Controles Cambiarios

Government officials in Bahrain were not prepared for the rapid rise in protest activities nor the encampment that sprung up overnight at the Pearl Roundabout in the center of the financial district and close to major government palaces and buildings. Just as the political changes that occurred in the region were one trigger for increased activism and mobilization to the conflict, the government response was a second trigger with much greater implications in my assessment. After 14 February 2011 government security forces responded with force.⁷¹ This excessive force and subsequent raids in Shia dominated areas of the country along with arrests and up to a reported 30 deaths that occurred at this time unified the Shia population in a way that had never before been seen in Bahrain.

a. Security Forces

In response to protest activities, initial security forces tactics were designed around isolating and containing protesters. This tactic worked to allow a sense of freedom of speech for protesters while also limiting the scope of the protest activities and impact on normal daily activities of other citizens. As soon as protest activities became violent or started to move into areas that impeded traffic or considered off limits, security forces would step in to stop the protest, at times forcefully. Mass arrests, use of excessive tear gas, and excessive use of force were common accusations of these security responses.⁷² This tactic was based on years of experience that demonstrated the power of the government as a show of force. In previous times, prospective protesters were weary of joining a protest when they perceived that security forces could arrest, imprison or cause physical harm without impunity during the protest. Traditionally, this type of reaction was enough to deter future demonstrations and limit participation in protests. In this instance, instead of slowing the protests gaining the initiative, protesters continued to gather in larger numbers.

71 M. Cherif Bassiouni and Nigel S. Rodley, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (Manama: Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011), 219.

72 Ibid.

One of the key problems with this type of response was that it was reactive in nature and thereby was time and labor intensive. As witnessed in early 2011, the Bahrain security forces were quickly overwhelmed and unable to contain the growing violence.

Security forces were consistently deployed throughout the island and always on a high state of alert. For short periods of time, this type of readiness could be sustained, but as the protests continued, the security forces quickly were unable to respond adequately.⁷³ It was at this time that the Bahrain Defense Force and then shortly thereafter the Peninsula Shield Force were utilized to contain the protests and violence. Security force tactics that worked well for short durations soon failed once the events were prolonged.

The lack of coordination between security forces hindered a smooth escalation of force in response to protest activities in early 2011. The Ministry of Interior security forces are built with the island divided and associated with police districts. Each district was responsible for policing actions within their areas except for protest and violent activities, which fell mainly to the Special Security Forces Command (SSFC). Under this framework, protests and its attributed violence were assumed to be short lived in nature and one unit could assume that responsibility. As a consequence, when protests were prolonged or grew larger than expected, the SSFC were quickly overwhelmed and incapable of adequately responding. The violence between security forces and protesters escalated quicker than expected during the initial protests and violence of early 2011, overwhelming the police force. The framework of how the Ministry of Interior assessed protests and responded was no longer adequate.

b. Political Response

In addition to the threat of violence as a detractor from joining protests, the legal system was a secondary and just as forceful means to stop participation in protests. The legal system was strongly tied with the government through family and tribal associations as well as political motivations.⁷⁴ Accusations of unfair trials and lengthy prison

73“Bahrain Asks for Gulf Help,” Al Jazeera, March 14, 2011,

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/bahrain/2011/03/201131454020610721.html.

74 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Washington, DC: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).

sentences minimized motivation for prospective protesters to actively participate. People that found themselves inside the prison and legal system rarely felt like they had a voice or adequate defense against charges brought against them.

Prior to 2011, the Ministry had deemed multiple Shia mosques as illegal and in need of closure or destruction. The Shia mosques in questions were built without regulation or permission from the government. The government excuse was that since they did not have permission and were not built to code, they were unsafe and needed to be destroyed for public safety. In a decision of poor timing and perception, the government destroyed dozens of these mosques during the early months of the Arab Spring in 2011.⁷⁵ The destruction of mosques considered holy to the Shia population solidified the Shia resistance as one for not only political objectives but also religious.

The destruction of the mosques also indicated to the Shia community that their community was now directly threatened politically as well as socially.

Government officials labeled the protests as an overt Shia attempt to overthrow the government.⁷⁶ By labeling all protests in this sectarian language, the government further provoked the situation, stoking further sectarian violence between communities.

Previous protests were similarly labeled this way in an effort to divide and weaken the resolve of the opposition. Identifying protesters through sectarian language and labeling them as foreign sponsored in an effort to minimize cooperation between opposition groups did not have the same effect this time. Isolating the groups through means of physical separation was no longer effective as groups sharing information through social media networks were already connected. Labeling them as one group only solidified them under one banner.

After the initial protests and government responses in early 2011, foreign investors lost confidence in Bahrain and pulled expat workers, weakening economic

75 Glen Carey, “Bahrain Opposition Accuses Government of Demolishing 30 Mosques,” Bloomberg, April 24, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-04-24/bahrain-opposition-accuses-government-of-demolishing-30-mosques

76 Frederik Richter, “Bahrain Expels Iran Diplomat,” Reuters, April 26, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bahrain-iran-expulsion-idUSTRE73P3Z020110426

progress in the country.⁷⁷ Not only were Shia leaders not able to access political power, but economic and trade opportunities quickly dissipated. Shia elite were directly challenged by changing economic factors solidifying their resolve with opposition intents on regime change and in turn fueling a larger sectarian fight