Contenidos Básicos

Since high port charges create problems that were mentioned in the above section, it is important to remedy this situation through the implementation of the National Ports Act (No. 12 of 2005) so as to establish a ports regulator who would reform the ports tariffs and see some of the benefits passed on to users and the remainder reinvested in much needed infrastructure (TNPA 2013:9). Ports regulation can take a range of different forms; from a highly focused sector regulator, to regulation that is greatly generalised. The location of regulatory functions has a great impact on how the regulation occurs (Bek et al. 2002:60).

According to the TNPA (2013:9), the White Paper on National Commercial Ports

the ports regulator to ensure that lower port tariffs are attained. It states that the state has a role to perform in controlling tariffs, and in setting service and safety standards. Examples of this category are the state airports, road and rail concessions, and the ports.

The White Paper states that “a port authority (or authorities) with specific responsibilities for the maintenance and development of port infrastructure will be established and since it will be a monopoly, the port authority will be regulated by an independent regulator” (TNPA 2013:9).

Again, to overcome this problem of high port charges, the TNPA must develop a new pricing strategy that will be utilised to divide the agreed revenue requirement between various categories of users. The TNPA must develop detailed proposals for individual tariff items, which can be submitted to the regulator for approval (Van der Merwe 2004:72). The aim is to have the new tariff structure in place for the upcoming years. The new pricing strategy must enable continuous investments in the extension and maintenance of the ports system in the country, and ensure effective cost recovery across all national ports. According to Nattrass and Seekings (2010), the new pricing strategy will address the requirements of the government’s policy direction, and other concerns communicated to the TNPA by other related stakeholders. Similarly, an alternative and independent asset valuation must also be undertaken as the foundation of a cost-recovery model for the pricing strategy. This would provide a better basis to establish the overall revenue to be recovered from users (TNPA 2012a:72-73).

Nattrass and Seekings (2010) pointed out that a revised pricing strategy has also been proposed by the TNPA, which aims to redistribute the revenue requirement between different categories of users, and will be implemented in stages through to 2019. It aims to consolidate national port dues and berth dues into a single tariff heading. At the moment the TNPA obtains 61% of its revenue from cargo owners, 19% from its tenants, and 20% from shipping lines (TNPA 2012a:75). According to the Department of Economic Development and Tourism (2004:103), the new pricing strategy aims to increase tenant and shipping line contributions and the new distribution of the revenue requirement is expected to be 46% from cargo owners,

33% from tenants, and 21% from shipping lines, with required revenue driven by a new tariff methodology that would be more highly disaggregated.

The new pricing strategy proposes the simplification of cargo dues by unifying them into a single tariff for each cargo handling type, such as containers, dry bulks, and so on. Port tenants should therefore be responsible for property maintenance expenditure and property administration costs as terminal operators derive value primarily from access to the quay wall and the adjacent land (Department of Economic Development and Tourism 2004:103).

The following principles for the new pricing strategy are proposed by the TNPA:

 Apply the user-pays and cost-recovery principles to ensure port users contribute to the required revenue;

 Allow future tariff adjustments to be based on changes in required revenues by port user group;

 Charge shipping lines for the costs of marine services and for maintenance of common wet infrastructure;

 Improve alignment to the financial structure of a landlord port (with higher real estate revenues);

 Decrease cargo dues for manufacturing industry, particularly for containers and the automotive sector; and

 Support the South African industrial objective to encourage the export of beneficiated goods (TNPA 2012b:60-61).

It is clear that this new pricing strategy is the most appropriate instrument suitable for lowering port charges. The lower the port tariffs, the higher or better the atmosphere in which IPAP can be applied and implemented.

4.4.8 Industrial financing

Nattrass and Seekings (2010) explained that industrial financing is considered to be one of the most significant pillars available to implement IPAP successfully. The suitability of current financing mechanisms that were mostly designed soon after democracy must be re-evaluated, considering evidence of their effectiveness, global

factors (Iheduru 2004:26). For this reason, there is a need for greater scale and more prioritisation, greater emphasis on more labour-intensive and value-adding activities, higher levels of reciprocity, and a focus on stimulating new or quantitatively higher levels of industrial activity (Zalk 2014:40). To add to these issues of the design, the quantum of industrial financing also needs to be revisited. Firstly, as the evolution of the global trading system creates diminishing space to use tariffs as a tool of industrial policy, the role of industrial financing becomes correspondingly more evident. Secondly, industrial financing plays a vital role in leveraging the levels of private sector investment necessary to meet the IPAP target of raising gross fixed capital. Thirdly, in the context of a volatile and often overvalued currency, industrial financing becomes an important tool to minimise scarcity and lower the cost of capital (Zalk 2014:41).