Construcción de ambientes enriquecidos y propicios para el desarrollo

I. Justltia Del.

The oentrai principle of Julian's theology is the ri^teousness of Qodi^ "ita conoinenter totiua naturae voce reaonabat# inseparabiliter Deo adhaerere

Justltiam# ut faciliua inveniretur qui subatantiam ejus# quam qui aequitatem negaret. All other

'propristates' must be consistent with this formal constituent of deity without which moral relationships are impossible. It is the 'augusta virtus' which

exists entitatively in Qod Himselfs "in ipso vero Deo# omnium quae sunt ex nihilo oonditore# immense et olaro per aeternum orbe reaplendet. Origo^jus divinitas eat# aetas ejus aeternitas# et aeternitas ultro citro neacia vel desinere vel coepiaae. Ut

^Harnaokf "History of Dogma#" Vol.V.p.192. ^Op. Impf.III.9. (P.L. XLV, 1250).

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ergo genua ejus (quo nomine nihil allud quam

originem iatelligi volo) Deua est."^ "God who is utterly fair-mirjded would oease to be God without

'iustitia'."^ ,Justice is not one quality among others# but simply an alteraative way of describing the 'simplex multiplicitas' which exists in God:

"tunc quoque nobis plurimum praebebit auxilii# cum docuerit# neo prudentiam# neo fortitudinem# nec tempérant iam posse sine jus tit ia contineri."

Julian reailises that since there are no extrinsic differentia to being the function of deflniticm must be descriptive rather than logical. It is in Qod that justice truly exists: "Ut igitur prima fidel

fundaments oognoscas} noster Deua# Eoclesiae oatholicae Deus# substantia nobis ignotus eat# et àb aspectu

similiter remotuaj quern vidit nemo hominum# neo videre potest (I Tim.vi.16)} ut aeternus sine prinoipio# ita aanctus Justusque sine vitio#

omnipotentissimus# aequissimua# misericordissimus# ^Op. Impf.1.37 (P.L. XLV, 1063-4).

% p . Impf.II.124l(P.L. XLV, 1194); of.111.9 (P.L. XLV, 1250); of.I.133 (P.L. XLV, 1132)t «Faolt quod vult ... ubi ergo inseparabiliter voluntas

cohaeret aequitati, quamoumque do illis noninavero# utramque signavi.'

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innotesoeos solo splondora virtuturn; factor omnium

quae non want* dis pensât or oorum quae sunt* examina tor ounotorum qui et sunt* et futurl sunt* et fuerunt* In ultimo d&tt terram* oaelum* et ounota slmul elmmenta moturuss excltator olnerum* et oorporum restltutors

sed propter aolam jus tit lam* haeo quae dlxlmus* ounota faoturus #

Despite this promising start there.Is no olear understanding that the precise nature of the * justltla Del * oan only be Interpreted In terms of the revelation g l v m In Christ: ^You (JUllan) tried to prove that even those who are strangers to the faith of Christ can have true righteousness»*^

Justice Is defined In uncoapxHMaisingly Aristotelian terns I * Justice* as It Is wont to be defined by the learned and as we oan understand* la (If the Stoics will allow us to prefer one to the other) the greatest

of all virtues* discharging diligently the duty of restoring his own to each* without fraud* without favour#* Julian appreciates that no tern can be

^ p . Impf. 1.50 (P.L. XLV, 1072), ^C. *r. Iv# 25.

*0p. Impf. 1.35 (P.L. XIV, 1063). Also quoted by Haraaolc, op. olt., p. 192.

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applied uni vocally to God and man: legal justice is not synonymous with divine rl^teousness»^ Since we cannot transcend the finite by an idealisation of the creaturely* we must turn to scripture for a clear

2

understanding of what Qod*s , justice means» We shall presently see that this Insight Is vitiated by .the primary categorisation of Justice In terms of Old Testament legal concepts rather than by reference to the life of Christ# Julian la convinced that at

stake In the controversy is the fundamental premiss on vhioh religion rests - namely* ttiat ethical values are not simply subjective descriptions of acquired preferences* but mirror the corresponding reality In Gods *Exseoramur quod exsecratur Deus* Intelllglimis quod exponlt Deus* dlsserlmus quod disputavlt Deus* credlnus propter quod juravlt Deus#*^ An unjust Ctod would not be God: * ### si probarl posset Justus non

