CONTRAVENCIONES GRAVES DE PRIMERA CLASE

In Eastern Ukraine, Putin’s security policy has seen a similar of hybrid methods, although unlike in Crimea, Russia has not proceeded to annexation. The origins of Russian military involvement are found in the violent clashes in and between Euromaidan and Anti-

Euromaidan protesters, which swept through Eastern Ukraine in the aftermath of

Yanukovich’s flight from office in late February 2014.

One of the most likely explanations for the differences in approach between Eastern Ukraine and Crimea is the population itself: surveys show that Russia’s popularity is vastly greater among Crimean residents than those living in Eastern Ukraine. Moreover, Eastern Ukrainians are less likely to believe the implications of the pro-Russian discourse; one example is the concept of Novorossiya (“New Russia”), which one survey shows is taken to mean “desire for independence” by most Crimean respondents, whereas those in South- and Eastern Ukraine are more likely to see it as “Russian political technology” ( O’Loughlin and Toal, 2015). Putin has designated Novorossiya to be Eastern and Southern Oblasts of “Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev and Odessa” (Putin, 2014b), based on Russia’s ‘historical relationship’ with these regions. Furthermore, Crimea had already enjoyed, since the dissolution of the USSR, the status as an Autonomous Republic within Ukraine; the Eastern and Southern Oblasts have not. Most likely, annexation of these territories would have led to an even greater confrontation between Russia and the West.

Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly the case that Russia has intervened extensively into Eastern Ukraine, predominantly in the adjacent Donetsk and Luhansk regions. As in Crimea, Russian officials have ostensibly denied that this was the case. However, there is a wealth of research available, based on open-source intelligence (OSINT), which points to the contrary. Czuperski et al.’s Hiding in Plain Sight (2015), for example, has extensively tracked the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine and located their positions and movements by tracking the pictures they posted of themselves online. They also tracked Russian military hardware

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that has been used against Ukrainian forces (sometimes under the guise of being a “humanitarian convoy”) and shelling of Ukrainian positions from Russian territory.

The opposition politician Boris Nemtsov’s (assassinated near the Kremlin on February 27, 2015) posthumous report Putin. War (2015: 17-23, 33-37) details eyewitness accounts of Russian servicemen, who stated that Russian special forces and paratroopers were ordered to disguise themselves as volunteers, and that the most important military operations have been led by Russian generals. It also details how families of Russian soldiers killed in action received compensation from the state and had to sign non-disclosure agreements. Bellingcat, a collective of investigative journalists, have tracked the cross-border movement of the infamous Russian-supplied BUK Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system that was used to shoot down Malaysia Airlines MH17 at the hands of the Russia-backed separatists (Bellingcat, 2015).

Unlike in Georgia, the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR & LPR) did not get an official Russian recognition of independence. However, their armed forces, a loose coalition of different allied militias, have been aided and abetted by Russian operations, The exact extent of this relationship is difficult to independently establish, in part because of the lack of transparency on the part of Kremlin and because of the problem of disentangling real volunteers from Russia from those who are sent on the Kremlin’s orders (Jackson, 2014).

Undoubtedly, Russian involvement has been a major factor in the continuation of the conflict there, which has seen back-and-forth offensives and counter-offensives between April 2014 until the immediate aftermath of Minsk-II, the ceasefire agreement that was signed between Ukraine and the separatists on February 12, 2015. During the initial stages of the ceasefire, pro-Russian forces used the opportunity to capture the strategic town of Debaltseve in Donetsk, which connects Donetsk with Luhansk via a rail hub and highway crossing (Luhn and Grytsenko, 2015). After that, no major territorial changes have occurred, thus more or less ‘freezing’ the conflict. Since there has been no fundamental peace agreement, the situation continues to be tense and the war officially still remains ongoing.

Despite heavy Russian engagement in hostilities, it is unlikely that Russia’s intent is to perpetuate conflict near its border; such a continued commitment would drain more resources and draw negative international attention, without (or perhaps marginally) gaining more influence. Minsk-II, although solidifying the separatist’s position through the capture of

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Debalteve, also was Putin’s signal to the separatists that this was as far as he would let them go (for the time being).

As Freedman (2015: 28) notes: “it would serve neither Ukraine nor Russia if Donetsk and Luhansk fell into disrepair and disarray, adrift in some separatist limbo”. Russia’s preference is for the implementation of all aspects the Minsk-II political resolution, which entails a high degree of independence for Donbass in a Ukrainian federative system, so that it can maintain its influence without the costly affair of continued involvement, or even annexation of the war-torn and divided regions. Such a renewed adventure would come at the cost of increased international confrontation at a time where Putin cannot afford it (Blank, 2016).