Construcción del fuselaje

The initial narrative formulation of an incident is not always successful. Stories fail for two reasons: because they are incomplete, that is, they lack some essential information, or because they are unconvincing, that is, the causal model is inappropriate. In such cases the story needs to be repaired. The major test of a story is its acceptance by others. Hence, it is usually true that repairs are prompted by the reactions of others, and in many cases are actually provided by others. Polanyi (1979) describes a story which was rejected because the causal model was clearly inappropriate. The narrator, a woman, recounts an episode of fainting on the New York subway during the rush hour. The subway cars were jammed with people, she was weak from emotional stress and insufficient food, they were all captives. . . . The narrator likens her situation to that of Jews in Nazi prison camps being herded together for execution. The group she relates her experience to rejects the analogy. Not only was her choice of analogue inappropriate, it also was clear that she was implicitly trying to shift responsibility for fainting and its aftermath from herself to the subway environment and other riders. Not surprisingly, her listeners quickly offered other points of view, that is, alternative models of responsibility. The narrator had, in fact, already explicitly identified the probable cause of her faint (lack of food, fatigue). Thus, her account was incoherent as well as inappropriate.

A more extensive repair procedure is illustrated in one of the narrative interactions reported by Gardner (1971) in his casebook on storytelling in psychotherapy. In several examples he shows that in therapy children sometimes tell either metaphoric or actual stories to communicate about their problems. Often, because of anxiety concerning the subject, the child’s story lacks the form of a good story. Or perhaps, the goal- oriented actions described by the child are ineffectual for dealing with the problems identified in the story. In response, the therapist retells the same story with modifications that help the child express feelings, and plan action. The case we have chosen for illustration (reported on pages 95 to 99) is that of a nine-year-old boy who is in therapy because of multiple fears, tantrums, and pervasive tension. Gardner asked the boy to tell a story. The boy produced a story about a dachshund taken by mistake to a training class for German shepherds. The dachshund “gets lost” in the class and is nearly trampled by the bigger dogs, but is saved by the man who is conducting the class. The dachshund is removed from the class but then is just left outside. Gardner interpreted the boy’s story as an

allegory which revealed the probable cause of the boy’s emotional problems, namely, feelings of abandonment. Gardner then re-tells the boy’s story. He retains the premise, that is, the causal model, but elaborates and clarifies many of the elements of the story, and introduces information and causal links which were missing in the boy’s version. In effect, Gardner took an inadequate but convincing story and made it a structurally complete story. The resulting story clarified the feelings of the child, since the child agreed the new version was like his own situation. The goal-oriented actions suggested were ones the child could use to gain the security he sought from persons other than his rather cold parents. The ending, growing up and living happily, offered the child a hopeful vision of his own future. The therapist was able to help the child create a more complete story-reflection of his problem, and to organize action for securing a solution. Haley (1976) describes similar techniques used in adult psychotherapy.

Gardner’s technique systematizes an informal but timeless practice used by parents, ministers, and pundits and advisors of various kinds, namely, the construction of narrative analogues to guide a person in resolving some predicament. This strategy works because the story (a) concretizes the problem, makes it explicit and gives it definite structure; (b) provides a natural basis for raising questions about causal relations and for modelling goal-oriented action; and (c) distances the listener (the “target” of the story) emotionally to a sufficient degree to sidestep that person’s defensiveness and anxiety. It is one of the virtues of narrative that it can convey information indirectly which would not be understood, or not be accepted if conveyed directly in literal and explicit terms. In effect, the use of analogue stories promotes discussion of a predicament by changing the immediate goal from solving the real-world problem into one of changing a story about a similar problem. Feelings play a prominent role in real predicaments and must also be carefully explored in analogue stories. Feelings provide information about expectations and role relations, and identify the features of a predicament which the person has not been able to comprehend (compare Dyer, 1983). The analogue story strategy will be most effective when it accepts the feelings generated by the real predicament but then explicitly resolves them in a constructive way. For example, if a person expresses shock or surprise about another’s behavior, then in the analogue of that situation the protagonist may be portrayed as unwittingly ignorant of facts which would have precluded such a reaction. Basically then, the construction of analogue stories is a form of tutelage in problem solving.

