CONTENIDO DIVERSIFICADO: “Proveedor de mujeres lonja”

However, if this is his argument, it adds nothing to insist that it is right

for irrelevant speaking to be barred, or to add that the contexts in which irrelevance is barred are the well-regulated contexts. If Aristotle had intended this passage simply as abductive confirmation of his claim about the irrelevance of the handbook writers’ techniques, he surely would not have been at such pains to bolster the argument in the way he actually does. Indeed, he is at great pains to emphasise that it is in states with good laws (a20) that such a situation would obtain, that all agree that the laws should be that way (a21f), that they are thus in that paragon of eunomia, the Areopagus (a23),36 _{that all are right to}

think that the laws should be this way (a23f), and that one should not

use irrelevant techniques to corrupt the judge (a24). He seems to consider it important to offer further justification for his contention that it is in well-regulated contexts that irrelevant speaking is barred (hence “γάρ” at a21 and a24). If this passage is nothing more than a pointed repetition of the claim that the handbook writers’ techniques were for irrelevant speaking, then it remains a mystery why so much of the text of this section is taken up with something that is not required to support this point – namely, the insistence on the correctness of prohibiting irrelevant appeals. That the handbook writers would be left with nothing to say if irrelevant speaking were prohibited will be true whether or not it is correct to prohibit irrelevant speaking.

Another possible interpretation is that this passage sets out the conditions that are a pre-requisite “for rhetoric to be practised in the proper way”.37 _{The idea has proved popular that Aristotle here is}

laying out a set of high ideals (either for the exercise of rhetoric or for the conditions of its exercise), for which orator or lawgiver should

36_{See further below n.55.} 37_{Schütrumpf [1994] 106.}

strive, but that will inevitably be compromised and tempered in the actual business of public speaking in real-world situations.38

This view is, however, quite problematic. It typically has difficulty showing how this passage is connected with its context, and in particular with the sections immediately prior which argue that the handbook writers have set out next to nothing about rhetoric. It also has difficulty making 1354a18ff. a telling criticism of Aristotle’s rivals. It seems scarcely a devastating criticism that their techniques would be barred in an ideal state – they would probably agree! Nor is it a serious objection to their methods that they were for “realistic” rhetoric rather than “ideal” rhetoric, or that rhetoric as they conceived it was a concession to the difficult realities of political and forensic life. Finally, this view faces the challenge of providing a satisfying explanation of why Aristotle should break off from his argument to speculate about what the exercise of rhetoric would be like in an ideal state.

Nevertheless, the unattractiveness of this view is probably best brought out by showing that a more attractive interpretation is available. Aristotle here is not concerned with applying ideals to the exercise of rhetoric, nor to the conditions for its exercise. His thought

38_{One form of this view involves distinguishing in Aristotle two contrasting views –}

an ideal view in I.1 and a realistic view elsewhere; cf. Sprute [1994] 119, who sees in I. 1 an “ideal rhetoric”, and he describes this section as constituting “a recommendation to lawgivers”; Engberg-Pedersen [1996] “austere” vs. “normal” rhetoric; Schütrumpf ([1994] 115) contrasts the rhetoric of I.1, rhetoric “in its most valuable form”, with that described elsewhere in the work, “rhetoric as it is practised”. Engberg-Pedersen’s view is harder to categorise, because he seems to see that I.1 aims to show the nature of rhetoric, rather than ideals that apply to it. Likewise, Sprute sees that for Aristotle the idealised conditions envisaged in this passage of I.1 help to show what is essential to rhetoric generally, though he does not explain how.

experiment here is supposed to shed light not on what the ideal conditions are for practising rhetoric, nor on how it would be practised by a morally uncompromising practitioner, but on what rhetoric is.

And in doing so, it helps to show that, for all their efforts in the name of rhetoric, the handbook writers have failed to elucidate it. That is, a18-21 is a further argument for the conclusion at a11-13. The fact that they would have nothing to say in well-governed conditions shows that their techniques are not techniques of rhetoric. Aristotle does not here criticise the handbook writers for setting out techniques for exercising rhetoric in a morally (or otherwise) objectionable way. He criticises them for the fact that their techniques fail to constitute an expertise in rhetoric at all. Aristotle may be concerned elsewhere with how one should exercise rhetorical skill responsibly rather than irresponsibly.39 _{But that is not his concern here. He is concerned here}

not with normative considerations, external to the nature of rhetoric, that apply to it; but rather with normative considerations, internal to the nature of rhetoric, violation of which undermines an activity’s claim to be an exercise of rhetorical expertise at all.40

The passage, I contend, supplies a further argument for Aristotle’s main conclusion in these opening pages of the Rhetoric, that the handbook writers have scarcely touched the art of rhetoric at all. The argument might be spelled out as follows.

