CREACIÓN Y PRIMEROS AÑOS

Is the new wave of legal indigenism creating a new model of the state (an intercultural state)? The new intercultural policies and legislation are confronted with a context of aggressive extractivism and social conflicts. It is therefore important to analyse with further details the tensions between the new legal indigenism and extractivist policies.

Colonialism allowed the emergence of extractivism and the Peruvian participation in the global economy through the exportation of Andean silver and the importing of European merchandise (Orihuela, 2012). After the silver boom, the guano international exportation cycle (1840s – 1870s) occupied its place in a context of the economic elite’s consolidation in the coast and indigenous peoples’ exclusion. This political economy generated unequal growth and political instability (Orihuela, 2012) reproduced in the following economic booms: the guano cycle was replaced by the rubber boom in the Amazon (1890 – 1920) and then again by mining and oil exploitation.

Through these stages Peru had maintained a small public sector and low industrialisation in a context of natural resources economic dependence, the political influence of foreign corporations and the power of the elite’s exporting oligarchy, which fostered liberal economic measures to facilitate the exportation of raw materials (Wise, 1994). This pattern was tried to change in the late sixties, when Peru joined the Latin American dependentista policy trend (see 4.2.1), and the military government of Velasco (1968–1975) promoted import substitution industrialisation, the nationalisation of industries and land reform (Orihuela, 2012). However, these policies were implemented through the generation of an enormous public debt and chaotic macroeconomic administration. Besides, in the seventies the oil shock generated a profound crisis in public finances which lasted until the eighties and was deepened by the first government of President Garcia (1985-1990) (Pastor and Wise, 1992; Wise, 1994; Alarco, 2010).

Fujimori’s election (1990) constituted the neoliberal turn in Peru, which was supported by economic elites, the technocracy, the military, and the international financial institutions (Mauceri, 1995; Arce, 2003). With the support of these actors, Fujimori

152 imposed an aggressive package of neoliberal reforms combined with political authoritarianism (Wise, 1994; Roberts, 1995; Mauceri, 1995). These reforms were based on the Washington Consensus and included the elimination of barriers for trade and investment, restriction to state intervention in the market and massive privatisation (Crabtree, 2000). Mining and hydrocarbons, in particular, were prioritised with a flexible tax regulation: the exemption of royalty payments and income tax for new mining operations until they had recovered their initial investments and tax-stability contracts (Orihuela, 2012; Arellano, 2011). The political justification for this aggressive neoliberal turn was the urgency of escaping from the economic and political disaster left by President García (hyperinflation and widespread terrorism) through the imposition of political and economic order.

President Toledo re-composed democracy in 2000 but his economic measures merely developed Fujimori’s neoliberalism (Haarstad and Fløysand, 2007). Toledo’s political banner was the benefits of the ‘trickle down’: everyone would gain from the natural outcomes of economic growth. Toledo’s policies achieved economic growth but in a very unequal way, generating no important decrease in poverty and unemployment figures (McClintock, 2006; Lee, 2010).

As explained in the last chapter, President García’s second period (2005 - 2011) reinforced the neoliberal project. The (questioned) official figures shows that economic growth increased and poverty rate decreased from 48% to 34% during his government (INEI, 2010), but social and political instability remained a fundamental problem. The first critique is that economic growth was achieved thanks to the increasing of minerals prices and China demand, which entails an unstable growth (Lee, 2010). Moreover, apart from the official figures, there are other figures that show the huge inequality of the country (See 1.3).

Furthermore, García’s government deepened extractive policies by strongly promoting extractive activities. During this period the number of social conflicts related to socio-environmental concerns increased considerably. What aspects of extractivism oppose local communities? Rent distribution, labour conditions, environmental degradation or something deeper? Let’s see briefly some of the most relevant social conflicts of the last years:

In Tambogrande (Piura), peasant’s grassroots organisations opposed a project developed by Manhattan Minerals (a Canadian company) in five years (1998–2003) with a cost above of US$60 million. The organisation claimed that agriculture (its main economic activity) would be displaced by the project, which would provide only few jobs in exchange for major ecological impacts (De Echave et al, 2009; Muradian et al, 2003;

Arce, 2008). The movement organised an unofficial local referendum and the result was that 93% voted against mining, and Manhattan was obliged to abandon the project (Bebbington and Williams, 2008).

