ALGUNAS CONSIDERACIONES ACERCA DE LOS DERECHOS Y DEBERES EN RELACION CON EL TRABAJO

Much of the preceding analysis developed at the hand of secondary literature – most of which is to be found in the organisational and business ethics literature. This move was intentional, as the point of this analysis was not only to introduce postmodern thought, but also to present an overview of how postmodernism is understood in the social sciences, particularly business ethics and organisation theory. In the section to follow, some of the views espoused by various theorists in the preceding analysis are critically analysed in terms of how these theorists view the theoretical landscape that inform their opinions.

5.1.Distinguishing between systematic modernism, critical modernism, and postmodernism The critique of modernism presented in this study correlates with the earlier Parker’s (1993) view of systematic or comprehensive modernism, defined as a position in support of totalising theories (see footnote 30). This critique translates in a rejection of all universal forms of rationality and ethics. Most of the theorists cited in this chapter are opposed to this view of modernism. However, what should be clear is that a rejection of universal theories does not necessarily translate into support for

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postmodern positions. In order to illustrate this point, it is necessary to briefly elaborate on the distinction between systematic modernism, critical modernism, and post(-)modernism.

Hassard (1993: 4) defines the objective of systemic modernism as the attempt ‘to facilitate the control of complex and large-scale operations through a range of highly programmed knowledge technologies.’ On this definition, it is difficult to see how systemic modernism differs from Hassard’s view of post-modernism (as an epoch), which – to recall – is a movement that supports ‘the realist notion that we simply need to find the right way of describing the [admittedly complex and fragmented] world ‘out there’’ (2). Or, more accurately, it is unclear that this view of post- modernism does in fact present us with a postmodern position. It seems that the ideal of universality, or the belief that we can (through the correct technologies) find the perfect means to describe objective reality, is still alive and well. The only thing that has changed is the sophistication of the technologies that must be employed, in order to uncover the mechanisation of the social order.

Critical modernism (see footnote 30), on the other hand, presents a more contextually-sensitive philosophical position. The main contemporary advocate of this position is Jürgen Habermas, who, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987), analyses the radical critique of reason, which he associates with the paradoxes of self-referential critique (i.e. the position that there is no vantage point from which to criticise Enlightenment rationality outside of critical reason (see sec. 6.2.)) (Fleming, 1996: 169). Because of their support for a radical critique of reason, many post- Enlightenment thinkers and postmodernists are (according to Habermas) unable to provide a sound basis for social critique. McCarthy (1987: ix) argues this point forcefully in the introduction to Discourse of Modernity, stating that Habermas is of the opinion that, as a result of the radical critique of reason, ‘the epistemological and moral subject has been definitively decentered and the conception of reason linked to it irrevocably desublimated.’ According to McCarthy (x), Habermas is very much aware of our essential finitude, but wishes to avoid the consequences of a radical critique of reason. Thus, the strategy that he follows in this book, is to reject ‘“the paradigm of consciousness” and its associated “philosophy of the subject” in favor of the through-and-through intersubjective paradigm of “communicative action”’(x).

In his Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas (1984) explains this paradigm as follows: we are able to recover a form of natural reason – or ‘the lost sense of the enlightenment that Kant first revealed to us’ (Power in Hassard, 1993: 5) – through experiencing the common sense of ordinary language. Habermas claims that we can recognise a certain sphere of validity through

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argumentation, and that this sphere of validity acts as the sole criterion according to which we can judge and critique knowledge claims. Rational argumentation is, therefore, the means through which we can reach consensus. In this regard, Habermas (1984: 17-18) writes:

Thus the rationality proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to the practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it possible to continue communicative action with other means when disagreements can no longer be repaired with everyday routines and yet are not to be settled by direct or strategic use of force.

What, therefore, distinguishes the critical modernist approach from the postmodern view, is that critical modernists still work with the regulative idea that an ideal horison of inter-subjective truth can be accessed.

Given this definition of critical modernism, Walton’s (1993) belief that we are relatively free to influence the workings of capitalism through an exercise in theory building that rests on a normative basis can be interpreted as corresponding with the project of critical modernism. Organisational theorists such as Thompson (1993), the earlier Parker (1993), and Reed (1993) are explicit in their support of critical modernism, and view critical modernism as a better alternative to systemic modernism and postmodernism. All three these organisational theorists are of the opinion that postmodernists dismiss outright the significantly grounded rationality inherent in practices, in favour of an approach that propagates radical incommensurability and polarisation in, and between, discourses. These theorists are, therefore, also opposed to a radical critique of reason.

