Controles endógenos para estudio de miRNAs en CP

Scholars of political science, philosophy, international relations and organizational theory are among those to have grappled with the concept of

legitimacy. Just as users of the concept have varied so too have the objects of their scrutiny: on a macro level the legitimacy of entire organisational structures (e.g.

systems of governance) have attracted attention, and on a micro level the focus has been on individual organisations.

At the heart of the definitional debate surrounding the concept of legitimacy lies a distinction dating back to Max Weber (1947) between theories of legitimacy that define what proper constraints on power should be and others that centre on the perceptions of those subject to that power. Weber situated himself in the latter camp and argued that rule was legitimate when subjects believed it to be so. This approach has gained traction across disciplines and ties in with the popular current notion of legitimacy as socially-constructed. Although discussions of legitimacy routinely begin by acknowledging the parallel positions described by Weber, it is rare to find a

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current definition of legitimacy that does not award a central role to perceptions. For example, Suchman’s (1995, p. 574) definition of organizational legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” is typical of current approaches.

Much current writing on legitimacy is organised around two key foci. At the macro level the legitimacy of the international system and its constituent actors, including NGOs, dominate legitimacy discussions (e.g. Hardt and Negri, 2000, Clark, 2003, Franck, 1988). In the context of organizations, strategies for managing or enhancing legitimacy occupy a similarly prominent position (e.g. Tilling and Tilt, 2010, O'Donovan, 2002, Deegan, 2007). Such strategies are often discussed in the context of avoiding or dealing with “legitimation crises”. Originally described by Habermas (1976) in the context of governments, a legitimation crisis was said to occur when a government retained the legal authority to govern but had lost the support of the electorate. The same concept is now routinely applied to corporate and other entities.

Definitions of NGO legitimacy tend to either focus exclusively on perception or on perception in addition to other, apparently objective, indicators. In a definition that focuses exclusively on perception, Slim (2002, p. 5), for example, has defined NGO legitimacy as “the particular status with which an organisation is imbued and perceived at any given time that enables it to operate with the general consent of peoples, governments, companies and non-state groups around the world”. Drawing on earlier work, Ossewaarde et al. (2008, p. 44) have argued that “not only is INGO legitimacy dependant on perceived conformity to their normative claims, but it is also expected that INGOs comply with international law (regulatory legitimacy), are cognitively capable of acting on behalf of the stated mission (cognitive legitimacy), and are able to show the effectuation of their mission to their stakeholders (output legitimacy)”. This definition combines an emphasis on apparently objective indicators of legitimacy with an emphasis on perceptions. Finally, a widely-cited NGO definition by Edwards (2000, p. 20) described legitimacy as “the right to be and do something in society – a sense that an organization is lawful, admissible and justified in its chosen course of action”.

Edwards’ reference to an NGO’s right to “do something in society” draws attention to the wide variety of NGO roles, each of which may require a separate

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basis for legitimacy. For example, although in a given context recipients of a particular NGO’s services may consider that NGO to be a legitimate service provider, this does not necessarily mean that those recipients would consider the same NGO to be a legitimate advocate for their interests. Similarly, even if service recipients consider a particular NGO to be legitimate in undertaking certain

activities, it does not automatically follow that that NGO’s donor will also consider it to be legitimate in undertaking those activities. As will be discussed in more detail in the context of NGO accountability, the variety of potential NGO stakeholders makes it necessary for any NGO concerned with its legitimacy to be clear about which stakeholders it most wants to be perceived as legitimate by. This argument ties in with Lister’s (2003) critique that much development literature fails to appropriately interrogate the concept of legitimacy as it asks whether organisations are legitimate without answering the key questions “legitimate for what?” and

“legitimate to whom?”. This questioning of what sources of legitimacy should be prioritised by NGOs harks back to the concept of alternative development, which emphasised the need for development to be bottom up.

Although a blinkered focus on legitimacy as exclusively dependant on perception might suggest that anything could potentially lead to an NGO being considered legitimate, it is more common for analysts to identify particular

characteristics or practices that are associated with NGO legitimacy. Depending on one’s approach to legitimacy these can either be understood as objective sources of legitimacy or as characteristics likely to lead to NGOs being perceived as legitimate.

The most frequently cited source of NGO legitimacy in various contexts, including advocacy and lobbying, is meaningful representation of an important constituency (Van Rooy, 2004). Although a small number of NGOs are

representative membership organisations, this is rare and NGO advocacy is routinely criticised on the grounds that NGOs are not representative (Hudson, 2002, Kelly, 2009). Representation as a key (or sole) criterion for legitimacy has in turn been widely criticised in NGO literature (Charnovitz, 2005, Edwards, 1999b). For example, it has been argued that whereas parliamentary democracy is about representation, civil society is about participation with NGOs representing ideas rather than people (Marschall, 2002). Responses to criticism regarding NGOs’ lack of representativeness have also highlighted the increasingly problematic nature of systems of representation in other domains. For example, the contentious idea of

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“politics of presence” suggests that fair representation implies proportionate representation on the basis of social characteristics rather than an exclusive reliance on shared ideas (Phillips, 1995).

Suggested sources of NGO legitimacy other than representation include laws (Brown and Jagadananda, 2007, Edwards, 1999b), moral position or values (Hudson, 2002, Van Rooy, 2004), technical experience and expertise (Naidoo, 2004),

performance (Atack, 1999) and mechanisms of accountability (Pearce, 1997, Edwards, 1999b). The identification of sources of legitimacy leads to the argument that just as in the case of corporate entities, NGOs may institute strategies designed at managing their legitimacy through actively influencing how they are likely to be perceived. Given that legitimacy is sufficiently diffused among a wide range of stakeholders to make direct enhancement difficult, Brown (2008, p. 11) has recommended that this process be conceived of in terms of the construction of

“legitimacy arguments”. From this perspective each NGO must, therefore, not only clearly identify for itself what it believes makes it legitimate, but also articulate this to its stakeholders with a view to influencing those stakeholders’ perceptions.