• No se han encontrado resultados

Contenidos comunes

CONTENIDOS CRITERIOS ESTÁNDARES CC

Bloque 1. Contenidos comunes

Along with others, Özal’s identity played a crucial role in his policy choices. In his identity, two key features were striking which were constructed through long socialization processes. First, Özal became a religious conservative person as a result of his societal socialization process. He was coming from an Anatolian, devout family and he acquired his basic religious sensitiveness in his family. His father was educated in an Ottoman madrasah for sixteen years, mastered both Arabic and Farsi languages and was carrying the qualities of a Muslim cleric. His mother, on the other hand, was a teacher with a good religious knowledge and ambitious to raise her children as faithful and believing Muslims.4 Özal carried always religious identity in his life and did not feel the need to hide it.5 For example, it was known that he was connected with the Nakshibandi order of dervishes. He made his first attempt to enter into politics in the Islamist NSP (National Salvation Party).6 Özal did not

2011, Ahmet Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges,” Turkish Studies, 11:1, (2010):103-123. A.Evin, K.Kirişçi, R.Linden, T.Straubhaar, N.Tocci, J. Tolay, J.Walker, “Getting to Zero, Turkey, Its Neighbors and the West,” Transatlantic Academy, (2010): 25 accessed 04.02.2011,

http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/getting-zero-turkey-its-neighbors-and-west. Ziya Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique,” Insight Turkey Vol. 13, No.1, (2001):.49, 58. Former PM Yıldırım Akbulut who was successor to Özal in the Motherland Party and was in office during the presidency of Özal, between 1989 and 1991 concludes as to the policies of PM Erdoğan that “He is following the policies of the Motherland Party. He wants to advance these policies and he does.” “Eski başbakandan ‘Nereden nereye’ dedirten açıklamalar,” zaman.com.tr, 05.02.2011, accessed 07.02.2011,

http://www.zaman.com.tr/multimedya.do?tur=video&aktifgaleri=9598&aktifsayfa=0&bolumno=4&aktifsayfaD etay=0&galeriDetayNo=9598&title=genelkurmay-basbakana-bagli-oldugunu-ogrendi. Soli Özel, Şuhnaz Yılmaz, Abdullah Akyüz, “Rebuilding a Partnership: Turkish-American Relations for a New Era, A Turkish Perspective,” Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association, TÜSİAD Publication No-T/2009-04/490, (April 2009): 47. Şaban Kardaş, “Turkish-American Relations in the 2000s: Revisiting the Basic Parameters of Partnership?” Perceptions, Volume XVI, Number 3, (Autumn 2011): 34-35. Bülent Aras and Pınar Akpınar, Türk Dış Politikasında Davutoğlu Dönemi: 2009 Değerlendirmesi, in Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı 2009, Burhanettin Duran, et al., (Ankara: SETA Yayınları XIII, Mart 2011), 27.

3

Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, “Dış Politika Kararlarını Belirlemede Psikolojik Etkenler ve Türkiye” (Psychological Factors in Foreign Policy Decision Making and Turkey), in Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1998), 535-542. For the influence of psychological factors on foreign policy, see also Şenay Yıldız’s interview with Robi Friedman, chairman of the International Group Psychotherapy Union, Akşam, 27.09.2011, accessed 01.10.2011,

http://www.aksam.com.tr/israille-kriz-kisisel-incinmeyle-basladi--69664h.html 4

Korkut Özal, Devlet Sırrı (State Secret), (İstanbul: Yakın Plan Yayınları, Ekim 2010), 13-15. 5

Muhittin Ataman, “Özal ve İslam Dünyası: İnanç ve Pragmatizm” (Özal and the Islamic World: Belief and Pragmatism), in Kim Bu Özal, Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Who is this Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality, eds. İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal, (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2. Baskı 2003), 357.

6

Sedat Laçiner, Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism,” the Journal of Turkish Weekly, 09.03.2009, accessed 01.10.2011, http://www.turkishweekly.net/print.asp?type=2&id=333

give up performing his ritual prayers even when he became President. When he was PM, he visited Mecca with the intention of making a pilgrimage, one of the five pillars of Islam.7 He usually used to quote in his addresses from Islamic resources, namely from Quran and Hadith.8 Given his religious identity, one should not be surprised that he was the first Turkish Prime Minister who laid emphasis on Islam as a part of Turkish national identity.9 In his political career, Özal’s decisions and policies were always under the influence of history, religion and his personal social adventure.10

On the other hand, Özal had internalized western values, such as democracy and liberalism, and he had acquired these values mainly, from a constructivist point of view, through societal socialization and transnational socialization processes. In terms of societal socialization, he had worked both in private and public sectors and witnessed several military putsches. Until Özal took his place in the political scene in 1980s, the country had experienced serious political and economic problems which led to recurrent military interventions into politics. These military interventions incurred Turkish people’s displeasure and along with others; Özal was also pushed to demand more democracy with higher standards. From a transnational socialization perspective, two experiences were crucial, namely his study in the U.S. and his employment in the World Bank as advisor. With respect to the former experience, as Laçiner points it out,

“having graduated from Istanbul Technical University in 1950 as an electrical engineer, Özal studied in the United States, and during these years became an admirer of the United States. In his view, the United States owed its success to its liberalism. Özal further argued that the United States and the Ottoman Empire were similar political structures: Both allowed different cultures and gave people freedom to exercise their religion, nationality and economic preferences. From this perspective, Turkey had to desert its authoritarian official understanding, namely the Kemalist state ideology.”11

As regards the latter experience, Turgut Özal was adviser to the World Bank on special projects between 1971 and 1973 and enjoyed an opportunity to make observations from an international perspective and developed very good relations with the IMF, the World Bank and the US administration.12 At this point, one ought to take into account that in the socialization processes of Özal, the transnational socialization was more in the fore front and international norms occupied a wider space in his identity. Consequently, his socialization processes both at societal and transnational levels resulted in his internalization of modern values such as democracy, liberal economy, freedom of thought, freedom of religion and conscious in a universal sense and freedom of enterprise. Along with traditional and religious values, Özal made all these modern values integral part of his identity.

