CONSTRUCCIÓN DE MURO DE RETENCION Y ESTACIONAMIENTO DE INTUR CENTRAL

communications relating to past crimes already crimes and future crimes intended to be committed.

- The period is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney.

- Paredes was planning to commit the crime of falsification.

- But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication

was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future.

- The testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan

- Sansaet himself was a conspirator and it is settled that for the atty- client privilege to apply in communication, it must be for a lawful purpose. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the attachment of the privilege.

2. YES

Ratio Despite his involvement in the crime, Sansaet fulfills all the

requirements needed for his discharge as state witness.

Reasoning Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification and

in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. One of the requirements for state witness is that he does not appear to be the most guilty (not that he is the least guilty as to what has been erroneously interpreted in some instances).

- It is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and warrants an imposition of the same penalty.

- In the case of People v Ocemar: ―And by „most guilty‟ we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the perpetration of the offense.

- The other requisites for the discharge of Sansaet as state witness are present.

- Sansaet is the only cooperative witness to the actual commission of the crime of falsification.

- There is absolute necessity for Sansaet‘s testimony because the prosecution has no direct evidence available.

- He does not appear to be the most guilty.

- His testimony can be corroborated by reputable witnesses. - Sansaet has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

CASTILLO V SANDIGANBAYAN

BUENA; February 21, 2002 (jojo mendoza)

NATURE

Petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

FACTS

On July 23, 1987, the Republic of the Philipines Filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against several persons, one of which is petitioner. The complaint alleges that- defendant Gregorio Castilo acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent of defendants Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, et al in establishing Hotel Properties, Inc. in order to acquire beneficial interest and control, and conceal ownership, of Silahis Hotel; defendant Gregorio Castillo signed all pertinent documents as attorney-in-fact of the defendants Enriquezes and Panlilio.

- On October 1992, petitioner died.

- On October 15, 1996, petitioner, represented by his heirs, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint against him is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and must be dismissed pursuant to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Regala v Sandiganbayan.

- On November 26, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to dismiss. Respondent contends that the ruling in Regala does not apply to the present case, because in said case, there was a clear finding that the ACCRA lawyers were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients as shown by PCGG‘s willingness to cut a deal with the ACCRA lawyers – the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. In this case, the petitioner is being sued as a principal defendant for being in conspiracy with other defendants in the commission of the acts complained of and he is not being required to name his clients.

ISSUE

WON petitioner‘s inclusion in the complaint violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege

HELD

YES. While it is true that unlike in Regala, petitioner in not being required to name his clients, the case of Regala is still applicable in the present case because the two cases are the same in more important aspects.

- The fact of the lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and defendants Enriquezes and Panlilios was immediately raised by petitioner as one of his affirmative defenses. In the same vein, in Regala, the professional relationship was raised merely as a defense by defendant lawyers and was not yet proven during the trial. This not withstanding, the court struck out the complaint against the lawyers. - Similar to the petitioners in Regala, petitioner is not a mere witness. He is a co-principal in the case for recovery of ill-gotten wealth. He has made his position clear from the very beginning that he is not willing to testify and he cannot be compelled to testify in view of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and of his fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.

- Since the doctrine of adherence to judicial precedents or stare decisis is provided in Art. 8 of the Civil Code, Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude petitioner Gregorio Castillo as party defendant in the case RP v Enriquez.

DALISAY V MAURICIO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; January 23, 2006 (bry san juan)

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Motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding Atty. Melanio ―Batas‖ Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

FACTS

- On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondent‘s services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled ―Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana,

respondent,” pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1,

Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorney‘s fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused.

- On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that ―for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent.‖ She recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed. On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and approving in toto Commissioner Navarro‘s Report and Recommendation. On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision. Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned of the trial court‘s Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that ―the tax declarations and title‖ submitted by complainant ―are not official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed.‖ Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against complainant charging her with violations of Article 171 and 172 and/or Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence.

- In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments. First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree. Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was ―considered submitted for decision‖ as early as August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence, ―he could not have done anything anymore‖ about it.

Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to

the case, preventing him from doing his job. And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her.

- In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that:: (1) respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned her money; (3) respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her money despite this Court‘s directive constitutes contempt.

ISSUE

WON respondent lawyer should be disciplined for failing to render services despite payment of his client

HELD

YES. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the client‘s cause. From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter‘s cause with wholehearted devotion.

- Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, ―there is nothing in the

records to show that he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044.‖

Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that he initiated new petitions.

- Undoubtedly, respondent‘s present version is a flagrant departure from his previous pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process. The present administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondent‘s previous admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from such admission and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been achieved by respondent‘s inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court. - At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondent‘s services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Pariñas v. Paguinto,[10] we held that ―a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected from the

client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand.‖ Per records,

complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the money.

- Neither do we find merit in respondent‘s second argument. The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already ―submitted for decision‖ does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple task. He should have returned complainant‘s money.

Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing nothing.

- In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the case. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity of complainant‘s title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.

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- Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal services to complainant. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides: