2.6.1. Networks and Party Sustainability
I argue that the sustainability of far-right parties is influenced by the nationalist
subculture. However, while Art focuses on the characteristics of potential party members
(radicals vs. activists) and critical historical junctures, I emphasize the organizational structure of far-right networks. Closer examination of this structure will provide insight into whether far- right parties, once established, will be destroyed from within due to factionalism. Several studies have suggested that far-right organization influences party success. However, most studies of far-right organization have focused on the party’s internal characteristics, and not on its relationships with other far-right groups (Kitschelt 1995, Lubbers et al. 2002). Analyzing the ways in which far-right parties cooperate or compete with other nationalist groups may help scholars gain a better understanding of how successful parties mobilize their support base. This analysis also might help us understand why unsuccessful parties splinter due to division within the nationalist movement.
In order to assess the organizational structure of the far-right, I use social network analysis to examine the degree of centralization within the far-right network. I do this both online, collecting data on the links between organizational websites, and offline, collecting data on overlapping organizational memberships. I believe that parties that occupy a central position within the far-right network will be better able to raise funds, recruit members, and diffuse
information about their policy preferences. I also believe that highly centralized networks will be less prone to factionalism.
Hypothesis 1: As centrality of the parliamentary party within the far-right network increases, the likelihood of party sustainability increases.
According to social network theories, actors that occupy a central position within a network have network power (Ibarra and Andrews 1993, Brass 1992). It may be useful for the far-right to have strong connections with other far-right actors as it could enhance the party’s ability to raise funds, recruit members, and diffuse information about their policies. There is also a possibility that a party that occupies a central position within the network will be less prone to factionalism. For example, De Witte and Verbeeck (1998) argue that the extreme right has been successful in Belgium and not the Netherlands because the Vlaams Blok was able to cooperate with Flemish-nationalist groups and clubs. And in Hungary, there is evidence to suggest that the participation of the paramilitary organization, the Hungarian Guard, at Jobbik party rallies has helped attract voters and intimidate members of the Roma community to prevent them from opposing anti-Roma policies (Waterfield, 2010; Day 2010).
Hypothesis 2: As the ideological centrality of party within a network increases, party sustainability increases.
A preexisting nationalist subculture can be an advantage for a far-right party, but this advantage may be negated if the party has to struggle with rival ideological factions. I argue that the ideological structure of the nationalist subculture can influence party sustainability. In When Parties Fail, Lawson and Merkl (1998) describe how the parties are threatened when alternative organizations emerge as competitors. Factionalism has repeatedly undermined the success of far- right parties (Givens 2005). Fitzmaurice describes the factionalism of the francophone far-right
in Belgium:
The French-speaking extreme right has seemed ‘groupusculaire’, fractious, divided, insubstantial, amateurish and unable to choose a clear strategy as between forms of ‘entryism’ on the fringes of the traditional Christian Social and Liberal parties of the right, romantic violence and destabilisation through links with paramilitary groups and limited infiltration of security services, ideological debate such as the so-called revisionist or neo-occidentalist philosophies, as against electoralism. (Fitzmaurice 1992: 305-6)
A party that is not near the ideological center of the broader network is more vulnerable to ideological competitors and factionalism as there will be rivals who do not feel that the party is representative of their ideology or interests. In addition, a lack of ideological cohesion within the party can influence the internal organization of a party, making it more likely that the party will divide into factions. There is often a divide between pragmatists, who are willing to moderate the party platform for votes and hardliners who are reluctant to weaken the
movement’s ideological purity. For example, in the 1990s, there was a divide within the Front Nationale between Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno Megret, who disapproved of Le Pen’s
extremism and anti-Semitic rhetoric (Givens 2005:105). Megret split from the party in 1998 to form the Mouvement National Republicain (National Republican Movement, MNR). While this split did not destroy the FN, certainly splits of this sort have the potential to destroy far-right parties, particularly if there is a lot of support for the ideological position of the breakaway party amongst nationalists.
2.6.2 Competitive Crowding in Networks
Hypothesis 3: As the asymmetry of a party’s overlap with a competitor in the network I increases, its sustainability decreases
The Flemish nationalist subculture is well-established and the connections between its
organizations have facilitated party building. As David Art argues, “The support of the radical wing of the Flemish national movement was critical for the VB in its early years.” (2008: 428)
For example, in the early days of the Vlaams Blok, it was able to draw hardline members from the preexisting Flemish national party, the Volksunie (People’s Union, VU) and the paramilitary organization, Voorpost. However, the density of ties between Flemish nationalist organizations can, paradoxically, make these organizations weaker, as they present opportunities for internal competition and shifting loyalties. When organizations are too densely connected within a network, they can become competitive for the loyalty of members. In their study of the semiconductor industry, Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan (1996) found that there is a relationship between niche position and organizational survival. Specifically, they found that a crowded niche position is negatively associated with a firm’s survival. In order to assess whether a niche has become crowded, one must measure the density of ties between similar organizations. In this case, competitive crowding, is the sum of an organization’s overlapping memberships. These overlaps are not necessarily symmetric, as some organizations will have more overlapping
memberships than others. The greater the asymmetry of the overlap, the stronger the competitive effect of organization j on organization i. (Podolny et al. 1996: 666).
Table 2.1. Niche Overlap of Two Hypothetical Organizations
Area of overlap between Organization i and Organization j
25 overlapping members
Area of j that does not overlap with I
75 members Area of i that does not overlap with j
25 members
3 METHODOLOGY