Crear Contenido Destacado

It was contended that the applicants lacked a sufficient interest in the matter and were at the “outer limits o f standing”.'^* Citing Wade'®^ to the effect that “the real question is whether the applicant can show some substantial default or abuse, and not whether personal rights or interests are involved”, Rose, L. J., pointed out that there were a number o f factors which, in combination, resulted in the applicants having a sufficient interest in the matter.' These factors were the importance o f vindicating the rule o f law, the importance o f the issue raised, the likely absence o f any other responsible challenger, the nature o f the breach o f duty against which relief is sought, and the prominent role o f these applicants in giving advice, guidance and assistance with regard to aid. ' " It is o f importance to note that in this case the court granted the petitioners the declaration sought.

World Development Movement is a case which has few parallels; it is a case that deals with pure public interest litigation. In other words, due to the public importance of the issues raised, the court was prepared to completely relax the rules o f standing. This is consistent with a trend developed in some countries, such as New Zealand, where the rules o f standing are dispensed with or relaxed when there is an important and significant public interest issue involved."^

at p. 619.

Wade, H. W. R. and Forsyth, C. P., Administrative Law [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 7^'’ edn., 1994], at p. 712.

His Lordship also referred to the “increasingly liberal approach to standing on the part o f the courts during the last 12 years” {supra., note 108).

supra., note 107, at p. 620.

"■ See, e.g., the New Zealand case of Finnigan v. New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc., [1985] 2 N. Z. L. R. 159, where the Court of Appeal held that the sufficiency o f an applicant’s interest had to judged in relation to the subject matter o f his application.

In the Equal Opportunities Commission^^^ the Commission and a Mrs Day, a part time worker, sought judicial review o f a statement made by the Secretary o f State for employment that a particular enactment’ was inconsistent with the European Community law on the equal treatment o f men and women by providing less favourable treatment in relation to unfair dismissal and redundancy to part-time workers, who were mostly women, and full-time workers, who were mostly m en.” ^ The appeal was allowed by the House o f Lords. Referring to the objections raised by the Secretary o f State regarding the locus standi o f the applicant, the House o f Lords expressed the view that the Equal Opportunities Commission had standing to apply for judicial review.

The above survey o f the applicable case law indicates that the English courts have greatly liberalized the rules o f standing in recent times so as to facilitate access to justice. This is particularly evident in public interest challenges. Thus it has been held by the courts that a parish council, which had not been named in a television programme, had a sufficiently direct interest to complain to the Broadcasting Complaints Commission about unjust or unequal treatment and had standing for the purpose (despite the fact that the application was refused on the merits of the case)."^ It has also been held that a prisoner, detained in Scotland, at the time o f filing the application, had locus standi to maintain an application for judicial review."^ In Leech the prisoner sought to challenge the validity

R. V. Secretary o f State fo r Employment, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission,

[1995] 1 A. C. I.

Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.

The applications were refused by the Divisional Court, [1992] C. O. D. 112, and by the Court o f Appeal, [1993] C. O. D. 117.

R. V. Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex parte Channel Four Television

Corporation, [1995] C. O. D. 289, at p. 290.

o f prison rules which permitted prison officers to read and stop correspondence between the prisoner and his solicitor. Standing was readily accorded due to the wider public interest implications o f the case.

It should be noted, however, that English courts are inclined to deny representative standing to a body which lacks a corporate personality if it seeks to maintain an application for judicial review in its own nam e.''* The Court o f Appeal has also expressed the view that the question o f locus standi goes to the jurisdiction o f the court.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the English courts have demonstrated a clear desire and willingness, in recent times, to significantly expand the rules o f standing so as to facilitate public interest challenges in respect o f unlawful administrative action. It should be noted that despite the fact that relief has been denied, in some cases, on a review o f the merits o f the case, standing has been accorded due to the fact that the sufficient interest criterion has been satisfied. This trend augurs well for democracy, liberty and for the supremacy accorded to the rule o f law. It is submitted that the liberalization o f the rules o f standing is indicative o f an expansion o f the frontiers o f rights consciousness in that society because it seeks to vindicate the fundamental right o f access to a competent court or tribunal.

See, e.g., R. v. Darlington Borough Council, ex parte Association o f Darlington Taxi Owners, [1994] C. O. D. 424.

VL

Locus Standi in Australia and Canada.