8. Métodos de reducción de ruido
8.4 Control del ruido en el puesto de trabajo
The reason why Baan SamBBrag was so well informed about the stakes in the first election may lie in the regular contacts between Semerak Thai men and Malays, at the Gherang Rulcu coffee shop and on the fishing boats. Also in
the fact that the Penggawa at that time was a Negara supporter, who would have appealed to the Thais1 reason and feeling -- by telling them what was at
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the prime factor swaying the Semerak Thais' decision nor the prime source of information on Negara's policy. Nho then said it was the British party? "The Malays said so."
Indeed they did. Two great issues differentiated Parti Negara from U.M.N.O. in the 1955 election campaign. One was Independence from Britain, the other was alliance with the Chinese, There was a superficial contradiction in the stand of each party on these issues. Parti Negara's stand on Independ ence was on the face of it anti-nationalist, but it was justified as a stand in defence of the Sultans and of Malay integrity, and of course since its formation as the Malayan National Conference in 1953? Parti Negara had repre sented Dato Onn bin Jaafar's new-found communalism.^
"Any Malay who demands independence from the British is a traitor to his ruler, said Dato Sir Onn bin Ja'afar, Secretary General of Parti Negara, speaking at a rally here last night /Kota Bharu, on 25th April 1955/ attended by nearly 1,000 Malays. He referred specifically to UMNO leaders who, he said, were malting this demand. He said that Malays in Penang and Malacca owed loyalty to the Queen but those in the Malay States owed it to their rulers.,,.Malays should not be misled by the ignorance of UMNO leaders, who had allowed UMNO's policy to be dictated by the Malayan Chinese Assoc iation. .. "7
The emphasis on the sovereignty of the Sultans and the illegality, there fore, of asking the British for Independence was a mere quibble. The fear of
the consequences for Malaya - and for the Malays - of the double loyalty and the dominance of the Chinese, though, was surely a genuine fear for Dato Onn, even if party interest, following the rout in the first three state elections (in Johore and Trengganu, 1954, and in Penang, February 1955), also indicated the postponement of Independence till such time as the party might
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In contrast to Parti Negara, the United Malays National Organisation was committed to an inter-communal policy, hut was thinking in terms of
Merdeka within the life of the forthcoming partly-elected Legislative Council, about 1959o Naturally, the whole rationale of the Chinese alliance (and
subsequent events and indeed the whole success of independent Malaya have vindicated it) was that inter-communalism is the only possible foundation of nationalist pox^er. The Chinese alliance was a means to a certain ends
Independence. UMNO too was pursuing' a nationalist end, but the higher of the two cptions, involving a risk proportionate to the stakes.
Yet it is slightly ironical that the party which was openly communal at that time should have won the Thais’ support, while the party of all the races was rejected. The paradox stems from the fact that the communal conservatism of Negara had made them shrink from the means necessary to achieve the supreme end of Independence, and this turned them Into the party of the status quo. UMNO, just as much a Malay party, accepted the political imperatives and em braced inter-communal ism only in order to come forward unambiguously as the party of national independence. Negara was smeared as the "Parti orang puteh" - the Englishmen's party. But as far as the Thai vote was concerned nothing
could be better propaganda for Negara, coming, as it did, 'from the Horse's mouth’s "The Malays said so."
Thus it came about that the Thais' first chance of participation in the new political process was used to register whole-hearted rejection of it. How sound their instinct was! Independence in Kelantan could only mean Malay rule. It was no unkind distortion that made UMNO appear in the guise of a Malay
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made much of it. The rejection of Independence evinces strong values
favouring British rule and rejecting Malay rule as such, when the choice is offered. It is only since Independence that the Thais have reconciled them selves to association with the Alliance and have come to appreciate and praise its inter™communal qualities. But these have become more easily apparent with the rise of an extreme conmiunalistic party on its 'right*. The evidence of 1955 is that Malay rule as such was unwanted. The evidence must be accepted - without, however, subscribing to the non-sequitur that no integration is
possible outside the framework of British rule.