5.2.In support of affirmative postmodernism

Such blanket dismissals of postmodernism are not fair. Whilst sceptical postmodernists may portray an ethical cynicism that verges on nihilism, affirmative postmodernists exhibit a healthy temperance in trying to find working solutions in the absence of any fixed truth (see Kilduff & Mehra, 1997; Gustafson, 2000). In this sense, one should be cautious of accepting Parker’s (1993), Walton’s (1993), Thompson’s (1993), or Reed’s (1993) conclusion that all moral judgements should be treated as equally valid from a postmodern perspective, simply because there is no firm basis for ethics. In Linstead’s (2004a: 177) words: ‘just because the terrain of ideas may be problematic, doesn’t mean we can’t act’. Moreover, we have seen examples in this chapter of both Lyotard’s (1984) and Derrida’s (1988a) explicit defence of contextually-based perceptions of truth. Gustafson (2000) also reiterates the point that certain postmodern positions can espouse various forms of

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morality without referring to ultimate truths, and further argues that postmodernists, such as Derrida, Foucault, and Levinas, can defend their positions on principle-based grounds. On this more nuanced reading, Parker’s (1993: 210) project of defending ethical-political claims against the postmodern attempt to put all productive disagreement into question is misguided, or represents – as Linstead (2004a: 177) states (rather more forcefully!) – ‘that old modernist non sequitur which seems to be based on a misreading of the fable of Buridan’s Ass’33.

Linstead (175) reads these blanket dismissals of postmodernism (mostly in the name of some form of universal, instrumental, or emancipatory rationality) as arrogant attempts to ‘take postmodernism back, either as a discursive retraction or in time to a golden age prior to all misunderstanding.’ According to him, ‘we can’t recall... postmodernism because the problem is not with the product and the product is any case not ours to recall.’ In this context, he specifically mentions Hassard and Parker’s (1993) jointly edited book Postmodernism and Organizations (in which Thompson’s and Reed’s articles also appear) as an example of a project which claims to debunk postmodernism. Linstead (2004a: 174) notes that in this book, he counted twenty-one actual references to Derrida (most of which appear in his own contribution), twenty references to Lyotard, and three references to Deleuze. Parker, on the other hand, is referenced twelve times! Linstead (174) critically describes this project as follows:

Having effectively mounted its arguments on a simulacrum of postmodernism, this Matrix of a book ends by dismissing the arguments of simulation, thereby warranting its own reality. Which just goes to show that if you think that everything that happens is real, and everything that is real happens, what can you expect?

Linstead’s criticism of Parker’s project does not necessarily translate in a support of postmodernism, but does present a challenge to the manner in which postmodern thought has been treated in organisational and (one could also argue, in business ethics) thought. Given this situation, Linstead (174-177) makes an impassioned appeal to return to the primary literature, and to explore the postmodern ideas in their own right, rather than to continue thinking in general frameworks of ‘isms’.

33 _{Buridan's ass is a paradox in philosophy. It refers to a hypothetical situation wherein an ass, placed} exactly in the middle between two stacks of hay of equal size and quality, will starve to death since it cannot make any rational decision to start eating one rather than the other. The paradox is named after the 14th century French philosopher Jean Buridan. (Taken from: Wikipedia:

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The strategy followed in chapter four and five is influenced by both Linstead’s plea for a more careful appraisal and reading of postmodern ideas, and Gustafson’s two-fold hope for business ethics. To recall: Gustafson’s two-fold hope for business ethics embodies the dual aims of taking seriously postmodern ideas, whilst still remaining focused on the practical context in which these ideas are enacted. As such, Gustafson’s hope calls for a reconciliation of Willmott’s (1998) position (where the moral task is described as not only voicing, but also reflecting on moral judgement) and Parker’s (1998b) later stance (where he argues in favour of thicker descriptions, so as to re-inscribe ethics as a ‘contextual, situational [and] highly specific’ practice (Jackall, 1988: 6)).

Both these agendas must be simultaneously followed. This is because if the ethical task is only construed in terms of reflecting on moral judgements, one risks turning ethics into a technology for textual critique, whereby the normative exclusions in discourses are exposed. However, if one views the ethical task as merely producing thicker descriptions of highly-contextual practices, one risks developing a relative and incommensurable view of ethics. Only by simultaneously engaging in textual critique, and in investigating the contexts in which our ethical decisions are enacted, is it possible to develop a productive reading of ethics. Such a reading can account for the norms that guide our relatively stable practices, but prevent these norms from being naturalised and turned into transcendental, categorically-binding rules and principles.

Derrida’s deconstructive ethics is an example of a postmodern position that does work on both these fronts. In chapters four and five, Derrida’s theory of deconstruction will be explained, and illustrated with specific reference to the implications that this theory holds for our understanding of corporate social responsibility. However, at this juncture it is necessary to provide some general remarks on how the postmodern view of ethics (presented in this chapter) can overcome some of the problems associated with the standard normative tale discussed in chapter one.