Consenso y Conflicto en los trabajos de grado en juventud

convention.

"The criterion of meaning", says Popper, "leads to the wrong demarcation of Science and Metaphysics". ("Conjectures and Refutations", essay 11, "The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics").

6* Unless increased truth content and lowered falsity content could be

established by some other way than testing. I am assuming that they cannot be established except by testing in some form.

7„ The term used by BffiB LAKATOS in his "Criticism and the Growth of Knovfledge" (edited with Alan Musgrave, 1970)a Lakatos essays "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes".

8, To explain any one event, an infinite number of meaningful explanations could be proposed, any of which 'might be true'. Only the testable ones provide a basis for selection between some of these competing proposals. 9, But see Chapter 2, footnote 10, on the weaknesses of 'belief.

10, The Greeks placed no great premium on testing. Some of their scientific theories were susceptible to retrodiotion - that is, they were required to account for the current state of observation. But the notion of testing by predicted consequences was never established,

11, The quotation is from ALASDAIR Mao INTYRE's "Ivlarcuse" (1970), He is describing Marcuse * s prose.

12, In "Conjectures and Refutations" (196$)

15. Also in "Conjectures and Refutations", Popper quotes (in Chapter 1) an

psychology* were very much in vogue, Popper tells us,

"Once, in 1919? I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no (difficulty in analysing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen the child, Sli^tly shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure.

'Because of my thousandfold experience,' he replied; whereupon I could not help sayings 'And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand-and-one-fold.* "

All Adler had sho^m was that a case-,, could be interpreted in the light of the theory. One is reminded irresistably of how each new historical

circumstance is adduced as further evidence of the soundness of Karl îvlarx's theories on the inevitable course of historical development.

69

Chapter 4

THE ACQUISITION AND DvIPROYBÎYÏENT OF SKILLS

"If a man write a better book, preach a better sermon, or make a better mouse-trap than his neighbour, though he build his house in the woods, the world will malce a beaten path to his door."

" Halph Waldo Emerson: 'Lecture noted down by Mr3.Sarah Yule'

1

70

The notion th a t th e re might be other uses for m etaphysical propositions^ other than those xdiich derive from th e ir inform ation conbarb^ lead s on to the

co n sid eratio n of attcanpts to achieve aims i n which the attem pts talce the form of a c tio n s. This c la s s of a c tiv ity is c le a rly distinct from th a t which xfe have already inspected in the sense th at R yle’s "knowledge how” to d is tin c t from h is "knoxvledge tshat” c. D espite the fa c t th a t the foregoing analysis has suggested th a t

all^human a c tiv itie s can be delineated by a d esired objective^ th e re i s s t i l l a d iffe re n c e which can be to e n tifie d betxmen those attem pts to ad iiav e aims xdilch proceed by x-rsy o f proposition^ and those xdiich involve an actual performance*

1

In h is essay "R ationalism in P o litic s ” ^ Michael Oakeshott s e ts out the txfo s o rts of knowledge appropriate to the d iffe re n t types of attempts® He says : "Every science^ every art, every practical a c tiv ity requiring s k i l l of any s o r t, indeed every human activ j.ty xiiatsoever, involves knoxfLedge® And, u n iv e rsa lly , th is

knowledge is of txm sorts, both of xtolch are atoays involved in any a c tu a l activity® I t i s not, I thinlc, making to o much of i t to c a ll toem two sorts of knowledge,

because (thaigh in fa c t they do not e x is t se p a ra te ly ) th e re are c e rta in im portant d iffe re n ce s between them®" He c a lls them tech n ical and pr actio al knox-rledge* The f i r s t of th ese is i n mmy activities formu].ated in to ru les, but he te l l s us :

"Whether or n o t i t i s , or has been, p re c is e ly form ulated, i t s c h ie f c h a ra c te ris tic is th a t i t i s su sceptible of p re c ise form ulation, a lth a i^ i sp e c ia l skjX l and Insight may be required to give i t th a t form ulation*" Tlie second s o rt he c a lls p r a c tic a l, "because i t e x is ts only i n u se , is nob r e f le c tiv e md (unlike ted in iq u e) cannot be

