PEOPLE v. PURISIMA (86 SCRA 542; 1978)
Facts:
Petitioners: City Fiscal of Manila, Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and the Solicitor General Public Respondents: CFI of Manila-branches VII & XVIII, CFI of Samar
• Par. 3, PD#9 provides:
knife,’ ‘spear,’ ‘dagger,’ ‘bolo,’ ‘balisong,’ ‘barong,’ ‘kris,’ or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 5 to 10 years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct
• Petitioners-fiscals filed before the respective respondent courts several & separate informations for illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Par. 3 of PD#9. (For illustration, one of the similarly written infos. alleged: That…accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed weapon…the same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.)
• Respondent courts, upon motions to quash filed by the defense counsels, issued their respective orders quashing the informations on common ground that the said informations did not allege facts constituting an offense penalized under PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of the crime: that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. They said that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.#1081 which seeks to attain the maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. They added that the non- inclusion of the aforementioned element of the offense leads to confusion as the same act punished as an offense under par. 3 of PD#9 is also the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance:
Sec. 26, Act#1780: It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: x x x. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding P500, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 6 months, or both…
Ordinance#3820—penalizes with a fine not more than P200 or imprisonment for not more than one month, or both…anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon…in any public place.
• Thus, the 26 petitions for review assailing the respective orders of the respondent courts. The petitions, having similar issues, were consolidated by the Supreme Court.
• The argument of the petitioners:
1. A perusal of par.3 of PD#9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy
2. The City Fiscal of Manila adds that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial; it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated
ISSUE: W/N the informations filed are sufficient form and substance to constitute the offense penalized under PD#9
HELD: NO.
• It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
• Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. This is especially in the case at bar where the acts being punished are covered by 2 penal statutes and a city ordinance. The right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against him, otherwise such act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under any of the 3 punitive laws and thus expose the accused to oppression and harassment.
• The elements of the offense under par. 3, PD#9 are: 1) the carrying outside one’s residence of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and 2) that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder. It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of Act#1780 and Ord#3820. Thus, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described under PD#9 is not a crime in itself. What makes the act criminal under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without such motivation, the act falls under the Act or the Ordinance. Consequently, the informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective and quashal is proper.
• The filing of the petitions were unnecessary because the petitioners could have availed itself of other remedies based on Rule 117, Sec.7. (Effect of sustaining the motion to quash); Rule 110, Sec.13 (Amendment of Info or complaint):
1. If the evidence so warranted, the People could have filed an amended info to include the second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondents. The SC has previously ruled that if the facts alleged in the info do not constitute an offense, the case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the info.
2. If the facts so justified, the petitioners could have filed a complaint either under Sec. 26 of Act#1780 or Manila city ordinance#3820, especially since the dismissal of the cases were made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash. Under Sec. 8, Rule 117, an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on extinguishment of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
PETITIONS DENIED.
96. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO ARIPAZA March 15, 2000
Nature: Automatic review of the decision of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte Facts:
235 In June 1995, 12-year old Rosita Encinas was sleeping with her brothers and sister when her stepfather Rodolfo Arizapa entered their room and proceeded to rape her. Rosita reported the incident to her two aunts and the barangay captain.
236 Arizapa was charged with the crime of rape. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the offense.
his stepdaughter. Aripaza said that he was admitting the offense of his own volition.
238 On October 8, 1997, the trial court found the Aripaza guilty of the crime of rape as defined in Art. 335 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 11 of RA 7659. He was sentenced to the supreme penalty of death.
239 In this automatic review before the Supreme Court, Aripaza contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of rape as it failed to conduct, before accepting his plea of guilty, a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his plea and his full comprehension of the consequences thereof as mandated by Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Section 3 – Pleas of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. – When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
Issue: WON the conviction of Aripaza may be set aside on the ground that his plea of guilty was improvidently made
Held: NO, because the plea of guilt was made after the court had already extensively received evidence which sufficiently proved the guilt of the accused.
Ratio:
240 The rationale behind Sec. 3 Rule 116 is that courts must proceed with caution where the possible punishment is in its severest form, because the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt when grave crimes are involved since the accused might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequences of his plea. 241 In the present case, the record indeed shows that the lower court failed to fully comply with
the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 116. There was no searching inquiry. The only question asked of Aripaza was this: “Are you admitting the offense charged against you of your own volition?”