1. If the handbook writers’ techniques were for exercising rhetorical expertise, then they would not be such as to be prohibited in a well-ordered state. (premise implicit)

39_{e.g. 1355a31.}

2. But they are such as to be prohibited in a well-ordered state. (1354a18-21)

3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), it is not the case that the handbook writers’ techniques are for exercising rhetorical expertise. (cf. a11-13)

Of course, the first premise is controversial. And yet, if Aristotle is able to trade on such an assumption it is immediately clear how the argument represents a cogent and powerful criticism of the handbook writers. We will see in the next chapter how this unstated premise fits into an outlook plausibly shared by both Aristotle and his audience, and will suggest some reasons why even those Aristotle is criticising may have had difficulty denying it. One obvious way in which one might assent to this first premise is if one supposed that speech- making was vital to the good functioning of a state, and rhetoric was simply a skill for doing this well (whatever that skill might turn out to consist in). On such a view, it would simply be inconceivable that a state with the right kind of laws would prohibit techniques that enabled the excellent discharging of a vital public function.

We will need to say much more about the link between public speaking and good governance, and between their related expertises of rhetoric and ‘politikê’. Here, however, let us merely observe the advantages of construing the argument as above. It makes sense of how the argument fits into the criticism of the handbook writers. It makes sense of why Aristotle is at such pains to justify his claim that it is in those states especially that are well-ordered (malista tais eunomoumenais a20) that the rules apply that would put the handbook writers’ techniques in difficulty. Hence it makes sense of the precise position in which we find these remarks, in a way that is hard to make

out on alternative interpretations. So, given these advantages, we note that this way of construing the argument involves supposing that it is in the nature of rhetorical expertise itself that its techniques comply with an insistence on relevant speaking that any well-ordered state should have. Complying with these particular normative requirements is built into the very nature of rhetoric itself, such that if you are speaking irrelevantly, you simply cannot be exercising rhetorical expertise.

We have claimed, then, that there is a nest of arguments ranged against the handbook writers, all of which require for their interpretation that we attribute to Aristotle an understanding of rhetoric that has significant normative content. Only the presentation of proper grounds for conviction counts as exercising the expertise. This is stated at 1354a13 and forms the basis for the two arguments immediately following. And rhetorical expertise has a nature such that it is simply impossible that exercising it would be prohibited by correctly- formulated laws. That using the handbook writers’ techniques would be utterly ruled out by such laws (1354a18-21) adds a further reason for concluding that they have – for all their efforts – told us nothing much about rhetoric. (1354a11-13)

Chapter 2 – Why only proper grounds for

conviction belong to rhetoric.

In the last chapter, we highlighted a claim that seems to be a pivotal premise in Aristotle’s arguments in the opening chapter of the Rhetoric.

Only proofs [i.e. proper grounds for conviction] belong to the expertise [of rhetoric]. 1354a13.

On this basis, Aristotle argues (a14-15) that to neglect expertise in enthymemes is to neglect a key element in rhetorical expertise. Similarly, he argues (a15-18) that providing techniques in speaking irrelevantly to the subject at hand does not amount to provision of any part of rhetorical expertise. He bolsters this latter argument with a thought experiment (a18-21) about how the advocates of such techniques would fare if every judicial context had – as properly every such context should – a prohibition on irrelevant speaking. But the thought experiment itself seems to presuppose an equally surprising claim – equally surprising to us, at least. That is as follows.

Rhetorical expertise has a nature such that it is simply impossible that exercising it would be prohibited by correctly-formulated laws.

Whilst perhaps to us, these two claims seem equally unobvious and in need of arguments to support them, in Rhetoric I.1, they are treated rather differently from each other. From 1354a11 to 1355a20, as his summary at 1355a19-20 makes clear, his chief concern is to criticise the views of the handbook writers. But it is important to see that he

pursues this in such a way as also to justify his own view. He is clearly aware that it has not been enough simply to assert that “the proofs are the only thing that belong to the expertise” (1354a13), he needs to argue for this. And by 1355a3, he considers this to have been achieved:

Since it is evident that the method belonging to the expertise has to do with proofs (or proper grounds for conviction) ... (1355a3-4).

By this point, Aristotle considers that his arguments against the handbook writers have vindicated the first claim: that rhetoric is an expertise in presenting proper grounds for conviction.

On the other hand, there is no indication that Aristotle is concerned to mount a defence of the second claim. He simply considers it obvious that exercising rhetorical expertise could not fall foul of a correctly- formulated law.

In what follows, we shall be examine how the arguments against the handbook writers work, and hence how they serve to justify Aristotle’s own view of rhetoric expressed in the first of the two claims above. The appeal of these arguments, as we shall see, is partly dialectical, where those with a different view of rhetoric, particularly Thrasymachus, would be committed to the arguments’ premises. But their appeal is also based on a highly plausible view of the role of rhetoric in a successfully functioning state. We have seen indications that such a view plays a crucial role in Aristotle’s arguments at the start of the

Rhetoric. It will be an important concern of this chapter to show how such a view is adhered to throughout the Rhetoric. We will note that it is consistent also with some important remarks in the Nicomachean Ethics. Furthermore, such a view will be argued to be highly plausible. On this view of rhetoric’s role in the state, Aristotle does not need to

defend his assumption that rhetoric is such that its exercise could not be prohibited by correctly-formulated laws (the second of the two claims highlighted above). He does not consider that it requires a defence, and I shall attempt to show that it is at least plausible that he is right.

