A fter Self-Governm ent, Simbu political actors set about exploring and, if possible expanding their roles, finding new sources of power and how to control them. Major issues which had arisen in the preceding months did not disappear, but were merely transferred into new arenas. Four case studies are given of attempts by Simbu politicians to expand their power, all of which involved the national parliamentarians in their home arenas. These are the creation o f a political arena for the entire Chimbu District, in the form of a 'district' (later to be called 'provincial') government; the effort by Iam bakey Okuk to create a local political and business base to complement his national office; the continuing tussle over the local coffee industry, which was an issue thatjbecame embroiled in the provincial struggle; and the foiled moves by politicians from northern Chimbu to take over large areas of land in Karimui/Bomai. These issues bridged formal Independence‘s * ^
Changes in the external (national) context continued apace. As Goode (1975) points out, the national political debate in 1974 moved from the timing of decolonization to the contents of the constitution. The House resolved that a date for Independence would be set after the constitution was passed. The national executive and legislature systematically followed the legislative programme for decolonization negotiated with Australia with a rush of legislation, and the House of Assembly members - sitting as a C onstituent Assembly - in July-A ugust 1975 passed the national constitution. In Chimbu as in the national arena, after the smooth fa it accompli of Self-Government, the issue o f Independence became something of an irrelevance in the district's continuing internal power struggles.
National constitutional decisions had local repercussions in Chimbu in 1975. On 30 June, even though the constitution had not yet been passed, Somare successfully moved that the Independence date be set at 16 September, a date which from 1971 had been deemed 'National Day', and which was the 91st anniversary of the declaration of the British protectorate over southeast New Guinea. Then on 28 July the legislature extended its term of office to the five-year term set in the draft constitution for future parliaments. The extension was opposed only rather half-heartedly by Somare, having been foreshadowed by a resolution on 25 February.
This decision was widely perceived as an act of cynical self-interest by parliamentarians, and in Simbu for months afterwards was claimed as a precedent by councillors also wishing to extend their terms of office. The move was taken as a sign of MPs' lack of confidence in re-election. It infuriated students in the national capital and antagonized politically aware people in Simbu, thus increasing the opposition to incumbents. The extension was moved by Kobale Kale (Sinasina), Government Whip, who shared a Port Moresby residence with several Highlands members of UP. Kale's cross-party, pan-Highlands links played an important role in building support for early Independence, and there was an element of tradeoff in extending the parliamentary term while hastening Independence. Okuk was behind the move to extend the life of the parliament, and he too was building pan-Highlands support at the time, another sign of the weakness of party allegiances. Soon after Independence, Okuk as Transport Minister took Kale to the United States for talks with Boeing Aircraft Corporation at Seattle. Kale at the time was moving close to Somare and the American trip was seen as Kale's reward for the support he delivered on the timing of Independence.
The 1974-75 period was the tensest time in PNG's decolonization, for all people. Simbu village leaders perceived a decline in government services and the economy. Some fears associated with Self-Government lingered: Papuan and Bougainville secession remained possibilities, and there was a visible reduction in expatriate staff, who were replaced by less experienced nationals. Related to this in the leaders' thinking was a continuing rise in clan warfare. The only people in Chimbu who were confident about the pace of constitutional change were senior national public servants and politicians. The transfer of sovereignty would of course increase their power, and they were sure of their ability to manage the state. Some were buying urban property cheaply from departing expatriates, and looked forward to prosperous futures.
