Initial training (in the classroom) could introduce the concept of SA and illustrate the dangers of poor SA (possibly using well-known incidents and accidents). Factors contributing to good and bad SA should be covered.
‘Loss of SA’ should not be deemed to be the cause of the accident. Much more depth is required in analysing the case study. Questions should be asked such as:
What did the crew become unaware of?
When did they stop noticing the critical element?
WHY have they lost awareness of that aspect?
What WERE they aware of?
How could you use this knowledge to help you generally, in the future? It is obvious to state that pilots must maintain high levels of SA at all times, in order to achieve safe flight and effective threat and error management. However, such a statement is simplistic. Maintaining high SA takes some effort and requires resources. In many
situations a pilot has no easy way of knowing how to direct their effort or resource in order to achieve SA. SA is not something that one can easily interrogate. It is not possible to be certain of the level of SA that one has at any given time, although a pilot may have a feeling about their awareness levels. A pilot with a very different mental model to reality is often said to have lost SA but may have no idea that they have lost it, and indeed may feel perfectly normal. Because of this, it is not easy for pilots to determine the amount or type of assessment that they need to do in order to maintain or increase SA.
Also under difficult conditions attention is taken away from the situational assessment task and so SA will degrade. It is established good practice (and worth reinforcement) that after an intense period of dealing with a specific situation, pilots make a wider review of their overall situation (partly in order to regain SA). It is however not simple for the pilots to know the extent that they may have lost SA, or to what extent they have regained it. SA involves awareness of many factors and so pilots can be under the firm impression that they have high SA, when in fact they may have a critical loss of SA in a single area. For these reasons, CRM trainers should be open to the limitations inherent in discussing situational awareness as if it is a ‘method’ for maintaining safe operation. Additionally, despite tips and tools developed to assist in diagnosing SA (such as those below or those within behavioural marker schemes) the CRM trainer must be careful not to give the impression that this is an exact science.
Situation awareness may be a worthy principle and a good vehicle for a common
articulation of a general phenomenon, as well as a way of helping pilots understand their limitations. However it is not a ‘silver bullet’ and CRM must not give pilots that impression or any idea that maintaining high SA is simply a factor of effort or ‘professionalism’. The CRM trainer should be able to balance the debate with realistic expectations and
knowledge.
When operating, recognition of reduced SA is understood to be important, although very difficult (as explained). It is unlikely that a pilot who has lost SA will passively recognise it without a clear signal or consequence. It is quite possible that SA will be regained on its own without the pilot ever realising that they had an inaccurate mental model of the situation.
CAP 737 Section A, Part 1, Chapter 8: Situational Awareness (SA)
Many trainers find LOFT exercises and debriefs to be a useful way to improve the
recognition of reduced SA with regard to both individuals and crew. The use of distractors to remove crew attention from an important but usually reliable parameter is one way to make the point. Mica Endsley advocates a training method whereby LOFT exercises are stopped midway through, in order to test individuals on their SA, and make them aware of their actual levels of SA, rather than their perceived levels, particularly at the end of an exercise.
Cues to recognition of ‘loss of SA’ have been proposed. The following list is adapted from Bovier 1997. It is claimed that most accidents involving human error include at least four of these cues, although such statements should be treated with caution because they imply causation and extrapolation without support.
Ambiguity – information from two or more sources does not agree
Fixation – focusing on one thing (i.e. attentional focus / tunnelling)
Confusion – uncertainty or bafflement about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or psychological discomfort)
Not prioritising the flying task – everyone is focused on non-flying activities
Everyone heads down
Not meeting expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile ETA, fuel burn, etc.
Skipping or not complying with SOPs
Busting limitations, minimums, regulatory requirements, etc.
Cannot resolve discrepancies – contradictory data or personal conflicts
Not communicating fully and effectively – vague or incomplete statements This list can be useful for a crew or trainer / checker. An item might suggest a problem with SA but it cannot confirm reduced SA. Hence pilots may need to assume reduced SA
based on a few cues, and attempt to regain it if they have the capacity.
Regaining SA can be problematic for the reasons previously given (one will not know when it has been regained or what aspects may have reduced and when). Hence, regaining SA is effectively a blind process that is much the same as for normal management of the flight. Crews can prioritise their situational updating using the aviate, navigate,
communicate model or any other systematic process. Tips for Good SA Management (Bovier, 1997) are as follows:
Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight
Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions
Rotate attention from plane to path to people (aviate, navigate, communicate)
Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan
Project ahead and consider contingencies
Focus on the details and scan the big picture
Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks
Watch for clues of degraded SA
Speak up when you see SA breaking down
The following text is from JARTEL (2002), and gives examples of good and bad practices that could indicate clues to situational awareness.
1. Crews need to be constantly aware of the state of different aircraft systems. a) Examples of poor practice:
i. Does not ask for updates
ii. Does not signal awareness of changing systems b) Examples of good practice:
i. Monitors and reports changes in system states ii. Acknowledges entries and changes to systems
2. Crews need to be aware of their environment (position, weather, air traffic, terrain).
a) Examples of poor practice:
i. Does not acknowledge / repeat ATC directions ii. Does not enquire about environmental changes
iii. Does not comment on relevant environmental factors, or is surprised by them
b) Examples of good practice:
i. Collects information about the environment ii. Contacts outside resources when necessary
CAP 737 Section A, Part 1, Chapter 8: Situational Awareness (SA)
3. Crews need not only to be aware of the present state of the aircraft systems and environment, but must also be able to predict future states in order to anticipate future events.
a) Examples of poor practice:
i. Does not set priorities with respect to time limits
ii. Does not discuss relationship between past events and present – future
iii. Is surprised by outcomes of past events. b) Examples of good practice:
i. Discusses contingency strategies ii. Identifies possible – future problems
SECTION A, PART 1, CHAPTER 9