3. LA PENETRACIÓN COGNITIVA DE LA EXPERIENCIA
3.5. Consecuencias epistémicas de la penetración cognitiva de la experiencia
A possible improvement of conditions regarding the four areas listed below could lead to a conducive environment that would contribute to confidence-building between the parties to the Cyprus issue.
1) Capoeira Dance: Assertion of maritime jurisdiction claims
So far the parties have done little toward building confidence over energy issues. On the contrary, the RoC’s initial declaration of an EEZ and signing of EEZ delimitation agreements with Egypt triggered a maritime dispute between Turkey and the RoC, creating serious security concerns in the region. While NATO member Turkey is not happy with the international community’s clear approval of the RoC’s exploration activities, the RoC appears to exercise some caution in furthering these activities, and has so far refrained from licensing areas that overlap with Turkish claims. Turkey has signaled that it would go as far as taking military action against any activity in these disputed areas.
The main obstacle in this domain is political. Mere lack of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the RoC complicates any effort to improve the situation. For the time being, an official third-party (e.g., UN) involvement seems to be impossible due to the political positions of the parties, Turkey’s in particular – a situation which elim- inates the possibility of obtaining parties’ consent for such an official involvement. The only option left seems to be an unofficial dialogue between the parties. The recent dialogue between Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Greek foreign minister Evangelos Venizelos might open a window in this regard. For this dialogue process to evolve into something that can contribute to confidence-
13 See, for example, PIO RoC, “The President of the Republic Mr. N. Anastasiades Addresses an Event at the
Cypriot Community Centre, in London,” September 21, 2013 (http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/ 9c0256267bb09565c2257076004d0270/825b75e8d46190c0c2257bed003ac419?OpenDocument); and “Cumhurbaşkanı Eroğlu Basın Mensuplarına Resepsiyon Verdi,” Haber KKTC, December 27, 2013 (http:// www.haberkktc.com/haber/cumhurbaskani-eroglu-basin-mensuplarina-resepsiyon-verdi-84664.html).
building, both parties should agree somehow not to push each other into escalating tensions in the region. While on the one hand the RoC might agree not to antagonize Turkey over the disputed areas, on the other hand Turkey might be persuaded to refrain from issuing military threats against the RoC.
2) Exploration / exploitation / revenue sharing / usage
So far both Cypriot sides have chosen to follow separate paths in their exploration activities, a situation which currently serves as a mutual provocation element. While the Turkish Cypriots say their proposals for cooperation remain on the table, the Greek Cypriots object to any kind of dialogue on this matter before a political settle- ment is reached. Exploitation has not started yet. On revenue sharing, the Greek Cypriots take the position that this also has to wait until after a settlement. The issue of usage (the possibility of using natural gas on both sides of the island) has not even been brought up yet. The reason for deadlock in this area is twofold. On the one hand, lack of dialogue prevents any progress toward confidence-building initiatives. On the other hand, the fact that all four items (exploration, exploitation, revenue sharing, and usage) are being considered as inseparable adds to the challenges of starting any discussion on these issues.
Matters of exploration and exploitation could be de-linked from matters of revenue sharing and usage, and two unofficial dialogue schemes could be established in order to increase the chances of progress. Matters of exploration and exploitation have essentially been related with the sovereignty claims of the two parties. Progress could conceivably be achieved here if Turkey could be induced to tone down its aggressive position. This could open a possibility for persuading the Greek Cypriot side to come closer to dialogue. Revenue-sharing and usage issues should be consid- ered under a separate dialogue process. There is potential for improvement here, especially because of opportunities involved regarding the financing of a possible Cyprus settlement, and conversion on both sides of the island to more-sustainable energy production infrastructures in line with the EU 2020 targets, etc.
3) Transportation to external markets
So far there have been various transportation scenarios, ranging from pipelines providing access to European markets through Greece or Turkey to construction of LNG facilities off the shores of Israel or on Cyprus. It seems that Israel’s moves will have a determining impact on developments in this area, which may or may not contribute to confidence-building among the parties. For the time being it seems that a dual transportation regime is being mooted. On the one hand, the RoC is determined to build an LNG terminal even though this seems to be a hard task to realize without Israel’s natural gas. On the other hand, several Turkish and Israeli
companies are in talks regarding the construction of a pipeline from Israel to Turkey, which would need to pass through the EEZ claimed by the RoC, thus raising an issue that would have to be discussed with the RoC.
Israel might play a key role in starting a dialogue between the RoC and Turkey. Of course, this requires a full normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations (downgraded as a result of the Mavi Marmara incident of May 2010). The two sides have been in dialogue for this purpose since March 2013, when, at the personal request of Presi- dent Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu apologized to Turkey for the killing of nine Turkish citizens during the incident.
As regards gas export options, signals regarding Israel’s concern for not putting all her eggs in one basket are becoming clearer every day. It seems that Israel will favor at least a dual transportation regime for its natural gas. In addition to recent discus- sions regarding possible gas exports to close neighbors, such as Egypt, Palestinian Authority, and Jordan, Israel will still have to consider developing further export routes for the 40 percent of its natural gas resources.14 An Israel-Turkey pipeline, which is considered as a commercially attractive option, could be realized if the RoC is persuaded to allow it to go through its EEZ. The catch in return for the RoC will be twofold: Such a pipeline could have a branch that would transport Israeli gas to the RoC, providing the increased volume of gas needed to make the latter’s planned LNG terminal commercially viable.15 Then the pipeline infrastructure could become the basis of a quick monetization option for the Aphrodite field (through export to Turkey), since for the time being the RoC is already behind schedule for its LNG terminal project.
4) Environmental protection
Although not discussed very much, environment seems to be the most possible area of cooperation between the two parties. A technical dialogue process on monitoring and crisis management could be established with the potential to have wider regional implications, and contribute to the development of an East Med Environ- mental Regulation regime regarding increasing hydrocarbon potential of the region. With its already-existing environmental regulation mechanism, the European Union could play a leadership role in convincing the parties to take constructive steps on the subject.
14 Natural Gas Europe, “Israel: An Overview of Export Options,” January 30, 2013 (http://www.naturalgas-
europe.com/israel-overview-of-export-options).
15 For more on monetization options of Cyprus Natural Gas, see: MIT Energy Initiative, “Interim Report for the
Study of Natural Gas Monetization Pathways for Cyprus, Economics of Project Development Options,” MIT Energy Initiative, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 2013 (http://www.cyi.ac.cy/Cyprus_NG_ interim_report.pdf).
Conclusion
The discovery of hydrocarbons off the shores of Cyprus has triggered tensions and exacerbated the parties’ more fundamental and long-standing disagreements at the negotiating table, and hence complicated the solution of the Cyprus problem. Yet, this discovery also holds the key to cooperation, ensuring non-escalation of conflicts and their ultimate resolution.There are numerous alternatives for regional cooper- ation that will bring greater benefits to the involved parties from the development of Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons. Thus, despite the political challenges, it is still possible that incentives from regional cooperation over hydrocarbons development may drive the parties to look for ways to bridge their differences. Arriving there would require bold political vision on the part of the leaders in the region – that is, both sides of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and Israel, coupled with backing from influen- tial external actors with an interest in reconciliation and stability in the region.