Among expatriates there was a great deal of uncertainty, especially in a rural area like Chimbu where they were a small and ostentatious minority. Insecurity troubled expatriates in both business and government, even those who were sympathetic to the newly emerging nation of Papua New Guinea and who were doing much to promote indigenous people (who werejmow referred to as 'nationals'). They were concerned that public service 'localization' was being rushed too fast, and worried at the stresses on national staff being promoted and transferred too rapidly to learn, consolidate and
mature in new jobs. The first non-kiap appointee as a District Commmissioner was
seen by district administrators in Chimbu as the harbinger of a system of political appointments to senior public service positions. (Changes in the national bureaucracy are described in Ballard 1981a.) Other departments were seen as 'poaching' the most
experienced and competent field administrators, at a time when recruitment into the lower ranks of the kiap service had slowed down (and ceased for a few years after Independence). As experienced staff became harder to retain, both nationals and expatriates admitted the decline in services which villagers had perceived. This process was inevitable, yet it came to be seen as caused by the post-colonial decentralization of political and administrative powers.
Decentralization commences
The second o f the Constitutional Planning Committee's terms of reference was 'local- regional-central government relations'. In a D iscussion Paper (PNG 1973a) and verbally at public m eetings the com m ittee advocated a form o f elected 'district governm ent' which would be stronger than the existing Area A uthorities (AAs). Support for this proposal was uneven, and quite low on the main New Guinea island. In fact the dem and was stronger in Chimbu than in any other m ainland district, according to a CPC staff member (pers. com m ., September 1973). At the CPC's Kundiawa meeting in August 1973 the AA chairman, Siwi Kurondo, demanded district governm ent in order that decisions be made quickly. By contrast, a national
A
Ninkama Bomai (Gumine), seriously questioned the utility of the idea. This division, based upon their different personal and institutional interests at the time, was a precursor to structural conflict embedded in the issue which emerged later.
The CPC had several concerns in advocating provincial government. The first was to deflect secessionist feelings in Bougainville and regionalist sentiment in the H ighlands and Papua (PNG ^ 9 7 3 b ), the latter potentially far larger in scale than Bougainville secessionism^hence considered more dangerous to national unity. Other concerns were to increase popular political participation and decentralize control of the state into local hands so as to sensitize the bureaucracy to local needs. Although the House legislated in June 1974 to give Bougainville an interim provincial government, recurrent Bougainville crises added to the sensitivity of the decentralization issue. The
Government Paper (PNG 1974b), in responding to the CPC's Final Report, strongly
questioned the concept of im m ediate nationw ide decentralization. This paper precipitated a serious division between the governm ent and form er CPC members (Barnett 1981), who formed a cross-party Nationalist Pressure Group (NPG) in August 1974 to advocate radical restructuring of the polity. At times in late 1974 and early 1975 the government's majority looked insecure, but the opposition UP leader, Tei Abal, preferred Somare's gradualism to the NPG's radicalism. The CPC's decentralization recom m endations received only brief and superficial discussion in the Constituent Assembly in March 1975. The topic was referred to a Follow-Up Committee (FUC),
comprising former members and advisers of the CPC, Pangu and the UP, for discussion until June (Ballard 1981b).
Despite their public commitment to decentralize, national government ministers became concerned at the likely consequent loss of their powers. Somare stated that To force on provincial leaders responsibilities for which they are not ready would be to invite disaster and chaos'. He spoke of the enormous costs that would arise from decentralization, saying that to give all districts provincial government now 'straight off
the counter' would bankrupt the state within three months (Post-Courier, 18 and 19
February 1975). Nonetheless, the government participated in the FUC's detailed consideration of the powers of the provinces and how to devolve them. Then, after months of inconclusive negotiations with the Somare government, the Bougainville leaders on 30 May 1975 resolved to secede from Papua New Guinea. This threat angered and united the House behind a rather shaky government, which nonetheless attempted negotiation with Bougainville leaders throughout July.
Meanwhile, during early 1974 the Chimbu A A members collectively came to see that their only possible chance of sharing real power with national ministers lay in the CPC's district government proposals. Their own lack of formal education meant that
c
they ould never become powerful public servants, and also for most that they could A
never follow the detailed technicalities of matters before the national legislature. Although prominent councillors in their home areas (two had been national parliamentarians), they felt they were being by-passed by younger and better educated men in politics, administration and business. Given their important role at the district level of politics, I collected their personal profiles. Seventeen provided personal details, and one declined (Standish 1979b:56 ff).
