Contraste y Validación de Hipótesis

A Digression on Propositional Knowing

We have already suggested that the kind of knowledge Plantinga is primarily concerned with is propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge is, simply, knowledge of propositions. In order to count as knowledge, of course, the proposition known must be true, it must be understood and it must be warrantedly believed. Just what is a proposition? According to Plantinga, “these are the things that are true or false; they are also the things we believe, and the things expressed by our sentences.”37 This implies

36

CD I/1, 323 (KD I/1, 341). 37

“Replies to My Colleagues,” In Alvin Plantinga, eds. James E. Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1985), 355.

an obvious, though occasionally overlooked, distinction between propositions and the sentences used to express them. Plantinga explains further, “when one sincerely asserts a proposition p, then one believes p (and hence grasps or understands it) and asserts p by way of assertively uttering a sentence that expresses p.”38 I take it that when Plantinga says ‘a sentence expresses a proposition’ this is short-hand for ‘a sentence is used by a person to express a proposition.’39 The truth or falsehood of a sentence is judged on the basis of the truth or falsehood of the proposition which is intended to be expressed by means of the sentence.40 The suitability of a sentence as the vehicle of the expression of a proposition will depend on all of the many factors that impact communication. A sentence, therefore, does not have the capacity perfectly to convey a proposition. Instead, as Plantinga affirms, the expression of a proposition by a sentence is successful when, “my interlocutor, upon hearing the sentence I use, grasps or apprehends the very proposition in question—the very proposition I believe, intend to assert, and express by my sentence.”41 In Plantinga’s view, our grasp or apprehension of a proposition is not an all or nothing venture, it is a matter of degree.42 One more obvious point to make is that propositions are about things, things that are referred to in sentences under some description or proper name. Sentences expressing propositions are typically composed of subjects, predicates and predicating terms; to grasp a proposition firmly one must apprehend clearly what is meant by each of these components.43

38

“Replies to My Colleagues,” 355. 39

In other words, I believe the proposition Plantinga means to assert with the sentence ‘a sentence expresses a proposition’ is better expressed using the sentence ‘a sentence is used by a person to express a proposition.’

40

See Plantinga, “Divine Knowledge,” in Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge, eds. C. Stephen Evans and Merold Westphal (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 43, where he also notes that not every sentence is intended to express a proposition.

41

“Replies to My Colleagues,” 355. 42

“Replies to My Colleagues,” 356. 43

It is important to note that the traditional ‘propositional’ sentence is certainly not the only vehicle for expressing propositions. Propositions can be given expression by means of other linguistic genres (e.g., poetry, parable, etc.). Propositions can also be expressed through non-linguistic means (e.g., sculpture, interpretive dance, etc.). These forms may serve to evoke or express more than propositions, though often not less. These forms may have the advantage of addressing non-cognitive barriers to and personal dimensions of knowing. The advantage of the traditional sentence in ‘propositional form,’ adopted as the primary form in research literature, is the precision with which it is able to express an intended proposition. Some suggest, however, that the impotence of ‘propositional’ form to address the fuller

Propositional knowing may be distinguished from other kinds of knowing. Propositional knowing takes the form of knowing that p (where p is a proposition). There is also practical knowledge—knowing how to do x, which just means being capable of doing x. There is experiential knowledge or the knowledge of acquaintance whereby one is familiar with x. The personal knowing we have discussed could be considered a special kind of experiential knowing. It is significant to note that practical, experiential and personal knowledge can and usually do have propositional content. Practical, experiential or personal knowledge is accompanied by propositional knowledge about the object that is known practically, experientially or personally. The relationship between propositional knowing and other kinds of knowing is complex.44 Growing in propositional knowledge is often a means to growing in other kinds of knowledge. Growing in other kinds of knowledge often involves the discovery of new propositional knowledge. Belief also has more than one sense. Belief as a component of propositional knowledge indicates assent to the truth of a proposition—belief that p. Belief that indicates trust in or submission to something or someone takes the form of belief in x. Each of these distinctions regarding belief, knowledge, propositions and their means of expression will be important for avoiding ambiguity as we now pick up where we left off with Barth.