2

form ulated in to rules*" The method by which i t to shared, he claiins, is "not the method of form ulated d o ctrine*” I t can "n eito er be taught nor learn ed , b u t only im parted and acquired® I t e x is ts only i n p ra c tic e , and the only way to acquire i t is by apprenticeship to a m aster - not because tha m aster can teach i t (he cannot), b u t because i t can be acquired only by continuous œ nliact xclth one xAo is

7 1 3

p e rp e tu a lly p r a c tis3.ng it" @

Oakeshott^s contention is th a t in aich a c tiv itie s as cookery^ the

in s tm c tio n s w ritte n in a cookery book consti'lxite only the te d in ic d . kno^/ledgee Eo one supposes th a t a person w ill become a good cook simply by reading it^ because th e re is ^ in addition^ tie p ra c tic a l knœ ledge which can onl.y bo im parted or

4*

acquired in usOo His c ritic ism of *the r a t i o n a l i s t ’ stems from wliat Oalceshott regards as the l a t t e r ’s a s s e rtio n th a t th is "practi.cal. knw ledge" is not Imowledge a t a l l5, th a t ’’p ro p erly spealcing^ th e re is no knovdedge which is not technical,

knocfledge” . Oakeshott does not say vîhether the p ra c tic a l knowledge can never be form ulated because i t is n e c e ssa rily of too complex an order^ or because i t is n o n -ra tio n alf but he does^ by h is u se of the terms ’’im parted and acquired" make i t clear th a t i t i s knowledge whidi can be passed from a person who knows i t to one Tiio does not^ a lb e it by a kind of d iffu sio n process ü iich soirehow surmounts the f a c t th a t the knowledge cannot be formulated^ Oskeshott p la in ly takes the view th a t i t is n o t merely our la c k of competence a t an a ly sis or d e sc rip tio n which renders us unable to transm it th is knowledge i n a form ulated schane^ b u t rath er th a t the kncwledge by i t s very nature^ d e fie s the treatm ent of an aly sis and descjrf-ptiono I t e x is ts "only in p ractice"o

I t is c e rta in ly tru e th a t when people engage in s).cilled a c tiv itie s ^ there is a c e rta in amount which they can 1 earn from in stru c tio n s supplied by others^ whether th ese be supplied by the v m tte n or spoken word. I t is a lso tru e th a t th e re is^ beyond this, a certaj.n amount which can only be gd.ned by actual experience of the activityo This is the p a r t we speak of when we ta lk about

"learn in g from p ractice "o One of the c h a ra c te ris tic s of a s k i l l Is th a t th e re i s a c le a rly -d e fin e d aim which d e lin e a te s i t from other activaities<» There is a

3

tZ.

in the actdAdtyp and which m i l be used as a standard agaiist which th e ir

performance w ill be judged. The two ty p es of knafledge^ technical and practical^

are designed to a s s is t in th e achievement (or nearer approach) of th e conventional ta r g e t. In golf g for example g the conventional ta r g e t is to complete the 18 holes of the course using as few stro k e s as p o ssib le ! and th is aim is a s siste d by both the te ch n ic al knowledge (of which clubs to use,, how to stand g e tc .) and th e

p ra c tic a l knowledge (of hcrw much fo rce to apply g when and how to swing the hips^ and so on).

P a rtic ip a tio n in a skilled activity consists in an attem pt to perform actions which will modify the observed universe to a predeterm ined p a tte rn . The conventional ta r g e t t e l l s us how th e observed universe should appear a fte r we have performed the action^ and thus gives us an id eal s ta te a g a in st which we can

measure the a c tu a l m odification achieved, Wîien we embark on a 2 0-fo o t p u tt on

the green of a g o lf course, we know th a t the conventional ta rg e t would have th e observed u n iv erse d iffe rin g , a f te r our stro k e , to the e ffe c t t h a t the ball would