So, as Aristotle sees it, the second claim set out above – crucial to his case but assumed unstated – does not require defending, but the first claim – explicit at 1354a13-14 – does. Aristotle’s arguments from 1354a13 to a21 against the handbook writers are devastating if they go through. I wish to suggest that having outlined his key arguments, he returns precisely to the task of justifying some key elements on which they depended. This occupies him from 1354a21 to 1354b16.

We have suggested that Aristotle’s arguments rely on unstated premises about the relationship between the proper functioning of the state and the nature of rhetoric. Let us therefore consider a sketch of this view that, I claim, Aristotle assumes. It is a view very different from our own understanding of rhetoric. Frustratingly, his view of the relationship between rhetoric and the state is something he never sets out explicitly. This might raise a worry about whether it is justified to attribute such views to Aristotle. We will attempt to answer these worries. Firstly, some remarks in the Nicomachean Ethics show that Aristotle saw an important connection between rhetoric and political expertise. However, these remarks fall short of asserting the stronger connection between rhetoric and the proper functioning of the polis

that his arguments in the Rhetoric require. Evidence for this is found in the Rhetoric itself. Secondly, therefore, we will show that Aristotle’s use of some key pieces of terminology in the Rhetoric seems to support

ascribing to him the views sketched here. Thirdly, and most importantly, these views are needed to make sense of some of his key passages of argument. The fourth strategy is to show how the views attributed to Aristotle about rhetoric and the state cohere well with what he says in the Rhetoric and elsewhere about the function and goal of rhetoric.

A sketch of Aristotle’s view of the relationship between rhetorical expertise and the proper functioning of the state.

States – plausibly all states, but certainly the Greek poleis of Aristotle’s day – need orators (public speakers). This is because in order to function well it is necessary for citizens to confer, deliberate and come to decisions. This includes deciding on laws and state policy, and coming to verdicts in the lawcourts. For citizens to make judgements about the merits of courses of action, or of each side’s case in a law suit, the case for each of these has to be made.

Rhetoric, then, is an expertise in discharging public speaking roles in the state – specifically, it is an expertise in helping citizens to arrive at good publicly-deliberated judgements,41 _by

making the case one way or another in relation to some

41 _{Reflection on what the technê of rhetoric serves to produce is suggested right at the}

start of the Rhetoric, when Aristotle says that, “as all would agree”, an expertise should account for non-accidental success (epitunchanousin 1354a9). But success in what? What exactly is the product whose successful production will be accounted for by this expertise? Aristotle’s answer seems to be that it is good publicly-deliberated judgements by citizens. Aristotle eventually says this explicitly at 1358b1-2, with the whole of I.3 devoted to explaining how this works in each kind of rhetoric. More briefly, at II.1, 1377b20-21, he says, “rhetoric is for the sake of a judgement (heneka kriseôs).” Cf. also I.2, 1357a1-2 where rhetoric’s function is discharged only in relation to things that are the objects of deliberation.

proposal,42 _{so that a judgement can be made as to its merits}

(often in comparison with the merits of some rival proposal).

If this view is correct, it suggests a basis for thinking that a genuine exercise of rhetoric could not be something that the laws should prohibit. This view of the relationship between rhetoric and the state could serve to underpin the unstated assumption in the argument at 1354a18-21, highlighted at the end of the previous chapter. The way this works is as follows. If the laws aim at the well-being of the state and its citizens then they should not prohibit anything that is necessary to public goods like the well-being of the state and its citizens (certainly not insofar as it is necessary to these). Arguably the making of good judgements by citizens in roles such as juror (dicast) and assemblyman (ecclesiast) is necessary to the well-being of state and citizens in this way. Similarly, the laws should not prohibit anything that conduces either to public goods like the well-being of the state and its citizens or to something necessary for such well-being. If it is correct to think of rhetoric as an expertise in enabling good judgements, then exercises of rhetoric are of this kind. The laws should not prohibit them.43

42_{“Demonstrating the matter, that it is or is not the case, that it happened or did not}

happen.” 1354a27-28.

43 _{The use of the Areopagus as an example (1354a23) recalls the role of persuasion and}

good laws in Aeschylus’ Eumenides. The prominence there of both persuasion (829, 885-6, 968-75; cf. earlier Agamemnon 385ff.) and the rule of law in good civic governance (482-89, 681-710), in the way Orestes’ situation is resolved through the establishment of the Areopagus court, suggests that these features are seen not as conflicting but as interrelated. That is, persuasion is not at odds with good civic governance, but crucial to it.

So, Aristotle’s strategy in the arguments from 1354a18 to 1354b22 is to make clear exactly what rhetoric’s proper role in the state is. To uncover this role just is to uncover the nature of rhetoric. And to grasp the nature of rhetoric is to have the basis for knowing what activities will and will not count as exercises of this expertise. This line of reasoning can then be used to devastating effect against those offering rival accounts of the techniques of rhetoric. Indeed, this is exactly what we find in the passages leading up to the double conclusion at 1354b16-22. The argument may be sketched as follows. First, rhetorical