^Op. Impf. II. 22 (P.L. XLV, 1149), ®0p. Impf. i U . 3 8 (P.L. XLV. 1264),

®0p. Impf. 111.49 (P.L. XLV, 1270); of. III. 93 (P.L. XLV, 1287). Of. Aug. C.J.1.22t ^But this matter about Which we are now speaking pertains to the very foundations of the faith, *

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#1

988#* coavlnoeretur Deus non esse# * Here the dual InTluenoes of Pelaglanism converge# On the one hand

Stoicism provides the framework for that concept of religion in which *the apprehension of Ctod meeting man in an absolute claim or demand takes the dominant*

controlling place# On the other hand Hebraism* with its thought of God as the Source and Sustainer of ethical values provides the content#^ Since our experience Is ethically conditioned* this knowledge of a just God Is given Intuitively In the structure of moral awareness# As a universal experience of transcendent obligation It provides the paradigm for a true understanding of God's relation to the world#^

lop, Impf. III.2 (P.L. XLV, 1249); of. 1.57 (?#L# XLV. 1079) 'sine justltla Deus ease non potest# ' of# 1#23 (P.L# XLV. 1061 ): 'Deus vero esse nisi

Justus non potest#'

% # H # Farmert "Revelation and Religion*” (London* 1954) p# 159; cf# W#P# Patersons "The Nature of Religion*" (London* 1929) p# 261#

^#R# Matthews I "God In Christian Thought and Experience*" (London* 1950). p# 40#

^cf# H#H# Farmers "God and Men*" (London* 1948) p# 20s 'If by God we mean that final reality of righteousness and love* from vdilch all things*

Including ourselves* depend for their existence* their nature* their coherence* their unfolding history and final outcome* then the whole meaning of our existence Is at stake In Him* and nothing less than the whole breadth of our experience could be the appropriate and

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This Immediate oonviotion élucidâtes everything religion can say# Nevertheless the doctrine of God does not derive its distinctive character solely from the human experience of moredlty# Otherwise one could never be sure that It was an authentic experience of a transcendent Subject# The Divine Reality Is

mediated to man not only In the unconditional

Imperative of the conscience vhen face to face with the moral law# It also comes through scripture and traditions "sed est plus* Justus* et verus Deus* qualas omnls sancta Serlptura* omnls lex et fldes nostra v e n e r a t u r # T h e justice of God is both Immediately Intuited and analytically Infearred from the revelatory historical events attested In scripture# The Law as the elucidation of divine commands and

human equity Is the supreme expression of justice; "Ergo Deum et justum et plum credlmus et veracem* ac per hoc nihil imposslblle mandasse legem ejus tenemus* nihil falsum coriflrmare testlmonla* nlhll Inlquum pronuntiare Judlola#"^ The essence of the religious relationship Is obedience to the moral law 1 ^ p . Impf. 111. 33 (P.L. XLV, 1231).

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Giver# Julian Is not thinking here of a knowledge of God consisting simply of general abstract norms of conduct# Rather each individual Is personally addressed by God and called to obey* and though this imperative has Its ground In a reality more ultimate than the phénoménal world* It receives expression in the Decalogue t "Deus Justus legem devotionis homlni

non poneret* si sum nos set pati peccandl neces si tatem# # # # Posult autem Deus Justus legem homlni* quen ulturum se* si fulsset praevarioatus* epopondit#”^ The Lav

embodies the primary orientation between God and man because It expresses those basic principles of

obllgatl<^^and loyalty which inhere In the personal relationship itself# à similar pre*occupation with

Juridical Ideas appears in the relation existing

between the Law and God's |U*ovldentlal actions# "atque ideo Inter praecepta et Judicia Del nihil esse

A

pugnarum#" Seldom do either Hugustine or Julian appreciate that a forensic Justice which we know to be sadly barren in human relationships* cannot exhaust

whet we mean by the rl^ateousneas of God# Vitiated by Impf, vt, IS (P.I...XLV, 15S9),.