Continguts específics del nivell Bàsic 2

Probably the biggest weakness of the Taliban organization is the use of violence and intimidation to keep the population in line. The Taliban aim to overcome this weakness by creating popular appeal through their IO campaign. The use of intimidation tactics creates vulnerability for the Taliban if the Coalition forces capable of providing a modicum of long-term security in return for local cooperation. Most survey respondents considered this the greatest Taliban vulnerability (Figure 41 below).

325 Barabási and Bonabeau, 57.

Taliban Weaknesses

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5

Intolerant interpretation of Islam Local legitimacy based on ethnicity Indiscriminate violence and intimidation Past history of repression Lack of international acceptance Opposition from tribal leaders A dominantly sectarian outlook

Rating Average

Figure 41. Perceptions of Taliban Weaknesses

The Taliban have an unenviable legacy of repressive rule, although their IO campaign tries to glorify their time in power. Their legacy can make people unfavorable to a reenactment of Taliban rule, a vulnerability for the organization.

Despite their deep understanding of the human terrain, the Taliban challenge the traditional tribal structures of the Pashtun by shifting power from the elders to the clergy and the youth. This creates innate resentment from the tribal elders and maliks, some of whom consider the Taliban a long-term threat to the tribal institutions. ³²⁶

The Taliban interpretation of Islam is not in harmony with the Afghan Islamic tradition, nor does it coincide with most of the regional ethnic groups' more tolerant views. This gives the Afghanistan and Pakistan security forces, who can legitimately discuss the issues as fellow Muslims, opportunities for turning the population against the Taliban.

326 Reportedly, more than 200 tribal elders who resisted Taliban domination were killed by the militants in 2005 and 2006. See Johnson and Mason, No Sign Until the Burst of Fire, 15.

Coupled with their religious interpretation is the Taliban’s dominantly sectarian outlook and alliance with extremist sectarian outfits like Sipah-e-Sahaba,³²⁷ which seriously hampers their ability to expand into other ethnic and sectarian communities.

A similar organizational weakness is over-reliance on ethnic and tribal connections that provides strength at the local level but hampers expansion beyond tribal and ethnic groups. This phenomenon is visible in the distribution of security incidents among various ethnic groups (Figure 42 below) and Pashtun tribal groups (Figure 43 below). It is clear from these figures that the Taliban are most active in the Pashtun dominated areas and within the Ghilzai and Karlanri tribal groups in particular. The mainly Pashtun nature of Taliban, and a high concentration of Ghilzais in its top leadership circles, inhibits lateral expansion into tribal and ethnic communities who opt for government presence. On the other hand, the reliance on tribal connections raises the possibility of clan and factional infighting within the organization, especially in cases that require allegiance to commanders from rival clans.

Figure 42. Ethnic Distribution of Security Incidents 2007-08 ³²⁸

327 Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan is a Sunni militant sectarian organization that primarily targets Shia Muslims. It operates mainly in Pakistan and Afghanistan and was banned by the Pakistani government in January 2002 as a terrorist outfit. For details see "Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan," South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Ssp.htm (accessed April 11, 2008).

328 Shahid Afsar, Distribution of Security Incidents in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2007-08 (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). Incident data derived from “Senlis Maps,” The Senlis Council-Security and Development Policy Group; http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/maps (accessed March 1, 2008).

Figure 43. Distribution of Security Incidents within Pashtun Tribal Groups³²⁹

The Taliban insurgency's tribal nature contradicts its purportedly religious focus and its claim to transcend tribal and ethnic boundaries, thereby raising questions about its basic stance.³³⁰ Rahimullah Yousufzai highlights the issue.

The Taliban and other jihad advocates often claim that they believe in the concept of a common Muslim ummah (community) and reject the division of their religion into groups based on ethnicity, language, geographical borders and tribes. In practice, this is easier said than done. In tribal societies such as that of the Pashtuns inhabiting Pakistan and Afghanistan, even ideologically-driven radical Taliban and jihadist fighters gravitate toward their own tribe and local commander whether fighting U.S.-led Coalition forces or the armed forces of Pakistan.³³¹

329 Shahid Afsar, Distribution of Security Incidents in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2007-08 (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). Incident data derived from “Senlis Maps,” The Senlis Council-Security and Development Policy Group; http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/maps (accessed March 1, 2008).

330 Smith, Talking to the Taliban.

331 Rahimullah Yusufzai, "The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban,"

Terrorism Monitor 6, no. 3 (February 7, 2008),

http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373954 (accessed February 11, 2008).

The lack of international support and recognition of the Taliban due to their assumed association with terror networks is a disadvantage for the organization in the international arena. Their association with terrorism raises serious questions about the Taliban's chances for acceptance should they wish to acquire official power at some stage, and creates problems for any negotiated settlement, as most nations will probably not negotiate openly with a group labeled as terrorist sponsors.

F. THE WAY FORWARD FOR THE TALIBAN: STRATEGIC OPTIONS