7

For instance, Özal’s Picture was published in an internet news site, Haber7.com, when he was performing his ritual pray as Imam in 1988 in Medina. This Picture of Ozal as an Imam is most probably the first picture of a Prime Minister in Turkish Republic’s political history. “İşte Turgut Özal’ın ‘imamlık’ yaptığı o an!” (Here is the moment of Turgut Ozal as Imam), Haber7.com, 14.01.2013, accessed 16.01.2013, http://www.haber7.com/ic- politika/haber/976897-iste-turgut-ozalin-imamlik-yaptigi-o-an

8

Ataman, "Özal ve İslam Dünyası: İnanç ve Pragmatizm," 356. 9

Berdal Aral, “Özal Döneminde İç ve Dış Siyaset: Süreklilik ya da Kopuş” (Domestic and Foreign Policy in Özal Era: Continuity or Rupture in Kim Bu Özal, Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Who is this Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality, eds. İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal, (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2. Baskı 2003), 244.

10

Şaban Çalış, “Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler: Özal, Balkanlar ve Neo-Osmanlıcılık!” in Kim Bu Özal, Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Who is this Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality, eds. İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal, (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2. Baskı 2003), 394.

11

Laçiner, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism" 12

Thus, as Gözen accurately notes, Özal’s life philosophy put forward a “mixed” identity. This “mixed identity” was composed of both Western philosophy and Islamic philosophy, and Özal’s political life was full of with behaviors in accordance with this identity.13 In fact, it was one of Özal’s characters to reconcile contradictory elements and to establish a harmonious relationship between them.14 In this framework, he was eager to reconcile the western values and Islamic values with a pragmatic approach.15 Paradoxically, he was, for instance, neither an absolute Islamist nor a secularist, but accepted both of them; he was neither an absolute traditionalist nor a modernist, but internalized both of them; he was neither the admirer of exclusively Quran nor computer/technology, but carried in one hand the Quran and in the other a computer.16 In substance, he was a religious conservative, nationalist, liberal and democrat politician,17 and these personal features reflected also on his political apprehension and political life.18 Here, one should mention his efforts to find a middle way between Islamism and Turkish nationalism, his goal of formulating a religious understanding suitable for democracy, liberalism and capitalism. His conclusion was a Turkish-Islamic Synthesis which represented an official re-evaluation of Islam as part of Turkish identity with the aim of promoting national solidarity and integration.19

It should be lastly noted that along with his other personal aforementioned features, he had a brilliant and ambitious character with an ability to adjust the changes, and he was a strong leader who was not hesitating to take initiatives.20 For instance, as it was seen in the neo-Ottomanism discussions, he was successful to bring several issues to the public agenda which were widely regarded as taboo in the Turkish society.21 In fact, by taking personal initiatives, Özal sometimes tended to exclude other organs of foreign policy making. This personal character of him peaked especially during his presidency. In addition to bureaucracy, Özal by-passed in some cases, particularly in the course of the Gulf War, even the government from policy-making processes, whereupon two foreign ministers resigned. While he enjoyed being ‘one man’ in the foreign policy realm during the Motherland Party (MP) government, which was established and headed by Özal and remained until 1991 under the strong influence of him, Özal did not hesitate to conflict with the True Path Party (TPP) government on foreign political issues as well. The Bosnia meeting organized by Özal without government’s involvement sets an important example in this regard.22 As a result, it

13

Ramazan Gözen, “Turgut Özal ve Körfez Savaşı: İdealler ve Gerçekler Açmazında Dış politika” (Turgut Özal and the Gulf War: Foreign Policy in the Dilemmas of Ideals and Realities), in Kim Bu Özal, Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Who is this Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality, eds. İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal, (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2. Baskı 2003), 312.

14

Aral, "Özal Döneminde İç ve Dış Siyaset: Süreklilik ya da Kopuş," 223. 15

Ibid., 228 16

Gözen, "Turgut Özal ve Körfez Savaşı," 312-313. 17

Laçiner, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism" 18

Gözen, "Turgut Özal ve Körfez Savaşı," 313. 19

Laçiner, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism,"10-11 20

Aral, "Özal Döneminde İç ve Dış Siyaset: Süreklilik ya da Kopuş," 242-243. 21

Çalış, “Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler,” 396. Cengiz Çandar, “20. Yüzyı’lın ‘put kırıcısı’; 21.Yüzyıl’ın

‘özgür bireyi,’” Hürriyet, 18.04.2008, accessed 11.07.2011,

http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=8729602 22

Gencer Özcan, “Türkiye’de Siyasal Rejim ve Dış Politika: 1983-1993” (Political Regime and Foreign Policy in Turkey:1983-1993), in Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1998), 528-533.

might be claimed that Özal’s personality and leadership was a significant determining factor of TFP from early 1980s until his death in 1993.23