Contexto del área de estudio

Pragmatism is considered a philosophical tradition that subsequently became the foundation of a raft of ideas (Reynolds, 2003). The development of pragmatism was not linear and nor fully coherent and yet the fundamental ideas developed by its founders profoundly shaped symbolic interactionism. The relevance of pragmatism to symbolic interactionism is evident particularly in the works of three noted pragmatists; Charles Pierce (1839-1914), William James (1842-1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952). These works overtly shaped the later symbolic interactionist

symbolic interactionism as articulated by these theorists are the focus of the following.

3.2.1 TRUTH AND ACTION

The term pragmatism was coined around 1878 by its advocate, Peirce, as a method for investigating the consequences of action (Peirce, 1940/1955). An important

contribution of Peirce was his argument that truth could only be revealed in practice. In other words, meaning or the truth did not reside in an object but in the ways in which the object was used. This resonates with the current research which moved beyond a technological determinist view to explore interactions around and the context within which technology existed. Thus, from this perspective the purpose of enquiry should be to study the consequences of action as a reflection of what can be considered the truth. Peirce was considered a logician pragmatist in proposing that the truth always lies in the outcome or result of the action (Reynolds, 2003).

Peirce’s work fundamentally influenced symbolic interaction. This is so in terms of truth conception where Peirce argued that the meaning of an object exists only in the actions directed towards that object (Peirce, 1940/1955). Furthermore and similarly significant was the proposition that the test of truth was not an individual issue but that truth could only be considered legitimate if socially acceptable (Hall, 1997). Hence, the focus of research on practice is on social interaction and processes rather than individuals.

The conceptualisation of action in relation to seeking the truth brought agency to the centre of pragmatism. For Peirce, the impetus for action was thinking and thinking

was prompted by doubt. Hence, the establishment of truth was a process of removing doubt through action (Blumer, 1969; Dewey, Boydston, & Walsh, 2008; Thayer, 1970). The situation of doubt later became the problematic situation for Mead (Eames, 1973). Action as social assumed a collective society and socially shared symbols for communication (Blumer, 1969). Peirce and later Mead also moved in the same direction in arguing that social communication is dependent on agreed upon signs, words, gestures and objects (Reynolds, 2003). Nonetheless, unlike Mead, Peirce was a realist in assuming the existence of a truth, even if a collective truth. James, although a fellow pragmatist, was perhaps most removed far from the realist position (Reynolds, 2003).

3.2.2 HABIT, INSTINCT AND SELF

James deviated from Peirce in arguing that “practical consequences meant consequences for the individual, and truth was simply that which was true for the individual” (Reynolds, 2003, p. 48). Although truth for James appeared as anything that the individual determined as true his contribution to symbolic interaction lay in the concepts of self, habit, and instinct.

For James, habits originated from past experiences and were embedded through repetition. As such habits modified and restrained instincts. This was a challenge to the behaviourist “reflex-arc” concept where the actions of humans were considered to be a response to external stimuli (James, 1890). On the contrary, it was the habits of humans as social actors that produced and reproduced social order. This was important to the research reported upon here because it pointed to the ways in the

social order of the health care context was constructed through habitual (and culturally and socially embedded) actions and practices.

The concept of social self appeared in James’ work to differentiate this self from the spiritual and material selves that reside in human beings (James, 1913). Social self is where an individual has an innate propensity to receive recognition from others in the community (James, 1913). This means that the self is a product of social interaction. Dewey, a much noted pragmatist, returned to James’ concept of habit and in so doing developed further the underpinnings of symbolic interaction.

3.2.3 THE RELATIVITY OF TRUTH

Dewey argued that habit is repetitive but not as individual behaviour. Rather habit is social and understood as “acquired predispositions to ways or modes of responses” (Dewey, 1957, p. 40). In terms of truth, James had argued that truth by itself is simply what gives satisfaction to the individual without empirical investigation (Ezorsky, 1967). Dewey disagreed and asserted that there is no meaning that could not be evaluated (Ezorsky, 1967). In line with Peirce, Dewey considered that

uncertainty (rather than doubt) was the motivation for the search for truth (Reynolds, 2003). Dewey used the term indeterminate situation which, as Reynolds (2003) points out, refers to the situation where thoughts arise as proposed solutions to a problem which then come a plan of action. The truth exists then when a thought or an idea is verified. This means that there is no definitive truth and that truth does not exist as an objective entity that is separate from a process of enquiry. More importantly, this assumes that human beings deliberate and make decisions about action. As with James, this was a fundamental rejection of reflex arc concept. On the

contrary, Dewey (1986) argued, the role of interaction is central to the construction of human and social behaviour. The crucial point of Dewey’s work was to draw the relationship between thought, mind and society. This grounding was directly taken up by Mead in the development of symbolic interactionism.