(a

be in the hole. I f , after our attempt, the b a ll does proceed to e n te r th e h o le, then we can, by the standards of the conventional ta r g e t, c a ll our attem pt

su c cessfu l, Tlie conventional ta r g e t may be an absolute one, or i t may be

com parative, b u t i t s existen ce is e s s e n tia l to sep arate o f f from other activ d .ties the lim ite d fie ld of a p a rtic u la r s k i l l . In golf we have, a th e o re tic a i absolute ta r g e t, in th a t the a b ility to complete 1 8 holes of golf in 18 strokes would be regarded as p e rfe c t by anyone trho contem plated üie a c tiv ity * But in te r n is , üie ta r g e t is com parative, for we are only required to p la c e the b a l l with such

directions and v e lo c itie s th a t our opponent cannot retu rn it*

Of course, in many s k i l l s , the adiievement of the nominated o b jectiv e is hedged about w ith a r t i f i c i a l l y imposed lim ita tio n s (ru le s of th e gams) in

73

order to make I t s attainm ent more d i f f i c u l t , or in order to make com parative

estim atio n of p a rtic ip a n ts easier and f a ir e r . These lim ita tio n s become q u a lific a ­ tio n s to the -fcarget, making i t a more lim ite d one. The objective in g o lf is thus to complete an 18 hole course in as few stro k es as p o ssib le , while carrying no

more th an ]ii clubs of an approved design, ih ile counting two penalty stro k es for every shot out of bounds, and so f o rth . Ttiese imposed lim ita tio n s are more evident in the s k ills we cal.l ’s p o r ts ’, but can often be p rese n t in oth er s k i l l s . I f a c la r in e ti s t, for example, were to intro d u ce a mnd m achiæ which could be co n tro lled e le c tro n ic a lly by means of sm tc h e s, he would n o t, however s a tis fa c to ry the perform ance, be described as a good p lay er. The notion of a s k ille d

c l a r in e ti s t is one which assumes th e lim ita tio n th a t the instrum ent must be played w ith the mouth.

I t might be argued th a t in some a c tiv i tie s such a s , for example, the play in g of m usical instrum ents or the p a in tin g of p ic tu re s , there is no cl ear ly-define d target. The m usician whmaim is to be ’b e t te r ’ than anyone else does not

necessarily know what standard w ill be used, and what performance he must

achieve to be ’b e t te r ’ . This is tr u e , and serves to dem onstrate th a t th e re are fa c e ts of th ese a c ti\d .tie s which cannot be c a lle d ’s k i l l ’ at a l l . One of the c r ite r ia which d istin g u ish a dcill or a c r a f t from an a r t is th a t the s k i l l or c r a f t has nominated standards by which i t can be ra te d , and th a t th e se standards have become ’o b jectified * by tlieir public formtxlationo Tixe score i n a game of

golf is n o t a m atter of su b jectiv e op in io n , whereas the excellence of a musical

r e c ita l most c e rta in ly i s . This is not to say th a t m usical ap p rec iatio n must be e n tire ly su b jectiv e. On the c o n tra ry , i t is because th e re are c learly -d efin ed

standards of measurement and assessm ent th a t m usical ap p reciatio n something which can be taught: people can be to ld what to look for*, and how to ap p reciate itc N onetheless, th e re remains in iiie judgement of a m usical perform ance an

74

element which depends upon the reactio n s of the observer.

I f t lie re is i n the minds of th e p a rtic ip a n ts or sp e c ta to rs of a p u rsu it a clearly -d efin ed o b jectiv e which is independent of their in d iv id u a l

opinions, th e n the a c tiv ity may be described as a d c ill or a c r a f t. I f the achievement of success depends for i t s attainm ent on tlie ré p o n se of the

sp e c ta to r, then we are dealing w ith an a c tiv ity which lias elem ents of ’a r t ’ i n i t , as >>'glL1 as (possibly) those of skilfL. Many a c tiv i.tie s do involve ole nient s of both@

A photograph can be a work of d c ill i f i t is to be only a lik e n e s s ; people who in sp e c t i t can compare i t with the su b ject and evaluate the accuracy of i t s

re p re se n ta tio n . I t can a lso , though, be a work of a r t i f th e contem plation of i t evokes in the minds of the spectators some awareness of th e relationships betweai