CONSECUENCIAS DEL USO DE TARJETAS DE CRÉDITO DE CONSUMO

4.1.1 An overview of the crisis-event

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were the paradigm-altering catalyst for the creation of the 9/11 Commission and the subsequent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. On this morning, 19 hijackers took control of four passenger aircraft and used them as missiles to attack targets within the United States of America. On the morning of September 11, two flights, American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, departed from Logan International Airport in Boston. Both flights were bound for Los Angeles, California. Further south, two more Los Angeles bound planes, United Airlines Flight 93 departed from Newark, New Jersey and American Airlines Flight 77 departed from Dulles International Airport in Washington DC. Early in each flight, these four aircraft were commandeered by teams of hijackers.

The first two airplanes, American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, were crashed into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City at 8:46:40 and 9:03:11 respectively. Approximately 35 minutes later, at 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 was crashed into the west block of the Pentagon building, in Arlington, Virginia. At 10:02:23. the final aircraft, United Airlines Flight 93 crashed into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The aircraft was on a direct flightpath back to

Washington DC, approximately 20 minutes flying time from the capitol. The 9/11 Commission concluded that the aircraft was intentionally crashed by the hijackers, as the passengers were attempting to gain access to the cockpit to retake control of the plane (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States 2004b: 14). The hijackers’ target was deemed to be either the Capitol Building or the White House in Washington, DC (Ibid.).

4.1.2 Institutional failures

The immediate impact of these attacks in terms of the loss of civilian lives was

significant, as “[m]ore than 2,600 people died at the World Trade Center; 125 died at the Pentagon; 256 died on the four planes” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States 2004b: 1). The attacks were unprecedented, in an historical context. This was the first instance when the United States of America had been

attacked on its home soil since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and this was the first time the American mainland had come under attack. The hijackers’ targets were chosen for their symbolic significance with the World Trade Center representing American financial power, the Pentagon a symbol of American military power and either the Capitol Building (The Congress) or the White House (The President) representing American political power. Although the intended destination of United Airlines Flight 93 cannot be verified, it is widely assumed that the attack would have been reserved for a target of extraordinary symbolic significance. During the trial of Salim Hamdan, Osama Bin Laden’s former driver, he testified he had overheard that United 93 was headed for ‘the dome’. This has been interpreted to mean the Capitol

Dome a part of the structure housing the United States Congress (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States 2004b). Even the method of attack was intended to be dramatic and create intensely public scenes of devastation which would be captured by the media thus creating indelible images that would be replayed ad nauseum (Weimann 2007). Combined, these factors created a crisis-event which had a very strong psychological impact on the American people.

Even without a clear and detailed accounting of what had transpired, it was evident that there had been a catastrophic failure of institutions and government agencies. While the failure to prevent the attacks was significant,the true extent of this failure is amplified when one considers that this was a failure of the central role of the United States Government. As Senator Jim Talent, former member of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committee, highlights:

First, the framers of the U.S. Constitution envisioned national defense as the priority obligation of the federal government. The first power granted to the president in Article 2 is “Commander-in-Chief of the Armies and Navies of the United States, and of the Militias of the Several States.” Of the 17 powers granted to Congress in Article 1, six relate specifically to defense, and the Constitution grants Congress the full range of authorities necessary to establish the defense of the nation (as it was then understood).

The other powers granted to Congress are permissive in nature; Congress can choose to exercise them or not. But the federal government is constitutionally obligated to defend the nation. Article 4, Section 4 states that the “United States shall guarantee to every State a republican form of government and shall protect each of them against invasion” (Talent 2010).

These Government institutions, which are constitutionally charged with the roles of national defence and the protection of the citizenry, had failed. In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks there was a growing chorus of voices calling for an independent investigation to determine what had happened and who was responsible. As the

literature confirms, a disaster-event of this nature and scope creates a circumstance fertile for the creation of a public inquiry (Turner, 1976). In fact, it was not long after September 11th that a chorus of support for the establishment of a Commission charged with investigating the terrorist attacks began to grow.

4.1.3 Calls for investigation

There were two main sources of vocal support for the creation of a public commission to investigate the attacks of September 11th and the related systemic failures. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks there was a general consensus amongst lawmakers that what the intelligence community needed to prevent further attacks was support and not recrimination. However, by mid-October opinions began to change as a small group of Senators and Representatives began publicly voicing their support for an independent inquiry. This group of legislators included Senators Joseph Lieberman and John

McCain, Congressmen Timothy Roemer, Chris Shays and Chris Smith. Support began to grow within Congress and by May the Democratic leadership of both Houses was openly advocating for the creation of a public inquiry (CNN 2002). Despite the growing support for creating a Commission, however, the White House remained opposed to the idea. The President’s position was that the Congressional Joint Inquiry was already operating and should be allowed to finish its investigation. The Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 conducted its work between February and December 2002. The Congressional Inquiry was made up of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The Joint Inquiry’s final report

runs 832 pages and sets out both a narrative and recommendations that focus

specifically on the intelligence failures that led to the 9/11 attacks. Additionally, the Administration was concerned that such a large public inquiry would consume time and resources and distract from the immediate priority of fighting the War on Terror

(Firestone and Risen 2002).

The second major driving force behind the creation of the 9/11 Commission was the families of the victims. Family members of the victims of the September 11th attacks had created Families of September 11th, a not-for profit entity in October of 2001. The organisation was created as a resource for family members and as a point of contact for the multitude of 9/11 charities which were created in the aftermath. Families of

September 11th, reflecting the frustration of many family members at the lack of definitive answers regarding details of the attacks, began meeting with these members of Congress and publicly supporting the creation of a Commission (Kean, et al. 2007: 16). “In June 2002, the families held a large rally in Washington, D.C.-- where their interest in a commission converged with the efforts of certain members of Congress. Immediately, the issue of the 9/11 Commission gained prominence” (Ibid.: 19). The families leveraged this momentum and began regular meetings with members of

Congress advocating for the creation of the Commission. While this effort was building momentum for a public inquiry, there remained resistance to the idea within both Congress and from the White House. Central to this resistance was the view that any September 11th investigation should be dealt with by the Intelligence Committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Administration’s view of the matter, as reported in the media in May 2002, was that “[...] the investigation should be confined

to Congress because it deals with sensitive information that could reveal sources and methods of intelligence. Therefore, [President Bush] said, the congressional

investigation is "the best place" to probe the events leading up to the terrorist attacks” (Brush, 2002).

By September 10th, 2002, however, the single most significant obstacle to the creation of a Commission, opposition from the White House, was eliminated. In fact, the President’s Press Secretary gave credit to the families for helping to change the President’s position on the matter. “The administration has met with some of the families of the 9/11 groups, who have talked about the need for a commission to look into a host of issues, and they have made compelling arguments” (Firestone and Risen 2002). This shift in White House policy cleared the way for Congressional legislation to begin on the creation of a public Commission and within weeks, the legislative process began.

4.2 Phase II: The National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the United