The total defeat of the Thais1 party in Kelantan (as in the rest of the Federation) in 1955 must have given them some premonition of &reat and inaus picious changes to come, but Independence itself passed uneventfully and many Thais take refuge from the realities of political change even now by refusing to believe that the British have really betrayed their trust. Whatever the Reservations and fears following 1955 there was nothing to warn the Thais of the magnitude of the approaching revolution. How many Malays of UMNO dreamed that the fruits of- Independence would slip so soon and so completely from their grasp?
In the first state council elections to all seats, held in Kelantan on 24th June 1959, the party of the kampongs, the party of Islam, swept to power
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in all but two of the 30 constituencies.
For the Semerak Thais the utter defeat of their chosen party for the second time in four years was a poor invitation to identify with the new pro cess. (The Negara having disappeared from the scene in Pasir Puteh Tenggara
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constituency, and the old Penggawa being imprisoned for embezzlement - his successor is pro-Alliance - the Semerak Thais had inevitably transferred their allegiance to the. Alliance.) But the peculiar character of the party which took power was far more demoralising than defeat as such. PMIP speakers had campaigned at Gherang Ruku on a programme which included the prohibition of pig-rearing and the ’nationalisation1, in a theociatic sense, of fakir temples.
In other Thai villages the 1959 election is remembered as the election when the Alliance was generally supported for the first time. The fact that it was the party in power when the second state elections were held would have given it a built-in advantage even in constituencies where Negara put up a candidate, provided the Penggawa was an Alliance supporter himself and could add his personal pressure to the attraction of the party of power to a loyal ■ minority. In any case Negara could no longer fight on a pro-British ticket and the Alliance could validly pose as the Thais' best guarantee against PMIP fanaticism (without, presumably, fearing that their worst fears would actually be realised in the election.)
However, Negara was still in the running and must have taken some Thai votes in the four state constituencies where Negara candidates faced a partly Thai electorate.***^ In Rantau Panjang the Negara candidate even appears to have been a Thai, from his unmistakable (Malay) nickname, Gelap Pak Wei, His poor showing - 66, lost deposit - may reflect the absence of any major Thai settlement in that constituency. In Tumpat Tengah the Negara was actually opposed by a Socialist Front candidate of mixed Thai and Indian parentage, who
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117 - P a r lia m e n ta r y B oundary S ta te constituency B oundary Tumpat K E L A N T A N HI LI R 'b s/K O T A BHARU
: f^-LuHtLIR
• •• — S ta te B oundary\
T U M P A T Main concentration of Thai population 13 10 m iles -p.\® Bachoko ’;- \
KOT A ' S H A R U \ ! H U L U • ! M A S H U L U * 20\
21V §1 P A S I R 19 22 P U T E H 2 5 Pasir (*) Puteh 23 24 Tanah Merah 27 28 26 29 \ K E L A N T A N ® Kuala Krai U L U 3 0 Figure 3.Kelantan Pa rl ia me nt ar y and. State-Assembly Constituencies, 1964, showing principal conc en tr at io ns o f Thai population. Th e St at e-Assembly co nstituences are :
Tu mp at Barat Tu mp at Te ng ah T u mp at Timor Kuala Kelantan Kota Bharu Utara Kota Bharu Pantai Meranti Tendong Ba nd ar Pasir Mas Ba nd ar Hi H r Bandar Hulu Kota Bharu Te ng ah Bachok Utara Bachok Tengah Bachok Selatan Kota Bharu Ti mo r Kota Bharu Barat Kota Bhar u Se latan Rantau Pa njang Lemal To k Uban Pa si r Puteh Utara Pa si r Puteh Te n g a h
Pasir Puteh Tenggara Machang Utara Tana h Me ra h Timo r Ta na h Me ra h Barat Machang Selatan Ulu Kelantan Timo r Ulu Kelantan Barat
elections Negara put up only one candidate, for Ulu Kelantan, which in the event was won by the Alliance.
In the 1964 General Election Negara fielded no candidates in Kelantan; likewise in the state elections. The PMIP won again, this time with 21:30
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seats in the state assembly and 8:10 parliamentary seats. Subsequent by- elections have shown distinct Alliance improvement and a growing PMIP problem
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