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Although Deleuze maintains that the principle of recognition applies equally to Theaetetus, Meditations and Critique of Pure Reason, three seminal work of Western metaphysics, it is important to emphasize, as Smith (2012: 137) remarks, that Deleuze is acutely aware of the profoundly different problems relating to Plato, Descartes and Kant. While Plato struggles with the apparent inability to distinguish the truth from falsehood in the Athenian democracy, Descartes (1641/2008: 22) is wrestling with the problem of uncovering deception internal to thought in fear of a malicious demon trying to deceive him. Kant, for his part, wants to ‘protect the rights of reason’ (1781-7/1998: Ax) against reason’s inherent tendency to transgress its proper domain and produce transcendental illusions. The three essential transcendental illusions that Kant describes are the ideas of the Soul, the World and God (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991/1994: 57).

Despite these differences, Deleuze suggests that the model of thought presupposed by Plato, Descartes and Kant operates upon the principle of recognition, assuming that the identity of the supposed same object remains the same regardless of the faculty employed. This

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principle, in turn, is essential for Plato, Descartes and Kant to make their respective arguments. While agreeing that the principle of recognition is necessary in order for us to meaningfully engage with the world, Deleuze still believes that the principle is problematic, because it does not permit the occurrence of novelty. His point, however, is not that the principle of recognition should be discarded altogether, but rather that it cannot provide a sufficient model of thought on its own, because recognition ultimately renders creative thinking impossible. Therefore, we should examine Deleuze’s critique of the principle of recognition.

In order to understand why Deleuze finds the principle of recognition problematic it is necessary to recall his definition of philosophy as the creation of concepts (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991/1994: 5). A concept, according to Deleuze, is not an empirical description of state of affairs, but rather an attempt to break with ‘common sense’ (1968/2001: 134). The role of philosophy, then, is to challenge our common sense convictions that we take for granted and to experiment with what we are capable of thinking given our mode of existence (Kaulingfreks and ten Bos, 2005).

To think creatively, according to Deleuze, requires that thought diverge from its habitual pattern and transgress its conventional mode of reasoning. But creative thinking is not a voluntary and self-generated activity that thought is capable of produce solitarily, because one cannot single-handily decide to think creatively. On the contrary, creative thinking only emerges when thought is confronted by a phenomenon that forces it to deviate from its habitual pattern and to stretch beyond its conventional modes of reasoning. Deleuze calls this kind of experience an encounter with a paradox. Confronting a paradox is what enables thought to transgress common sense.

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The term ‘paradox’ is derived from the ancient Greek paradoxon, designating that which is contrary to or beyond (para) conventional opinion or common sense (doxon) (see Spoelstra, 2007: 26). A paradox emerges when thought is confronted by a phenomenon that cannot be adequately comprehended by conventional ways of thinking. Philosophical concepts are paradoxical in a literal sense: they extend beyond (para) common sense (doxa) (ten Bos, 2007). Seen from the point of view of common sense, paradoxes are absurd, illogical and nonsensical because they do not conform to the conventional way of reasoning. But precisely because they contravene the conventional manner of thinking, paradoxes offer an opportunity to break free of common sense. In other words, the lack of integration between paradox and common sense suggests new ways of thinking. Therefore, Deleuze argues that ‘Paradox is the pathos or the passion of philosophy’ (1968/2001: 227), because it allows for the creation of concepts that transgress common sense.

Common sense presupposes, according to Deleuze, the principle of recognition, because the ‘employment of all the faculties on a supposed same object’ (2001: xvi) allows for the formation of shared conceptions. As ten Bos explains, common sense establishes itself by capturing the ‘flux of appearances and experiences […] under one common denominator’, permitting the emergence of coherent concepts expressing a sense of ‘shared identities, communities and worlds’ (2007: 144). The formula for common sense reads, ‘Everybody knows that…’ (Deleuze, 1968/2001: 129). For instance, everybody knows that the sky is blue and everybody knows that men are mortal. The same goes for the dogmatic image of thought. Everybody knows that authentic leaders are ethically responsible while inauthentic leaders are morally dubious. Everybody knows that creative managers are innovative while bureaucrats are

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unimaginative rule-followers. And everybody knows that entrepreneurs have the capacity to save the economy during the time of crisis.

Granting that common sense is required for humans to interact with each other and to make a shared community, the establishment of common sense always involves a certain amount of dogmatism, because everything that does not conform to the prevalent truth is excluded and considered irrational, stupid and ridiculous (Spoelstra, 2007: 16). Therefore, Deleuze (1968/2001) assigns philosophy the responsibility to counter common sense by creating paradoxical concepts that seek to explore what lies beyond conventional reasoning. Deleuze explains that ‘the philosopher takes the side of the idiot as though of a man without presuppositions’ (1968/2001: 130) in order to create concepts that challenge, transgress and contravene common sense convictions.

While the task of philosophy is to break free of common sense, Deleuze maintains that the principle of recognition can ‘never inspire anything but conformities’ (1968/2001: 135). This is the case because the principle of recognition fails to allow for paradox. Instead, recognition presupposes that there is harmony between the faculties, so it reconfirms preconceived ideas while judging divergence from common sense as error, irrationality or failure (Deleuze, 1968/2001: 148). In effect, the principle of recognition renders the appearance of contradictory phenomena ‘imperceptible’ (Deleuze, 1968/2001: 140). Therefore, Deleuze concludes that the principle of recognition cannot provide a model of thought that enables philosophy to challenge common sense convictions and to experiment with our mode of existence by creating new concepts.

As previously indicated, Descartes’ conception of the piece of wax is unaffected by the differences between the different faculties. He sees, touches and imagines the same wax, even if the qualities of the wax

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change depending on its temperature. The principle of recognition therefore presupposes that objects have stable identities, because they remain equivalent regardless of the faculty employed. But Deleuze insists that the image of thought based upon the principle of recognition is incapable of thinking the identity of objects in new and different ways. It becomes impossible to create new concepts that rearrange the conception and relationship between things. As Smith remarks, ‘if identity (A is A) were the primary principle, that is, if identities were already pre-given, then there would in principle be no production of the new (no new differences)’ (2007a: 1).

If the image of thought based upon the principle of recognition guides the activity of thinking, then, as Deleuze emphasizes, it ‘is left without means to realise its project of breaking with doxa’ (1968/2001: 134, original italics). Consequently, Deleuze argues that we need a new image of thought in order to retrieve the capacity for philosophical thinking that is defined by its ability to challenge common sense (Spoelstra, 2007). In order to enable creative thinking, Deleuze argues that philosophy needs an image of thought that tolerates paradox.