broadly and thereby invade the area of constitutionally protected freedoms
3. Anti-Plunder act is unconstitutional for it dispenses with due process since the terms in S1, par. D and S2 (“combination”,
“series”, “pattern”) are precisely vague &
overbroad, which denies the petitioner of the right to be informed of the nature &
cause of the accusation against him.
4. Anti-Plunder act is unconstitutional for it dispenses with due process since the S4 thereof sets a lower standard for the modicum of evidence required to convict person than that which is required for criminal cases, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the Anti-Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad
2. Whether or not the Anti-Plunder Law lowers the threshold for evidence in violation of due process
3. Whether or not Plunder as defined is malum prohibitum, which means that criminal intent need not be proved in order to convict person.
Held: 1. NO. There are several levels of reasoning which the SC used.
a.
presumption of constitutionality of a statute- basic principle that a legislative enactment is presumed to be in harmony with the Consti. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort.b. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity.
1. words of a statute will be interpreted in the natural, plain &
ordinary acceptation, except in cases where it is evident that the legislature intended a technical &
special legal meaning
2. a statute is not rendered uncertain
& void merely because general terms are used, or because it employed terms that were not defined. There is no statutory or constitutional command that the Congress needs to define every word it uses. Inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
3. challenge of a statute for being
“vague” can only be applied for
those laws which in the face are utterly vague and cannot be clarified by a saving clause or by construction.
c. the overbroad and vagueness doctrines, according to the SC, have a special application for free-speech cases & are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
Therefore, the Anti-Plunder law does not violate due process since it defines the act which it purports to punish, giving the accused fair warning of the charges against him, and can effectively interpose a defense on his behalf.
2. NO. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The petitioner’s contention that the language of the law which states that not every act of amassing wealth needs to be proven, but only a pattern or series of acts, dispenses with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is unfounded. The prosecution still has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the acts constituting plunder (though not all) occurred, and these predicate acts form a pattern. Hence it does not lower the level of evidence from “beyond reasonable doubt” to “mere preponderance”.
Further, S4 on “for the purposes of establishing the crime of plunder”, a procedural & does not define a substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy.
3. NO. Plunder is mala in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Mens rea must be proven. Again, this only means that the Anti-Plunder Law does not establish a lower level of evidence. P
Petition dismissed for lack of merit. RA 7080 held to be constitutional.
**We don’t have digests for the Hamdy and Velasquez Rodriguez cases.
B. “Old” Substantive Due Process: Protection for Property Interests
Doctrine: prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal/criminal statues not civil.
Chase, J Facts
• 1779 Normand Morrison executed a will in favor of Bull and wife, his grandparents.
•
1793 The Court of Probate of Hartford disapproved of the will and refused its recording.•
Calder and Wife claim their rights as the wife is heiress to N. Morrison as a physician after the disapproval of the will. By existing laws of Connecticut, wife is said to have the rights as heiress(not explained how).• 1795 The Legislature of Connecticut passed a
resolution or law(May) setting aside the first negative decree of the court of Probate for Hartford, granting a new hearing and appeal within 6 months. The new Calder vs. Bull
hearing in the Court of Probate now, approved the will and ordered its recording(July) .
• 1795 (Aug) An appeal was had in the Superior Court of Hartford, and in 1796, The superior court of Hartford affirmed the decree of the Court of Probate.
•
And still in 1796, An appeal was gained in the SC of errors of Connecticut who in June of that year, adjudged, that there were no errors.•
Since it was more than 18 months since the decree of the Court of Probate, Caleb Bull and Wife were barred of all right of appeal by a statute of Connecticut. But their will was indeed affirmed so why bother?•
But the plaintiffs Calder and wife had a reason to appeal because the effect of the resolution was divest the right that accrued to Calder and wife when the court of Probate denied the will of Norman Morrison. (remember: the new hearing approved the will affirmed by the superior court and SC of Errors)•
The plaintiffs Calder and wife petitioned the SC and contended that the resolution made by Connecticut was an ex post facto law, prohibited by theconstitution, therefore, void. The court then had power to declare such law void.
The court will answer the contention of the plaintiffs but whether the Legislature of any of the States can revise and correct, by law, a decision of any of its Courts of Justice will not be answered now as the case doesn’t go that far. This is only important if the state’s constitution does not prohibit the correction or revision. But the ponente gave his opinion.
Plaintiffs argue that the Legislature of Connecticut had no constitutional power to make the resolution (or law) in question, granting a new hearing, etc
• The ponente said that without giving opinion at this time, whether the court had jurisdiction to decide that any law made by Congress contrary to the constitution is void. He is fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state legislature contrary to the consti is void.
