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Rawls opens A Theory of Justice saying that “[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” (1999[1971]: p.1). The obscure nature of this sentence requires further investigation. Thus, in order to develop some ideas honouring the Rawlsian project – restated in Political Liberalism (1993) and Justice as Fairness (2001) – this thesis suggests rephrasing and dividing the sentence in two parts: (i) “looking for justice is the first virtue of societies, as looking for truth is the first virtue of scientific communities”; (ii) “promoting a well-ordered society (stability for the right reasons) is the first virtue of social institutions, as promoting a situation of normal science (for the right reasons) is the first virtue of systems of thought”.
The main aim of the first rephrased sentence is making clear that virtuous societies – and not virtuous social institutions – are those that look for “justice”. Social institutions have a different function, as explored in the next paragraph. This comparison shows how Rawls (and this thesis) understand justice. “Looking for justice”, that is, “trying to treat all individuals in a just way”, is a characteristic of a virtuous society, not of a virtuous individual. Of course, ordinarily, individuals are classified as just or unjust. However, here, “just” is a quality exclusively related to social decisions. In this sense, “justice” means “social justice”. Moreover, societies can look for other virtues, like efficiency, but justice is considered as the most important one9. Nevertheless, since well-ordered societies are composed of individuals who take decisions in the public sphere, to be just, these societies depend on individuals with certain virtues10. One of the aims of this thesis is to investigate such virtues and how to cultivate them.
The second sentence serves to explain, through another analogy, the role of virtuous institutions in Rawls‟ project. According to him, virtuous social institutions are those which preserve conditions for a society to progress politically towards “justice”, exactly as, according to Kuhn, virtuous systems of thought are those in which knowledge progresses towards “truth”11
. In 2.2, it is shown that, in Kuhn‟s view, a virtuous system – a virtuous paradigm – is associated with a period of normality. In these moments, scientists have a basis
9
Other approaches can claim that, for example, eliminating oppression or suffering, increasing average welfare, or perpetuating the culture are more important than promoting justice. However, as explored in chapter 4, these ideas are somehow contemplated by the current proposal.
10 The same distinction can be applied for scientific communities and scientists.
11 “Truth” and “justice” are mentioned between brackets, because, for pragmatism (the metaphysical-
epistemological approach behind this thesis), they only exist within a consensual context. This idea is explored in 2.2.
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of common beliefs which allow them to collaborate towards producing new methodologies and data, creating plenty of new knowledge. It is claimed here that, according to Rawls, virtuous institutions are those which guarantee social stability. Such a moment allows citizens to live in a system of social cooperation, which helps them to develop just societies in a well- ordered way (2001, p.27-8).
Though this analogy seems interesting, there are also some limits to it. Firstly, the development of natural sciences requires a different type of precision from what is needed in social sciences. Actually, the identification of a paradigm in social sciences is much more difficult and controversial than in natural sciences. Furthermore, it is far from obvious that some specific values associated with the idea of justice are shared by individuals in Western contemporary societies. Even so, 2.4 presents the historical development of a shared belief in broad ideas of equal liberty, communal responsibility and democracy.
Reflecting specifically on theories of justice, two other limits can be identified. Invariably, theories of justice – unlike theories about the natural world – do not intend only to describe phenomena, but also to actively influence the way societies are organised and individuals behave. Finally, as explored in 2.2, the range of consensus in natural sciences is quite small, since the agreement is expected only between “principal” researchers‟12 theories centred in specific fields and “minor” researchers‟ findings. On the other hand, political consensus, as aimed by Rawls (1993; 2001), is general, that is, such equilibrium has to reach (almost) all society – something much more difficult. This depends on a dialogue between principal and minor researchers from different areas (philosophy, sociology, psychology, history, economics, etc.) and the translation of their ideas to the population; at the same time, people‟s ideas have to reach academic debate (this point is explored in 2.4). This dialogue is essential for refining ideas and solving political puzzles. More than this, since political discussions are much less precise than scientific debates (and, as discussed in 2.3, scientific ethos seems to be more developed than social ethos), mechanisms for dealing with dissensus in political theory are imperative. It is also possible to say that, following Honig (1993) and Mouffe (1993), dissensus is inherent to (democratic) politics. Actually this idea is also explored by Alnes (2017) in his reflection about the room of dissensus in Rawlsian idea of overlapping
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consensus (2.6). Then, it is not expected that equilibrium in politics is based on the same level of consensus as in natural sciences.
Having presented initial possibilities and limits of investigations in natural sciences and political philosophy, it is also interesting to show that the inspiration behind the Rawlsian idea of reflective equilibrium comes directly from reflections on the development of sciences. Though this expression was invented by Rawls, it is based on Goodman‟s works on philosophy of science (1999[1971], p.18). Through proposing such equilibrium, Rawls tries to capture the idea of a “virtuous circle” between basic ideas and justifications proposed by Goodman to solve a problem about how sciences are developed. As discussed in 2.2, this proposal is closely connected with Kuhn‟s and Dewey‟s ideas on the development of knowledge.