Narrative repair is potentially an unending process. Retrospection, or reminiscing, can be viewed as a process of testing the continued validity of life experience stories. Sometimes new information relevant to an incident is discovered which creates discrepancies in the accepted story, but more often interpretive perspectives change prompting reevaluation of the causal model which organized the original account. These repairs may occur spontaneously during retrospection but may also require guidance and collaboration as, for example, in the life review procedures developed by Lewis and Butler (1974).

Finally, narrative repair may entail overcoming the restrictive tendencies of analogical thinking described earlier, that is, reaching out to other domains or other levels of abstraction for useful causal models.

The two kinds of narrative repair which we have described are probably the most common narrative tasks, but there is another which should be mentioned. The class of stories we will call puzzlements consists of accounts in search of explanations. Experiences that are puzzling or ambiguous may be recounted to a friend with the hope that the friend can explain why the incident occurred or what it means. Such cases require generation rather than replacement of information. In effect, the narrative task has been transferred to someone else.

CONCLUSION

Narrative thinking – storying – is a successful method of organizing perception, thought, memory, and action. It is not the only successful method, but within its natural domain of everyday interpersonal experience it is more effective than any other. Nevertheless, narrative thinking is widely disparaged. The bias against narrative thought has been illustrated in two recent discussions of classroom education. Cazden and Hymes (1978) and Barnes, Britton, and Rosen (1971) both observed that personal anecdotes offered by students during discussion or questioning were rejected by teachers as inappropriate. The schools try to inculcate a style of thinking which emphasizes definition, abstraction, conceptual analysis, and rigorous canons of evidence or proof. There can be no doubt that these procedures are essential for certain kinds of inquiry, but we can certainly challenge the rejection of narrative from the province of rationality.

It is important to distinguish the use of narrative in postdictive explanation from its use in prediction. After the fact, that is, postdictive

accounts cannot be expected to satisfy the same criteria which we apply to predictive accounts. The reason is simple enough: stories cannot be tested like hypotheses because authentic events cannot be replicated under controlled conditions. However, mankind has developed both formal and informal methods for testing stories. Consider jurisprudence: Trials try to establish responsibility, settle disputes, and impose some redress. The procedures used in this mode are halfway between those of narrative and those of scientific theorizing. For example, the evidential procedures used in trials resemble both stories and theories. Consistency and credibility are required, but cross-examination and verifiability are also entailed. However, since the events under judicial review cannot be repeated, that is, replicated as required in tests of theories and hypotheses, decisions are frequently based on precedents. That is essentially a process of pattern matching. The judgment of likeness may be more rigorous in trials because several constraints are specified, but it is still the same process used in storying. Equivalent procedures are used informally in checking the stories we encounter in everyday life. Thus, there are accepted ways of evaluating the completeness, coherence, plausibility, and applicability of any story. Given the limitations on absolute proof imposed by the circumstances of everyday life, we believe that postdictive narrative cognition fully qualifies as a rational process.

Two other points may be made about the validity and utility of narrative thinking. First, where practical choice and action are concerned, stories are better guides than rules or maxims. Rules and maxims state significant generalizations about experience but stories illustrate and explain what those summaries mean. The oldest form of moral literature is the parable; the most common form of informal instruction is the anecdote. Both forms enable us to understand generalizations about the social order because they exemplify that order in a contextualized account. Second, stories can also be used as tests of the validity of maxims and rules of thumb. That is, stories can function as arguments. Stories are natural mediators between the particular and the general in human experience. We should strive to improve and refine this mode of thinking, not eschew it.

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PART III

The Emplotment of