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CONTROL AMBIENTAL

In document DOCUMENTO 2. NORMAS URBANÍSTICAS (página 122-126)

REGULACIÓN DE USOS DEL SUELO Y DE LA EDIFICACIÓN

Artículo 4.2.53. CONTROL AMBIENTAL

The three independent variables that were identified cover both EU level factors and domestic politics factors. In identifying these variables it is acknowledged that there are other potential alternative variables that could be relevant. The variables in this project have been identified as potentially the most important, drawing on the literature review. Indicative modes of classification for these variables are given below and how they are to be operationalized.

(IV1) The level of development of the EU’s policy approach

The first independent variable is the ‘EU level’ factor i.e. what the EU was doing in terms of its policy approach. The policy approach that the EU has taken to potential new member states is clearly dynamic, in that it changes over time, responds to geo- political events, and is potentially informed by changes to the EU’s composition. Cases will be classified according to this variable as having had either a high, medium or low level of level of development of the EU’s policy approach, and cases will be classified according to this variable in Chapter 3 through analysis of the interview data.

A high level of development of the policy approach will be taken to mean that the EU had developed a sophisticated set of policies and was seeking extensive engagement at multiple levels (e.g. with political elites and civil society actors), was offering significant financial resources (e.g. funding for governmental reform, NGOs) and was employing extensive monitoring of reform in the target country. A medium level of development of the policy approach will be taken to mean that the EU had a set of policies and was seeking some level of engagement, was offering some level of financial resources, but was not extensively monitoring reform in the target country. A low level of development of the policy approach will be taken to mean that the EU had only a limited set of policies (e.g. sanctions, dialogues), was not engaged at multiple levels, was not offering significant resources, nor was it extensively monitoring reform in the target country.

The EU may have a highly developed policy approach to a country that is a formal candidate for EU membership, or it may have only a low level policy approach towards it. Similarly, the EU may have a highly developed policy approach to a country that has only a very distant prospect of EU membership. Alternatively, the EU could have a fairly highly developed policy approach to a country post-accession e.g. the CVM policy approach used with Bulgaria and Romania. Another theoretical possibility is that the EU may be forced by events to greatly increase its level of development of policy approach to a particular country, but which had no bearing or relation to its level of relationship with the EU. For example, if it was determined that a certain country needed the EU to develop some innovative policy approach of some kind. The EU’s policy approach is therefore independent of the level of the relationship with the EU (the DV) that a particular country may, or may not, have. For example, even though a country like Turkey had the offer of a negotiation towards EU membership, it was actually subject to a less developed policy approach than a country like Ukraine, which did not have a formal offer of EU membership.

(IV2) The receptiveness of the political elite to EU influence

Cases will be classified according to this variable in Chapter 4 as having had either a high, medium or low level of receptiveness to EU influence, bearing in mind the definition of the word ‘receptive’ as ‘able or quick to receive impressions or ideas.’ A high level of receptiveness will be taken to mean that the political elite was willing to enter into negotiation with the EU on a highly complex negotiated relationship. A medium level of receptiveness will be taken to mean that the political elite was willing to take part in more flexible partnership arrangements with the EU, such as ENP Action Plans. A low level of receptiveness will be taken to mean that the political elite was unwilling to enter into formal negotiations with the EU of any kind. A receptive domestic political elite is seen as essential (Pridham, 2005; Haughton, 2007) and for the EU’s ‘leverage’ to work it is argued that it must operate on a receptive political elite (Vachudova, 2005).

Cases will be classified according to this variable as having had either a high, medium or low level of pro-EU civil society activity, bearing in mind the definition of the word ‘active’ as ‘working, operative, originating action, not merely passive or inert.’ Cases will be classified according to this variable through analysis of the interview data. The operationalization of this variable reflects the three key areas of civil society which will be explored in detail in Chapter 5, namely mass participation social movements, a politically active national Church, and NGOs.

It is important to state that it is a particular kind of civil society that the EU wishes to encourage and to engage with, namely pro-EU civil society. There are plenty of groups within civil society that do not wish to see their country engage with the EU, and also which the EU does not wish to encourage. These may include far right, xenophobic, homophobic, anti-democratic or anti-European groups. This variable therefore relates to the level of activity of pro-EU groups within civil society. A high level of activity will be taken to mean that civil society had all three of the following: a mass participation active social movement(s), a politically active national Church, and NGOs that were extensively engaged with their domestic government. A medium level of activity will be taken to mean that civil society had two of the following: a mass participation active social movement(s), a politically active national Church, and NGOs that were extensively engaged with their domestic government. A low level of activity will be taken to mean that civil society had only one of the following: a mass participation active social movement(s), a politically active national Church, and NGOs that were extensively engaged with their domestic government.

1.3.6 Hypotheses

Drawing on these independent variables, three hypotheses were derived which will be subject to test. Hypothesis 1 (H1) will be tested in Chapter 3, hypothesis 2 (H2) in Chapter 4, and hypothesis 3 (H3) in Chapter 5.

(H1) If the EU employed a high level of development of its policy approach, we would expect to see an increase in the level of the relationship with the EU.

(H2) If domestic political elites are more receptive to EU influence, we would expect to see an increase in the level of the relationship with the EU.

(H3) If there is a more active pro-EU civil society, we would expect to see an increase in the level of the relationship with the EU.

As most phenomena of interest in comparative research have a high level of causal complexity (Ragin, 1987: 24), it is important to note at this point that by identifying these three hypotheses it is not assumed that any one of them alone holds the explanation or the answer to the central research problem in this project. The best explanation(s) for the success or failure of EU engagement with potential new member states will most likely be found in the interplay between the EU policies that have been employed and the domestic factors in each case. This study seeks to examine the possible causal mechanisms caused by the interaction between IV1 (EU factor), IV2 (domestic factor) and IV3 (domestic factor), or some combination of the IVs, that may explain the observed changes in the DV. The possible combinations of the IVs, and possible interaction between the IVs, will be identified in Chapter 6, and these will suggest possible causal mechanisms. The qualitative interview data will help identify which causal mechanism(s) offer the best explanation(s) for the changes in the DV. Consideration will also be given to the idea of equifinality (i.e. that there may be more than one path to the outcome). In other words, the EU might reach a higher level of relationship with potential member states through different causal mechanisms in each case.

In document DOCUMENTO 2. NORMAS URBANÍSTICAS (página 122-126)

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