Coste de personal

Supervision of EP delegations by their national party leaders is costly, but so is disunity. It damages both the delegation in parliament and the face of the party in the electorate (Kam 2009). The number one cited cause for disunity among EP delegations and incongruity with their national parties was the lack of information exchange and understanding between levels of government.¹³ The organization of leadership and the requirements for communication are some of the most important tools parties have to increase MEP congruence with their policy preferences.

The tools available to national parties to supervise and constrain their European politi-cians are similar to those used in national parliaments but become more complicated at the European level. Here, politics are often much more technical and it is impossible for national politicians to keep up with the nuanced nature of the legislation. In addition to a lack of technical knowledge and information, national politicians often do not know how the the legislative process of the EP works.¹⁴ In addition to difficulties with technical information, legislating at the EP level often requires a different kind of political skill and strategy. MEPs at the EP must be better at working in coalitions and reaching across party and national

13Nearly every MEP I interviewed mentioned the lack of information exchange and its problems when asked about the nature of communication between themselves and their national party.

14Once again, this was a common thread through all interviews at the EP.

lines.¹⁵ Also, politics often take place on different cleavages than in national parliaments, especially if something is in the national interest and will garner support from all national MEPs. Sometimes MEPs even deliberately avoid communicating with the national party al-together if they know it will cause problems and disagreement.¹⁶ For instance, Tonino Picula and Davor Ivo Stier were both heavily criticized by their parties for intense cooperation on the EP’s work in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Krasnec 2014).¹⁷ With Picula representing the SDP and Stier the HDZ, these two politicians would never cross party lines in national politics.

The opposition between the two parties and their leaders, Zoran Milanovič and Tomislav Karamarko, respectively, remains healthy. So much so that this cooperation is thought to have cost Picula the leading spot on the 2014 SDP European electoral list (Dalje.com 2014).

In the EP, each party will have a different way of managing their communicative rela-tionship with their EP delegation and there are several ways parties have chosen to supervise their MEPs. Parties are able to sanction members that perform poorly or diverge from the party line. The strongest tool for sanction available to national parties is the aforementioned selection and the use of the media to condemn the actions of a MEP to signal disapproval.

Many parties also choose a head delegate from among their MEPs. This delegate serves as the main link between national parties and their EP delegations. This role is mostly for the purposes of sharing information but, for some parties, this person can act as a whip for the party members and ensure party unity. Providing direct instruction to parliament members on specific legislation is another way parties can ensure their politicians vote as they wish;

however, direct instructions are rare in the EP. Most EP delegations have some flexibility to work on legislation on their own, but this varies in degree across parties. Those MEPs that expressed an ability to work freely without specific constraints from their national parties were often from German or Nordic Parties and often contrasted their experiences with their colleagues from Southern Europe, who do not experience this kind of freedom.¹⁸ Finally, any tactic that makes sure MEPs are fully informed about their party’s positions on policy matters helps increase the congruence of MEPs and their parties. The more an MEP is

15Interview 6.18.2013(3). European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

16Interview 5.30.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

17Interview 6.10.2014. Zagreb, Croatia.

18Interview 6.4.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium. Interview 9.17.2013. European Parlia-ment. Brussels, Belgium.

aware of the position of their party, the better they can represent it in any representative body. Information sharing that flows both to EP and from the EP to the party will help MEPs better understand their party’s preferences and will help national parties determine what is at stake at the European level and what it means to them. One way to ensure com-munication occurs is to formalize it in the organization of the party. Formalizing positions for MEPs within the party leadership promotes communication between EP delegations and their parties.

The formal structure of executive leadership within parties is one way to compare na-tional parties. All parties have executive leadership, but the composition of leadership varies.

Just as centralization of selection determined the ability of a party to select its most pre-ferred candidates, centralization of leadership allows parties to better supervise their MEPs.

In this dissertation, I consider two types of leadership and measure how they impact the policy congruence of an individual with their party. I distinguish supervision of MEPs as either inclusive or exclusive based on whether or not an MEP is formally included in a party’s leadership. I consider executive leadership to be any party body that is the main source of power between party congresses. For most parties, this body is comprised of a party president, vice president, perhaps a few party secretaries, and representation from the national legislature. For some parties at least one MEP, usually the head delegate, is also automatically included in this select group, but for most parties this is not a requirement.

This inclusion is an important link for MEPs because it creates a direct connection with the leadership through which information can flow.

Information sharing between MEPs and their party leadership should work in one of two ways. First, inclusion in executive leadership can provide MEPs with valuable information about the party that allows them to make the most accurate decisions in the EP based on their knowledge. It also allows MEPs to share information with the leadership, which is especially important given the complexity of EP legislation. On one hand, I expect parties that have this type of inclusive leadership structure to have MEPs that behave more as trustees in their representation and be granted the discretion to make decisions on legislation as they see fit. Alternatively, I expect MEPs that are excluded from the leadership to behave more like delegates and attempt to cater to the party when faced with decisions. Trustees

make decisions based on their own knowledge and personal beliefs and have the insight and power to use their own expert judgment. Delegates will attempt to be loyal party members and behave in whatever way they feel the party would find most acceptable (Fox and Shotts 2009). Parties that have policy seeking goals are more likely to include MEPs in their leadership because they hold stronger preferences and are willing to make policy at the European level.