The Netherlands had exploited its special relationship with Japan and preserved its ‘national prestige and economic interest’. This special relationship, however, came to an end by the conclusion of the Harris Treaty in 1858. In the past, Japan had had closer relations with the Netherlands than with other powers and it had given the Dutch certain privileges. The Netherlands had been given a pledge by Japan that such privileges would also be granted in the future. The Japanese believed that people generally show more goodwill to blood relatives. Since the Netherlands, with China, had had a long relationship with Japan, the Netherlands was regarded more or less as a blood relative. Also, in respect to foreign relations, the Dutch predominance in Japan had been accepted by the British in the Japanese-British treaty.527 That the Netherlands was greatly valued was also revealed in the Japanese utterance that ‘the Dutch were distinguished from other nations and were trusted most by the Japanese Government’.528 Since the opening of Japan, the Dutch Government had been
relying on this pledge and patiently persisted in the difficult negotiations with the Japanese Government which was experiencing serious domestic troubles after the country’s opening. However, it now became clear that the high Dutch expectations were based on an illusion.
The Netherlands did acquire most-favoured-nation treatment, and was able to enjoy the same rights as granted to the United States in the Harris Treaty. The sticking point was, the status of Deshima as a bonded warehouse, considered a very important vested right by the Dutch, was still unsecured. The Minister of Colonial Affairs proposed postponing the ratification until this point had been clarified by Japan, but the Dutch Government decided to conclude a new treaty without delay. The Ministers of Colonial and Foreign
527 Van der Chijs, Neêrlands streven, p.179. NA Koloniën, 5878, 2 October N.331 of ‘Dagelijksche Aanteekeningen van 29 November 1854 t/m 13 November 1855 behoorende tot de missive van den Nederlandschen Kommissaris in Japan van den 10 November 1855 La.T Geheim gericht aan Z.E. den Goeverneur Generaal van Nederlandsch Indië’ on 8 April N196/O.
528 Van der Chijs, Neêrlands streven, p.125. J.C. Lewe van Middelstum, ‘De Openstelling van Japan’, De gids, 1858, p.69.
Affairs had, on behalf of the king, signed the previous agreement and treaty, but now the signature of the king was required to ratify the new treaty modelled on the American text.529 The Minister of Colonial Affairs requested the Minister of Foreign Affairs to give the necessary consent for the signing of the treaty. Although the form of the treaty was not the correct one, the Minister of Colonial Affairs thought that it would be desirable to prepare the related official documents immediately, because he believed that it would be difficult to require the proper form in negotiations with a country like Japan, which had had few relations with foreign countries until recently.530 Later, the Minister of Colonial Affairs requested the Minister of Foreign Affairs to ask the king to ratify the signature of Donker Curtius in order to conclude the treaty. After his consent, the instrument of ratification would be submitted to the king.531 A distinctive feature of the Dutch-Japanese treaty was that it mentioned that books, medicine and steam engines were exempt from import duties; moreover merchant ships, coffee and sugar were subject to a duty of 5 per cent of their value, while other products would be taxed at a 20 per cent duty rate.532
It was proposed to send Von Siebold to Japan in order to bring the ratification of the Dutch-Japanese additional treaty of 1856, and to promote Dutch commerce there by acting as a representative of the NHM. The Minister of Colonial Affairs anticipated that this measure would strengthen Dutch diplomacy in Japan, but the Ministry of Colonial Affairs strongly opposed the idea. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs explained that it would be difficult for the Japanese to distinguish between Von Siebold’s role as a civil employee of the NHM and as an official representative of the Dutch Government. Hence, the Dutch Government tried to realize its plan for free trade in Japan by means of private merchants. Moreover it was worried that Donker Curtius’ management of Japanese affairs and his standing with the Japanese authorities might be called into doubt, if the Japanese regarded the sending of Von Siebold as a sign of the Dutch Government’s disapproval of his management of Japanese affairs. It might also create the impression that, in the eyes of the Dutch Government, Curtius had failed to supply his Government with full information on Japanese
529 NA Koloniën no.5902, 8 December 1858 N.446, Geheim. 530 NA Koloniën no.5903, 5 January 1859 N.3, Geheim. 531 NA Koloniën no.5903, 22 January 1859 N.37, Geheim. 532 Ishii, Nihon kaikokushi, p.364.
