more ‘uneven’ measures passed than their counterparts. Statistically, no relationships were found between scope or effect and passage. Another aspect that must be considered is how the ‘citizen impact’ criterion relates to the ‘inclusive’ criterion referenced in the hypothesis. Previous studies conflated these criteria and, thus, did not identify these conflicting trends. Accordingly, the evaluation of H2 relies on how the preference of voters is defined. These findings indicate that voters do prefer inclusive measures across-the- board, but adopt a greater number of ‘uneven’ initiatives albeit at a lower approval rate.