(before Marbury cguro to!) And if they had problems with the laws contrary to State charters or consti, it is within the state court’s jurisdiction.
Issue
WON the resolution of the Connecticut Legislature is an ex post facto law. NO
•
It is accepted that all the people-delegated powers of the Fed. Gov’t are defined, and it has no constructive powers. So, all the powers that remain in the State Gov’t are indefinite(trivia:except in Masachusetts). (ex. establishment of the courts of justice and justices)• But the Constitution was established for justice, gen.
welfare, liberty and protection of their persons and property from violence. These purposes and determinants of the nature and terms are the reasons why the people enter into the social compact. Although not expressly said, they restrain the absolute power of the legislature(nature of free Republican gov’t). Any act in violation of the social compact is not a rightful exercise of legislative authority.
•
That no man should be compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the laws permit.1•
The prohibition against their making any ex post facto laws was introduced for greater caution because when they were under Great Britain, laws under the denomination of bills of attainder or bills of pains and penalties were passed. These acts were legislative and judicial power. (ex. treason when they aren’t in other times and one witness even when the law required two, all for the “safety of the kingdom”).SECs 9 and 10 of the US Consti provided this prohibition(see patterson below for text).
•
The prohibition is not to pass any law concerning, and after the fact; but that the Legislatures of the several states, shall not pass laws, after a fact done by a subject, or citizen, which shall have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for having done it.
•
This is an additional bulwark in favour of the personal security of the subject, to protect his person from punishment by legislative acts, having aretrospective operation. BUT NOT to secure the citizen in his private rights, of either property, or contracts. If the prohibition of ex post facto laws included personal rights then why the need for other prohibitions in making only gold and silver the legal tender and not to pass laws impairing obligations in contracts which are retrospective. (Wouldn’t it be superfluous?)
• The restriction against ex post facto law was to secure the person of the subject from injury from such law, enumerated to be laws that:
1. makes an action, which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes it
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed
3. changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender
• Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective(this is the prohibited); but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law.
•
Every law that takes away, or impairs, rights vested, agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective and unjust, but not all, take for example a pardon. There is a difference in making an unlawful act lawful and one making it a crime. ( ex post facto meaning taken by ponente from Wooddeson, Blackstone;Massachusetts’, Maryland’s and North Carolina’s Constitutions, or forms of Government same as one or two of the enumerated)
• The prohibition contemplated the fact not to be affected by subsequent law, was some fact to be done by a Citizen, or Subject. Citing Justice Raymond calling stat. 7 Geo. 1st. stat. 2 par 8, ex post facto because it affected contracts for South Sea Stock made before the statute.
•
In the present case there is no fact done by the plaintiffs, that is affected by the resolution of the Connecticut. The 1st decree of the court of probate was given before the resolution and in 1 The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they may declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases, but they can’t change innocence to punishable guilt or violate the rights in contracts and private property.(I don’t know why the ponente said this, when he debunked it anyway)that’s sense, they lost what they were entitled to were it not for the resolution. And the decree was the only fact that which the resolution affected, this is not within the intention of the law to be prohibited.
• The framers of the prohibition didn’t intend to include vested rights, or else the provision “that private property should not be taken for public use without just compensation” is
superfluous/unnecessary. Why need specific prohibition?
•
Anyway, the resolution (or law) alone had no manner of effect on any right whatever vested in Calder and wife. The Resolution combined with the new hearing, and the decision, in virtue of it, took away their right to recover the property in question. But whencombined they took away no right of property vested in Calder and wife; because the 1st decree against the will did not vest in or transfer any property to them. Because a vested right means that, that person has the power to do certain actions, possess things according to the law of the land.
• If any one has a right to property such right is a perfect and exclusive right; but no one can have such right before he has acquired a better right to the property, than any other person in the world: a right, therefore, only to recover property cannot be called a perfect and exclusive right. (I think the will was more excl and perfect as it was valid)
Then Justice Chase is of the opinion that the petition is void. Judgment affirmed.
Patterson, J.
The Connecticut Consti is made up of usages.(I think this means ancient and uniform practice) He recognizes that eversince the Connecticut Legislature had been able to do judicial acts(like granting of new trials. Even though in 1762 they imparted this to the courts, they still
retained this right. The imparting didn’t annihilate their power, instead it only shred the jurisdiction. So the resolution could be seen both ways, either a judicial or legislative act.
But for the purpose of answering the petition of the plaintiffs, WON the resolution was an ex post facto law.
We will look at this as a judicial act(remember ex post are legislative).
Using Judge Blackstone’s description 2 and the constitutions of Masachussets3 ,Delaware4 , North Carolina5 and Maryland6, we see that the prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only in penal
statutes.
The 1st Art. in Sec 9 of the US Consti says “No