In many ways the^P were 'middle men', neither traditional nor modem leaders.
Nine claimed Tokpisin literacy, but I judged only three as functionally literate. Their
average age in the mid-1970s was the mid-forties, a mature age in a society with a life expectancy in the mid-fifties. Yet they valued modem education, because 59 per cent of those with children of secondary school age had sent them to high school - daughters included. Sixty per cent were polygynous. One had disposed of his pigs on becoming a Seventh Day Adventist; the others claimed to have six or more pigs, with an average
claimed ownership of 28 pigs and a median figure of sixteen, figures which I could not verify and which I strongly suspect to be too high. In the northern Chimbu 30 years ago only 10 per cent of adult men were polygynous, a proportion which has since
WAS ajfiotUjsr-
halved. Average pig ownership^ about four in ^sample of men about the same age. So by the simplest criteria these were 'big-men'.
These impressions were reinforced by their modem business sector activities. Almost 60 per cent owned or had owned pig projects with imported stock; 52 per cent had or had owned cattle projects; 94 per cent grew coffee, and 76 per cent owned coffee hulling machines; almost 60 per cent owned or had owned motor vehicles; 53 per cent were engaged in coffee buying. If they were peasants, they were big peasants. For
their political work each received allowances of over K 1,000 per annum, and 71 were
able to employ paid workmen, which was perhaps needed to create time for politics. Given that yearly per capita incomes were around K50, the AA members were part of a privileged and small elite.
These were the people who followed Siwi Kurondo's 1973 lead and opted for early provincial government, and strongly pushed this view upon Chief Minister Somare when he visited their meeting in June 1974 (Rabbie Namaliu, pers. comm. June 1974). Given Kurondo's pioneer Highlands Pangu role, Somare agreed in principle to the AA's verbal submission. Thus the national government agreed that Chimbu would have the first Highlands provincial government.
The AA members set about finding other ways to gain prestige. Having spare funds at the end of 1974, the AA sent a delegation of six on an educational tour of Malaysia, Singapore and Brisbane with their executive officer, an Australian. Apart from one discussion of a "farmers' university" (an agricultural training institute) in Malaysia and occasional ribald references, this trip in subsequent years was rarely mentioned in public by those who went. The executive officer considered the party suffered acute culture shock whilst abroad (John Dagge interview, June 1975).
Explicitly to increase the AA's dignity, Kurondo sought from the chair to impose procedures similar to those of the national House. Also replicating the national legislature, its meetings frequently grew rowdy, especially after lunch-time sessions at the hotel. Often, after such politicking, the meetings would revise a vote. The loudest voice was possessed by the Deputy Chairman, Kuman Dai,1 whose bulk was imposing, but Kurondo clearly had a^/degree of subtle authority. A flexible chairman, he often adjourned the meeting for coffee (or cold water) at a heated moment. He would accept an unimportant proposal which he personally opposed and quickly push it through, in order to keep business moving towards an agenda item which he wanted passed.
l The middle-aged son of former Gumine luluai Dai, Kuman Dai was amongst the earliest Simbu
educated to Grade 6 and functional literacy at Kondiu school in the 1950s, only years after peace in his area. He became a councillor and occasional coffee buyer.
In mid-1975 Kurondo instigated a 'question time' system, at which senior officers in Chimbu from different central government departments (Chief Minister’s, Education, Public Works, Agriculture, Health and so on) would come to answer questions on notice from Authority members. These then became general question sessions, and were intended to create open communication with public servants. The competence and enthusiasm of the officials - or their lack, in one case - soon became apparent, but the Authority members themselves were very often gratuitously hostile and counter-productively rude. Although these sessions were designed to raise the knowledge and stature of the A A members, their impatience or inability to listen to relevant technical considerations lowered their stature in public service eyes.