trade.533 In spite of this opposition in the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, the Minister of Colonial Affairs did not abandon his plan. Requesting the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to inform Donker Curtius of his comment, he expressed his disappointment; the documents he had received shortly before had left him with the impression that Donker Curtius no longer showed the same active and lively concern about ensuring the centuries-old Dutch position in Japan, which had previously characterized his endeavours.534
Until 1858 the Dutch Government had tried to give direction to their policies towards Japan to other countries, while simultaneously attempting to exploit its relations with Japan for its own sake, even if this meant that the opening of Japan to international trade was delayed. Against this background, the Minister of Colonial Affairs expressed his disappointment that ‘at present, so to speak, the Netherlands only follows other powers, especially the United States of North America and it is pleased with acquiring the same privilege admitted to other powers.…I shall not speak my wish here that the Netherlands should be admitted more privileges than others powers in Japan. These last words show that this would be contradictory to the altruistic Dutch policy pursued up to then. Yet the Minister expected that the Netherlands could acquire one exception, recognition of Deshima as a bonded warehouse. The Minister considered that this Dutch privilege was of importance, because the Netherlands would have a chance to establish a vast market for its colonial products in Asia. In spite of this expectation, he finally expressed his grief saying ‘I confess that I would have liked to have seen the Netherlands, as much as the circumstances and our position as a minor power would allow, would lead the way for other powers in Japan, and not merely only follow the flag of others, a situation which has now obviously materialized.’
Moreover, the Minister of Colonial Affairs continued, he did not intend to blame Donker Curtius that not he, but the American Consul-General, had negotiated the new treaty with Japan. He approved of the fact that Donker Curtius had thought it necessary to enter into the conclusion of a new treaty for the purpose of securing the Dutch position of the most-favoured-nation treatment, although he had not been explicitly authorized to do this. On the other hand, the Minister pointed out that a new treaty had been unnecessary,
533 NA Koloniën no.5903, 9 February 1859 N.62.
because the previous treaty had already promised the Dutch the position as the most-favoured-nation in Japan. Therefore, the Minister criticized Donker Curtius saying that ‘it would be better to say that he thought he would enter into a new treaty, because the position regulated in the previous treaty could be rectified considerably, improved and should be changed to consolidate a firmer position over a long period of time.’
The Minister of Colonial Affairs also criticized Donker Curtius for the fact that the currency unit used in the Dutch-Japanese treaty was the dollar. While admitting that the dollar was already generally known as the current money in the Japan and China Seas, he commented that Donker Curtius did not need to obey the American negotiator ‘like a slave’, and, ‘if a trifling thing is pointed out’, to accept the American currency even in the regulations of payment and reparations. Therefore, the Minister instructed that, at the very least, ‘these regulations are to be written in the Dutch currency against the price of the dollar’. Furthermore, he rejected as ‘groundless’ the comment by Donker Curtius that ‘the Netherlands had recently lagged behind others from the political and economic viewpoint in Japan’.
Here, it is important to notice that the influence of the dollar in Asia was being more firmly established: the provisions for payment were expressed in dollars in the Japanese-American treaty. This point seems to have been significant, in spite of having no connection with the most-favored-nation treatment. That is, if the Netherlands had preceded other countries in the currency regulation of the treaty with Japan, the influence accompanying the advantage would have been significant. Actually it is difficult to presume this real influence, however it would have contributed greatly to Dutch ‘national prestige and economic interest’ in Asia.
Moreover, the Minister of Colonial Affairs did ‘not overlook’ the matter that Donker Curtius and the Japanese negotiators regarded it as ‘unnecessary and strange’ to include a similar article as in the Japanese-American treaty in the Dutch-Japanese treaty. The article in the American document said that the United States of America supported the Japanese interests in West European countries and that Japan placed orders in the United States. The Minister feared that the Netherlands would need to double its activities in order not to lag behind the United States in Japan in respect of political influence, trade, and industry, because the United States would exploit the differences between the two agreements in order to promote its own interests over those of the Dutch.