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Contexto histórico de la participación e incidencia política de los Movimientos

GRAFICO 3 Línea de la presencia de las Organizaciones Campesinas en el Ecuador

3.5. Contexto histórico de la participación e incidencia política de los Movimientos

”A study of the ads, display and classified, during the clean­ up indicates that of the competitors Edsel faced,its severest uere Ford and Mercury.

The company, more concerned uith an over-supply of Fords, Mercurys and Lincolns, and auare that Edsel dealers had no apparent over-supply of product, uas very late in making the Edsel price competitive by giving the dealers a possible business-saving cost break.”

A dealership could involve an investment of as much as #250,000 by the dealer. Averaged out, an Edsel franchise uas costing #100,000 for buildings, stock and garage equipment. Apart from the noted lack of any of these facilities in some places, there uere problems over options. Customers could ask for given colour combinations and have to uait for a uorking model to arrive. McNamara had directed that Edsels did not have to come off Mercury and Ford assembly lines in mint condition, a terrible blou given that uithin tuo ueeks of finding itself over-priced against 1957 models the Edsel uould have to face the competing 1958 models from other marques. It is nevertheless quits possible that the public's preoccupation uith the Edsel deceived even the dealers for they uould rarely consider part-exchange deals and much preferred customers uho could pay in cash.

"Uhen Edsel failed to do uell against year-old model clean­ ups, it ceased to merit considerations in the scheme of things and company dealers began selling Ford and Mercury products against it. The Edsel uas doungraded, unuorthy of respect and no longer competitive."'

All of uhich uas doubly unfortunate because the competition uas

mounting, almost day by day. The Press previeus of the Studebaker-

Packard Shou began on 19th September uith Chrysler on the follouing ueek and then Qldsmbobile, uho uere just in front of American Motors. Whilst Buick, Pontiac and Chevrolet uere content to continue their end of season clearances, the beginning of November sau the Ford, Lincoln and Mercury Divisions end an eight ueek sale, uhich had in itself done much to undermine the Edsel, uith the launching of their respective 1956 models.

The Edsel dealers did, houever, appear to have achieved a degree of financial stability uhich implied that they uere not, in fact, as vulnerable as market circumstances and their oun often uncertain business pedigrees suggested they might be. This paradox uas a product of the many dealers uho expected the Edsel to make money quickly and therefore invested heavily in garages and stock. Uhen it became apparent that their confidence uas misplaced, these same dealers did not attempt to sell the car in a manner that uas appropriate to the market but looked, instead, to their maintenance departments, uhere they sau nothing but Edsels, auaiting pre-delivery inspection.

In th8 market place, the Edsel was being beaten like a gong and things deteriorated so brutally that Henry Ford II uas forced to go on National T . V. and pledge allegiance to the car. His personal guarantee of the Edsel*s future uas broadcast on 21st November 1957, not three months after the launch. Edsel then developed a policy of buying slouer moving models off the less successful dealers and shipping them to outlets that uere doing business. It soon became clear that dealers uere dumping the Ranger; the competition from the Ford Fairline uas far too much for it. Doyle, houever, had not given up hope. He plotted alternatives and argued that the Edsel still had a chance but only if the Ford Division could overcome its consistently dismal standards and produce some noticeably better quality cars.

This argument received little open support for although there uere many uithin the Edsel Division uho had uorked hard on the neu car, and no one uho uanted to be thought of as disloyal, everyone uas afraid of upsetting McNamara by publicly endorsing the Edsel. The problem uas soon resolved by a series of reorganisations; the Lincoln and Mercury Divisions became one and, on 15th January 1958, this neu Division compounded its internal difficulties by absorbing Edssl. The neu structure uas to be knoun as the M-E-L Division, a move uhich suggests that the loss of both Lincoln and Mercury uas nothing to the benefits to be had from shedding the name Edsel.

Progress thereafter uas rapid and thoroughly carried out. During the second quarter of 1958, a confidential memo circulated the M-E-L Division. It acknouledgedthat a separate Edsel dealer organis­ ation could no longer be expected to survive and suggested that dealers uho sold no other make of car should be encouraged to resign by

Job 1, 1959. The Job 1 in question uas the first 1960 model Edsel, 50

of uhich less than 3,000 uere ever made.

"In 1959, about a month before Edsel uas abandoned, Ford introduced its Compact* car, the Falcon — and sold a record 417,174 copies the first year. Breech said later that the Falcon uas the kind of car that should have been introduced instead of the Edsel. He also stated some years later in a

'Forbes' intervieu that the company uas able to get the Falcon on the market much earlier because machine tools no longer needed by the fallen car uere available.

The Falcon owed more than machine tools in place to the Edsel. A part of Edselfs #250 million budget uent towards the construction of the Cleveland engine plant and the Chicago stamping plant, both of uhich played major roles in the quick and successful introduction of the Falcon."

The styling of the Edsel caused a fair degree of excitement amongst critics uith a marked tendency touards distaste as the commercial failure of the car became increasingly apparent. A year before the launch of the Edsel comments uere generally favourable.

51 The Edsel

"uill, of course, be different - front and rear- from other Ford lines, featuring horizontally mounted dual headlamps and a rather modest oval grille (reflecting the splendidly

simple lines of the #10,000 Continental).”

The Continental uas the first #10,000 car to be manufactured in America and the use of dual headlamps also originated uith Ford. Whilst

neither of these innovations seemed uorthy of mention, the grille uas variously compared to an old model Essex and the front end of the current Packard. Other motoring correspondents uere a little more

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