Even though AAs were formally only advisory bodies, as part of the government's response to problems noted by the CPC, and to the CPC itself, Chief Minister Somare sought to increase their roles. The principal field in which the AA had a role was in the preparation of the district's Rural Improvement Program (RIP), minor projects funded from the central government. In 1973 and 1974 the District Co ordinating Committee (comprising departmental representatives) prepared recommendations on the following financial year's RIP programme on the basis of submissions from their staff, including Assistant District Commissioners and councils.
These were passed to the AA for cursory comment, and the A A accepted them as faits
accomplis. For the 1975 recommendations the AA invited proposals and debated these at length, but without any clear policy priorities there was heated division. On only one occasion before 1977 were generalized policy guidelines spelt out, in relation to the
1976/77 RIP recommendations.
In January 1976, with the RIP recommendations well overdue in Port Moresby and the A A sitting ending, the Authority established a sub-committee to rank the 142 submissions for funds from councils and non-government bodies. This group included the AA's three functionally literate members and young men from the provincial government committee. I was also appointed, presumably for my clerical skills, and John Kaupa, MHA, merely attached himself. In order to avoid any charges of meddling and to give some coherence to our task, I summarized what appeared to me to be the AA's consensus on priorities. These were to open up a road to Bomai in southern Chimbu (of which more later), to promote business (especially prestigious cattle projects for councils) and to open more high schools. These priorities were implicitly accepted by the AA. We worked until 3 am, our proceedings prolonged by John Kaupa, whose loud persistence repeatedly wore down the committee, for the apparent benefit of his electorate, although many of his local Council's proposals
received such low priority they were not expected to receive funding. Nevertheless, this was a good example of an educated young man drawing state resources into his local arena. The group's recommendations were accepted by the A A, if only because the meeting was scheduled to end. This was an atypically rational process; the Simbu politician is a strong-willed person and if a desired course of action conflicts with an agreed set of abstract principles then he or she has no qualms about dropping the general and implementing the particular.
From 1974 steps commenced to improve planning and co-ordination processes which had always been weak in short-staffed Chimbu. On the initiative of a Public Service Board Member, Ignatius Kilage a Simbu helping his people from Port Moresby, the Central Planning Office (CPO) commissioned an Australian National University (ANU) study team led by Dr Diana Howlett to prepare a base-line socio economic study. Howlett had worked on the Eastern Highlands over many years, and Robin Hide and Elspeth Young were completing doctorates on Simbu agriculture and migration respectively (Hide 1981; Young 1977). The team commenced work in June 1975, along with three Simbu counterparts. Because leaders in the province had limited knowledge of conditions outside their home areas, the team held three workshops with A A members in remote comers of the province to assess the concerns of rural villagers, and a concluding seminar in Kundiawa with officials and educated youth.
The resulting 'Green Book' report (Howlett et al. 1976) highlights social and
geographic inequalities and argues against large-scale agricultural projects and capital- intensive secondary industry. Rather, it advocates the development of small businesses using 'appropriate technology' wherever possible. After this document was presented
to the A A in November 1976 (with a Tokpisin summary a year later) a series of
seminars commenced in 1977 at which the report was explained by tertiary educated Simbu. The older AA members and national politicians resented being lectured by youths, and rejected the overall egalitarian thrust of the report. Some called the report 'the Chimbu Bible' and carried copies around as symbolic legitimating devices, but the AA lacked any commitment to it as a policy guide. The seminars concluded early as immediate political concerns took over with the creation of a provincial government
While the ANU/CPO team was working in Chimbu a women's organization coincidentally emerged which initially appeared to seek small scale, decentralized agricultural business and to meet the Green Book's recommendations. This was the
'Kuman Yangpela Didiman ' (E = Young Agronomists), a Chimbu-wide organization
which eventually comprised 21 constituent clubs, mostly led by the mature wives of leading rural figures. This body bore no resemblance to the Western Highlands-based,
and Lutheran church-inspired, movement using the same Tokpisin name, and in fact it