In Cajamarca, Yanachocha mining has been developing mining projects in a context of social and environmental concerns (Arce, 2008; De Echave et al, 2009). One of the main conflicts was about the exploitation of the Quilish Hill. Peasant and local organisation demanded a stop to the operations because the project was threatening the water supply and agriculture. Yanacocha had to renounce exploitation of the Hill after five years of tense negotiations (Arellano, 2011; Palacios, 2009). Today, another mining

153 project of Yanacocha in Cajamarca (Conga) has been paralysed because of the local communities’ opposition.

In the case of Majaz Mining in Piura (today Río Blanco Copper S.A.), a lot of social conflicts emerged around a mining project located in the community of Yanta. The opposition of local people against the possibility to convert the rural zone of Piura into a mining district (De Echave et al, 2009), led to a situation in which comuneros were tortured by private security of the company and it had to compensate the victims in 2011 (Servindi, 2011).

In Apurimac the project Las Bambas involves conflicts around labour issues and compensation of comuneros displaced. The company Xstrata Copper has developed an ambitious relocation plan of the Fuerabamba’s community to relocate all the people (more than 1000) in five years. Recent tensions emerged not because of the opposition to the project (almost all were agreed) but because of the compensation and other economic promises of the company (Company representative interview 2, 13-05-13).

Xtrata mining also has developed the mining project Tintaya in Espinar - Cusco for many years, and local people’s claims seek to negotiate the social and environmental conditions of continuity of operations (De Echave et al, 2009). These two cases are understood as ‘conflicts of coexistence’ (Activist interview 7, 02-05-2013), in which mining activities have been already there, and people negotiate a new social contract with the company regarding economic, social and environmental terms. However, companies should not assume that consent cannot be rescinded when new concerns arise (Laplante and Spears, 2008), namely, conflicts that appear as manageable can later become problematic. For example, in the case of Tintaya in 2012 social unrest emerged because of the alleged contamination of the water and environment of the zone due to mining activities. The situation became problematic with governmental imposition of the state of exception, the imprisonment of local leaders and total grassroots opposition to the company.

The above mentioned conflicts are located in Andean regions where politics is articulated through peasant communities. However, the conflicts are very diverse. The controversies in Cerro Quilish and Tambogrande show that “some projects may never obtain community support, given the importance of certain sites to people’s identities, livelihoods and well-being” (Laplante and Spears, 2008: p. 115).

In that context, many authors propose a typology of conflicts. Arellano (2011) distinguishes three types of conflicts: 1) Anti-mining conflicts; 2) Conflicts to achieve power of negotiation on economic compensation and better labour opportunities; 3) Conflicts for canon minero¹⁴ led by local authorities and population. According to Arellano (2011), anti-mining or ‘all-or-nothing’ type conflicts are conflicts of resistance that occur when local people perceive that they do not need mining: they have their own social and economic arrangements and mining is likely to conflict directly with them.

These types of conflicts would be exceptional whereas redistributive conflicts would demonstrate that extraction is not the problem. Similarly, Tanaka identifies four patterns of conflicts: 1) the perception of incompatibility of economic activities and the way of life; 2) the access to private economic benefits (population claims compensation and benefits from companies); 3) the access to public resources (claims of acquiring more

14 Percentage of the total tax revenues derived from mining and that is distributed to local and regional governments in which mining is undertaken.

154 benefits from public revenues or canon); 4) the management of public goods and resources (disputes on the mode in which governments spend and administer public resources).

These different typologies have different emphasis regarding the rationale of social conflicts. However, for these and other authors even though social conflicts are plural, there is an absolute tendency that explains all social conflicts and the way to overcome the tensions is by reforming the extractive governance.

7.3.2. Theorising social conflict: Laws, institutions and hidden indigeneity