Controlador Lógico Programable

The difference between the asymmetrical conflict in Colombia with the conflict in Northern Ireland is that here third party actors played a crucial role during the conflict but these interventions were not primarily defined by a neutral role, the third parties that participated in the conflict sought to aid and assist one or the other conflicting actors, situation that had an effect on the power balance, shifting primarily towards the Colombian state. This is why they have been addressed before actually referring to the negotiation process and peace accord. “The impact of third parties is directly related to the results of peace summits. It depends on whether and how they support the communication between opponents, if they show the ability to bring suggestions in order to facilitate the formulation of the written agreement and, lastly, how their individual interest has manipulating effects at the negotiation table” (Duschka, 2017, p. 4).

The United States since it is the recurrent third party actor of this investigation; shall be addressed first. Washington has always had strong ties with Bogota, especially in economic aspects, the fight against drug trafficking and the war on terror as of 9/11, also led to the increase of the relations between both states, where both governments adopted a much more intolerant attitude against terrorism. Moreover, the United States assisted the formation of the paramilitary groups (Duman, 2014) in Colombia to support the national armed forces to contain and fight-off the FARC. Therefore, Washington’s influence in the conflict favoured the Colombian state and aided them to eliminate the terror and drug trafficking. Furthermore, Washington increased its relationship with Bogota in 1998 with the creation and implementation of “Plan Colombia” (Restrepo, Spagat & Vargas, 2004), an aid programme that served to put pressure on the local government in relation to the human rights performance and to combat drugs, contributing towards peace in Colombia. Moreover, it provided technological equipment and training programmes for the military forces. With “Plan Colombia”, the U.S. government has given more than $5

14 _{Although, the two main actors of the conflict are the Colombian government and the FARC, the}

Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is another rebellious group within in Colombia who has threatened the stability and security of the Colombia society, shall not be addressed in the present research.

billion to Colombia’s military and polices forces (Ramírez Montañez, 2017) to contain and fight terror and drug trafficking. To a certain extent it managed to give an advantage in the conflict to the Colombian state, since it was able to modernise the Colombian Armed Forces (Gomez-Suarez, 2014) and strike significant blows towards FARC. This can also be seen as an action destined to deepen the asymmetry between the conflicting actors and seeking the termination of the conflict through military force, although it has been previously stated that terror and insurgency (Edwards, 2011) are not always solved through brutal military campaigns, where it is better for a conflict to evolve from a confrontation phase to a negotiation phase (Gallo & Marzano, 2009). With a unilateral intervention from third party actors, they might even prolong the conflict and led it to a stage of hurting stalemate. In the end, Plan Colombia provided “sustainable social and economic opportunities, keeping human rights, strengthening rule of law, and making governance more transparent, participatory and accountable” (Ramírez Montañez, 2017, p. 325). For this reason, it was able to restructure and revitalise Colombia’s legal and political systems, and it helped professionalise the national Armed Forces. The plan boosted the weakened state and avoided turning into a failed state. The intervention of the US must be conceived as a gain for the Colombian state, and a unilateral aid towards the government of Colombia. For this reason, the United States could not be considered an actor that pushed the conflicting towards peace; its involvement clearly favoured the war against drugs and terror, promoting democracy and safety in the region. Having the US as a mediator during the negotiation process would have deepened even more the sense of mistrust between both conflicting parties and would have not contributed directly towards a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Although, at one point FARC was in favour of the U.S. aiding the peace accords as a third party actor, since it had played a fundamental role in the Northern Ireland negotiation process and had shown actions of good faith, building trust between the two actors, when president Clinton granted a visa to Gerry Adams. With this in mind, the FARC reached out to the Obama administration so it would grant permission to Ricardo Palmera, alias Simón Trinidad, an ex commander of the FARC, who is captive in an U.S. prison, to participate in the negotiation process (Gomez-Suarez, 2014). This action would once again create an environment of trust and position the U.S. towards a more neutral and transparent position in the negotiation process, situation that did not happen and caused greater division between the FARC and Washington.

Therefore, U.S. involvement in the conflict consisted mainly in a clear and unilateral support towards the government of Bogota, seeking to neutralise and eliminate the FARC’s threats by supporting and aiding not only the government but also the Armed Forces to succeed in the conflict. The reason behind this, were that the causes of the conflict were clearly a common enemy to Washington and since Colombia is a producer and exporter of cocaine through drug cartels and guerrilla groups like FARC, the U.S. felt committed to takes sides with the Colombian government. Another third party that played a significant role in conflict and in the peace process was the government of Venezuela, especially under the presidency of the late Hugo Chávez. Not only is Venezuela a nation affected by the spill-over effects of the conflict but it has been deeply criticised by the Colombian government for aiding and allowing FARC camps within its territories and overall, giving the FARC recognition and legitimacy (Duman, 2014). Chavez went even further by denying that FARC was a terrorist group and it should be seen as a belligerent group (Arango, 2008), hence its fight is a legitimate one and its demands and interests should be heard and accepted. “Chavez managed to get FARC to the formal negotiations, not only because he had the willingness to do so, but also because he had won the respect of FARC’s leadership. Such a respect developed thanks to a shared ideology upon which FARC members were allowed to seek refuge in Venezuela” (Gomez-Suarez, 2014, p 5). Although with his death in 2013, Venezuela lost a leading role in assisting the peace negotiations in Havana.

For this reason, Venezuela was much more involved and interested in supporting the demands and changes that FARC desired, and gave them political support and protection. Neutrality was not characteristic of the Chavez administration and linked the FARC’s cause with the Bolivarian revolution, which he sought to lead and develop in South America. It must be stated that the Venezuelan involvement fostered an end to the conflict by opening the possibility for a negotiation process, since it was able to gain the trust of FARC.

The fact that two third party actors took sides in the conflict and in regards to the negotiation process, this finally compromised their involvement for the setting up of the peace talks in Havana, where both the Colombian government and FARC decided that the future accords would touch upon domestic affairs and that the participation or assistance of third parties would not be necessary, and that the initial negotiations would have a character of closed-doors (Gomez-Suarez, 2014). This shows that third parties in the end where not as useful and determining as they were

in the negotiation process of the Northern Ireland conflict, because the conflict of interests that both the United States and Venezuela sought in the region were much greater than establishing peace for the very sake of peace. Although negotiations and the peace accord was supported and praised by the international community and observed by other nations (Chile and Norway), the two main actors of the conflict took the mature decision to continue the negotiation process on their own and concentrate on the issues that divided and compromised Colombia’s stability and progress.