Barth and Propositional Knowing

We have already confirmed that, for Barth, revelation is principally personal divine self-disclosure. Revelation, therefore, cannot be reduced to propositions.45 This leaves

dimensions of knowing can so impede successful communication of meaning that other means of expressing propositions are, in fact, superior. Kevin Vanhoozer, for example, suggests that “fixation on sentence-long statements only fails to do justice to the particularity and plurality of the Bible’s diverse literary forms because certain aspects of meaning, and reality, emerge only under certain literary frameworks of description” (“The Apostolic Discourse and Its Developments,” in Scripture’s Doctrine

and Theology’s Bible: How the New Testament Shapes Christian Dogmatics, eds. Markus Bockmuehl

and Alan J. Torrance [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, forthcoming 2008]). 44

This complexity is compounded by other non-cognitive dimensions which directly impact knowledge structures. The interconnectedness of the affective and the cognitive is commonly acknowledged. See

WCB, 205–209, 301–310. 45

On the question of whether revelation can be equated with doctrinal propositions, Barth’s view is clear. “Will the truth of revelation submit to such materialisation and depersonalisation? Can one have it in

open the question of whether, in Barth’s view, revelation has propositional content that is in some way available to human subjects. Does revelation as personal knowing eclipse the propositional? Does Barth believe that revelation is indifferent to propositional content, or merely that the propositional content of faith cannot be known outside of the gift of personal divine self-revealing? It may be helpful to look at some of Barth’s sterner warnings regarding propositions (Sätze).

The concept of truths of revelation in the sense of Latin propositions given and sealed once for all with divine authority in both wording and meaning is theologically impossible if it is a fact that revelation is true in the free decision of God which was taken once for all in Jesus Christ.46

we cannot view [revelation] in such a way that propositions may be taken from it which, isolated from the giving of God’s Word in revelation, Scripture and proclamation, can be known as general truths by man, . . . so that they for their part can then be made—and this is the decisive point— the presupposition of an understanding of God’s Word or the basis of theology.47

It is for this reason and in this sense that we finally speak of the Word of God as the mystery of God. . . . as one might put it, a theological warning against theology, a warning against the idea that its propositions or principles are certain in themselves like the supposed axioms of the mathematicians and physicists, and are not rather related to their theme and content, which alone are certain, which they cannot master, by which they must be mastered if they are not to be mere soap-bubbles.48

abstraction from the person of Him who reveals it and from the revelatory act of this person in which it is given to other persons to perceive?” (CD I/1, 270; KD I/1, 285).

46

CD I/1, 15 (KD I/1, 14). Barth is not suggesting that the truth of what is revealed is relative to God’s decision to reveal it, rather than absolute, anchored in the reality of the object of revelation. It is rather that God’s decision to reveal is part of who God is, as the object of revelation. God is also his revealing. 47

CD I/1, 130 (KD I/1, 134). 48

These are strong warnings, yet rather than supporting the conclusion that revelation has

no propositional content, propositional content is assumed and given a strict qualification. Barth’s apparent anxiety about propositions is directed at a view of revelation as the lossless transmission of divine data in self-contained human statements. In each instance, his intent is to highlight the utter incapacity of human words, conceptions and noetic equipment to contain the personal revelation of God. We must remember, however, that in the miracle of faith this incapacity is overcome. Having remembered this, we must not forget that even the propositional content of revelation remains ever dependent on the gracious action of divine self-disclosure—the gift of faith. It may be illuminating to consider how this might proceed for a particular proposition—one which would traditionally be considered a revealed ‘truth.’

Consider the proposition Plantinga often returns to, “God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself.”49 How might grasping this proposition be related to Barth’s notion of revelation, such that, on the one hand, it constitutes a genuine human grasp of the proposition, while on the other hand, it remains fundamentally dependent on the personal knowing of faith? Throughout this analysis it will be important to keep in mind the difference between a proposition and its means of expression. The way in which the proposition in question is expressed may, of course, vary. The appropriateness of the expression will depend on a multitude of situational variables. Perhaps one hears a sermon that explicitly addresses the sentence ‘God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself’ or, what may be more likely, one encounters a presentation of the Gospel narrative that expresses the proposition in question and many others. The question is: How might one be given a grasp of this proposition which is a genuine human grasp and also derivative of the faith-giving activity of the Sprit?

Consider again what is involved in grasping a proposition. The strength of one’s grasp of a proposition is dependent upon how clearly one apprehends the subject, predicate, and the nature of the predication involved. There may be many ways in which one comes to acquire a new or strengthened apprehension of these things—through experience, inference, testimony, etc. There are also different ways of apprehending a proposition. It is possible to have no prior knowledge of a subject and still apprehend a proposition in a certain sense. Take for example the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Newg is unhappy today’. One might have no other knowledge of Newg and still firmly apprehend

49

that Newg has the property of being unhappy today. There is a difficulty with this, however. What is meant by the expression ‘being unhappy today’ depends, in part, on the nature of the thing about which it is expressed. Think of the difference it would make if

Newg were an amoeba, a tropical storm, a personal computer, or a new-born baby. We can see, therefore, that the stronger one’s apprehension of the realities involved the better one’s grasp of a proposition about them.

