The analyst Charles Rycroft has pointed out that 'the proposition
"Psychoanalysis is not a science" can be made true or untrue by choosing the appropriate definition of science' (Rycroft 1966). Various criteria of
demarcation between science and non-science have been proposed, of which by far the most influential has come from Karl Popper (1980). Building on Hume's exposure of the logical deficiencies of attempts to confirm scientific statements by verifying them. Popper proposed instead that the hallmark of true science should be that the null hypothesis has a significantly better than even chance of being supported by the data. Scientific standing is thus defined not by whether a particular statement is true or false but by whether it can generate clear predictions vulnerable to falsification®. The riskier a
® This can lead, as Laudan has pointed out , to some ridiculous conclusions. While scientific status can be enjoyed by any eccentric claim that can be falsified (the earth is flat; the earth is at the centre of the universe; the Loch Ness Monster exists), statements such as there are atoms', 'black holes exist' and 'there is an unconscious part of the mind' are not scientific (Laudan 1983).
hypothesis, the better its potential to expand the boundaries of scientific knowledge.
Within these parameters, Popper considers psychoanalysis to be unscientific, not primarily because of Eysenck's objection that it is untestable but
because, even if tests could be set up, the statements of psychoanalysis are essentially unfalsifiable. There is, according to Popper, 'no conceivable
human behaviour which would contradict them' (1972). Once again, though the focus of the argument is different from Eysenck's, the complaint is the same: psychoanalysis employs immunising strategies, 'self-confirm atory' rather than 'self-corrective' procedures (Farrell 1981), to protect itself from evaluation. It is, therefore, unscientific^®.
Popper called psychoanalysis a 'prescientific m yth' (Popper 1972). We can, I think, allow psychoanalytic therapy to be described as 'proto-scientific' - in common w ith most, if not all, psychological treatments (and a good many physical therapies as well). It is a contentious point as to which treatments, if any, might be excused from offering further proof of their efficacy. Even behavioural treatments, founded on theoretically well-established principles of learning, reinforcement schedules and so on, are 'contaminated' by a great many non-specific factors, which are difficult to isolate and which have not been properly studied. But it is surely the theory that Popper wants to term prescientific and mythic. The philosopher Brian Farrell (who himself regards psychoanalysis as a 'premature' theory, a juvenile not yet come to maturity) does not agree that it has the attributes of a myth (Farrell 1981). Popper presumably wishes to liken analytic theory to legends and fairy-stories which purvey truth only in symbolic vessels; the great difference, says Farrell, lies in the open-ness of psychoanalysis. It continues to evolve and mature and is capable of modification in a way that a myth is not. Nevertheless, though
Popper is sticking his neck out in assuming that it is possible to define, once and for all, the kinds of issues that fall within science's domain and those that lie outside its jurisdiction. Nicholas Rescher, writing on the unpredictability of future science, believes that we cannot know what questions will be up for debate on the scientific agenda in years to come, and that we cannot say clearly what it can and cannot accomplish. To categorise whole ranges of phenomena as being uninteresting to science is, therefore, 'a risky and unprofitable business' (Rescher 1983).
psychoanalysis probably contains signposts to the truth, it has not yet demonstrated its truthful insights to the satisfaction of the empiricist. Farrell sees no need to be perturbed by this: 'such imprecise or vague pointers are not uncharacteristic of the early stages of a scientific enquiry, and they may be indispensable to further advance' (op cit). What he does take issue on is the indifference of analysts to claims made by their theory which are, so far, unsupported or, worse, which point away from the truth.
The 'prem aturity' description of psychoanalysis is supported by psychologist Paul Kline who views the theory as a premature empirical synthesis offered in advance of the evidence (Kline 1981) - in other words, a working model, which is heuristically useful but needs a great deal of transformation and revision to get into empirical shape. Prematurity need not be an embarrass ment; all sciences are cognisant w ith it and have subsequently built on its foundations. William Harvey's conceptions on the circulation of the blood around the body and Newton's particle theory of matter and light are tw o such embryonic sets of ideas which needed refinement and adjustment but which turned out to be abundantly fruitful. The High Level postulates of psychoanalysis similarly need much modification before they are suitable for the derivation of testable hypotheses. But some of the Low Level conjectures are certainly capable of being translated into operational definitions and, indeed, have been.