El control estadístico de la calidad

We started out this chapter with the observation that broadly neo-classical economic thinking continues to predominate in questions of climate change mitigation policy in the context of advanced industrial economies, but also and perhaps more explicitly in the policy prescriptions doled out to developing countries. The simple answer is get the prices right. At first glance this stands in some contrast to the substantively more nuanced explanations of technological change and economic development which now predominate in thinking on development.

On closer analysis of the theory, however, we find the repeated retrenchment of the neo-classical paradigm in the face of conflicting empirical evidence. Far from falsification, neo-classical theory has ironically extended its reach from prices, to institutions, to governance, to politics. And produced policy prescriptions to match. If it is not the prices, then it is getting the institutions right, if not the institutions then the governance, if not the governance then the politics. And what are the ‘right’ institutional, governance and political arrangements? Precisely those which will allow us to get the prices right, and this goes for environmental governance as much as it does economic governance.

Recent research performed under the auspices of the World Bank, focuses on, in order of merit, considerations of internalizing knowledge and environmental externalities (preferably through market based mechanisms such as the CDM), trade liberalization and FDI, addressing financial market failures, and developing absorptive capacity in recipient countries (Popp 2011b; Dutz & Sharma 2012). Even political economy and behavioral issues get a mention, although there remains a strong aversion to the bête noir of selective industrial policy (e.g. World Bank 2012). On closer analysis, the account of both behavior and political economy is very narrow. Political economy emerges as a consideration only due to government induced market distortions such as fuel subsidies, not as a more fundamental condition of the system. Behaviour is also characterized in terms of individual motivations, broader social structures are not considered.

As regards our concerns here, the treatment of the political economy of climate mitigation is inadequate if not wholly absent. Political economy considerations are likely to be critical for understanding the context for the implementation of mitigation strategies, from the perspective of institutional arrangements to foster environmental technology adoption and development, the implications for natural resource rents, and from the more general perspective of capital accumulation and redistribution.

The process of industrialisation or economic catch-up is a process of structural change that is unlikely to be distributionally neutral. This itself is likely to mean that changes may be destabilising and face political inertia. This may be overcome through the redistribution of political power managed through economic rents or other means, and the formal and informal institutions that mediate this process. Moreover, the creation of rents is likely to be central to the possibility of technological change in the shape of rents

for learning. Both redistributional rents and rents for learning may coincide, but they may not. Whether they do or not depends upon the political economy context. It is not only that in the board sense that there will need to be some concordance between economic and political power. But at the micro-level the configuration of political power will need to be such that it can foster technological catch-up through the effective management of rents, and address the vested interests emerging from incumbent sectors.

When considering the possibility of environmental technological change, the implications for rents (whether they be technology rents, natural resource rents or something else), and the extent to which the scale and distribution of rents is likely to change will be important. Indeed, considering the scale of fossil fuel rents and the dramatic change in the distribution of rents a more sustainable techno-economic paradigm may imply, considerations of rents, their distribution and the political economy context, which determines this is likely to be central to the possibility of this type of change occurring. It maybe that in some contexts there is greater political space for environmental technologies than others, but as we suggested in Chapter 2, this needs to be shown it cannot be assumed.

We are now in a position to start to answer the first research question raised at the end of Chapter 1. Our question asked to what extent systematic environmental technological change was likely to be affected by the political economy, and what were the best ways of understanding this relationship. In response to this Chapters 2 and 3 (and supporting annexes) agrued that there are strong grounds for adopting an evolutionary approach to understanding processes of technological change and economic development. This seems to be the case for both an understanding of the micro-foundations for technological change (Chapter 2), and an understanding of the broader process of economic development (Chapter 3). We have also agrued that a direct implication of this is that we can expect political economy processes to be directly implicated in structurally significant technological change. Further, that the scope for structural technological change to take place will be dependant upon the political economy context. An analytical framework for elaborating this process (Figures 3.3 and 3.4) which stressed the interlinkages between the disposition of holding power, the techno-economic paradigm, economic performance, and distributional and institutional outcomes.

The development of this framework also represents a step towards answering the second, empirical research question, namely “To what extent have political economy factors influenced the choice of technology in the electricity services industry of Vietnam? ” This question both serves to test the utility of the analytical framework we have developed and generate substantive understanding of a particular country context. Before testing the research questions through the development of the Vietnam case study (Chapters 6 and 7), we first need to understand how the techno-economic constraints fced by a particular technological system interacts with the political economy. The next chapter looks at how the political economy is likely to be elaborated in the context of the electricity sector though an examination of the technological, economic and political aspects of the sector.

Chapter 4: Political economy and technological change in