Now let us consider what it takes to have a relatively strong grasp of the proposition that God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself. If we are correct in what we have said so far, it requires a relatively strong apprehension of what is being expressed by the proper names ‘God,’ and ‘Christ,’ as well as what is meant by ‘reconciling,’ etc. Where might we turn to find greater clarity about these realities? Principally, Barth suggests, this clarification comes though God’s own transforming work of self-revelation through the witness of the Bible and the proclamation of the Church. In Christian scripture and preaching, however, we find more expressions in human words which are used together in an attempt to clarify what those expressions intend. The problem, which is for Barth patent, is that all those words are never adequate, by themselves, to give a sufficient grasp of the reality referred to by the proper names ‘God’ and ‘Christ.’ Certainly one can become competent in using the words, and still lack a basic understanding of and familiarity with the realities to which they refer. Plantinga has a great deal to offer in navigating the subtleties involved with proper names, real referents, and propositional utterances. Of particular assistance on this issue is the extremely helpful distinction Plantinga draws between de dicto and de re belief.50

De Dicto Assertion and De Re Belief

Plantinga’s primary deployment of the de dicto/de re distinction is in discussions of modality where de re and de dicto distinguish two kinds of necessity.51De dicto necessity applies to a dictum—that is, to the abstract proposition. De re necessity applies to the

res—that is, to the individual realities referred to by the abstract proposition. This same distinction can also be applied to distinguish two kinds of belief. De dicto belief affirms

50

“A competent speaker could use his words to assert a proposition of which he has only an inchoate grasp or even no grasp at all” (“Replies to My Colleagues,” 357).

51

See “De Re et De Dicto,” Noûs 3, no. 3 (1969): 235–258. For the distinction in Aquinas, see Summa

the truth of the abstract proposition. De re belief affirms, of that to which the proposition refers, what is ascribed to it by the proposition. This is a subtle, but enormously consequential distinction. We can illustrate the distinction formally if we consider the proposition expressed by ‘a is x.’ De dicto belief affirms the abstract assignment of the property x to a. Believing de dicto of ‘a’ that it has the property x may involve knowing little else about the reality referred to by a. De re belief affirms that x is true of the actual reality referred to by a. De re belief is always of some specific ‘concrete’ reality. This formal illustration struggles to give us a clear conception of de re belief because a is itself a pure abstraction with no specific reference. Let us take, therefore, a somewhat far- fetched, though much more concrete example.

Consider the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘the fastest typing ventriloquist in the world is performing tonight in St Andrews.’ One need not know exactly who is the fastest typing ventriloquist in the world to believe that there is a fastest typing ventriloquist and that he or she is performing tonight in St Andrews. This would be to believe de dicto of ‘the fastest typing ventriloquist in the world’ that he or she is performing tonight in St Andrews. Suppose, however, that the fastest typing ventriloquist in the world is actually my close friend and colleague Kelly D. Liebengood. This would enable me to believe de re of Kelly both that he is the fastest typing ventriloquist in the world and that he is performing his act tonight in St Andrews. We could, perhaps, take an illustration that is right at the heart of our broader concern. Consider the proposition expressed by ‘God is omniscient.’52 One may assert this proposition de dicto. One may form the de dicto belief with respect to the proper name ‘God’ that it stands for a thing that has the property of omniscience. One may also form the de re belief of God, the personal being to which ‘God’ refers, that he has the property of omniscience.53 De re

belief, therefore, seems to require some knowing contact with the real referent(s) of the proposition. Since God’s knowledge of himself is perfect, he is in the best position to form de re beliefs about himself with respect to true propositions referring to him. Furthermore, Jesus Christ as God incarnate, the Son who knows the Father, stands in a

52

See WCB, 293, where Plantinga considers the de dicto assertion that ‘there is an all-powerful, all- knowing, wholly good person who has created and sustains the world.’

53

“. . . the theist believes that there is such a being, but also, no doubt, believes of God, the being who in fact meets this description, that he exists. It isn’t necessary, however, that he does the latter; perhaps he forms the de dicto belief but never performs the de re act of believing something or other of the being in question” (WCB, 293–294).

unique position with respect to human knowledge of God. In Christ we find God’s human

knowledge of himself.

It is clear that, for Barth, genuine human knowledge of God that comes by the self- revealing Word of God in the gift of faith involves not merely de dicto assertion, but de re

belief. This gives us another way of framing our question regarding the propositional content of revelation. According to Barth, how is it that God’s self-disclosure enables human knowing to transcend the de dicto, yielding warranted de re belief? We are now ready to tackle three, very much interconnected, nodal issues for coming to grips with Barth’s theology of revelation. We will treat them in the following order: 1) the hiddenness of God, 2) the problem of analogical predication, and 3) the significance of

historical knowledge.